Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University

Schulich Law Scholars
Reports & Public Policy Documents

Faculty Scholarship

11-15-2011

End-of-Life Decision-Making in Canada: The Report by the
RoyalSociety of Canada Expert Panel on End-of-Life DecisionMaking
Udo Schüklenk
Johannes J. M. Van Delden
Jocelyn Downie
Sheila A. M. McLean
Ross Upshur

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/reports
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Authors
Udo Schüklenk, Johannes J. M. Van Delden, Jocelyn Downie, Sheila A. M. McLean, Ross Upshur, and
Daniel Weinstock

Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702 (print); 1467-8519 (online)
Volume 25 Number S1 2011 pp 1–73

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2011.01939.x

End-of-Life Decision-Making in Canada: The Report by the Royal
Society of Canada Expert Panel on End-of-Life Decision-Making
bioe_1939

1..73

UDO SCHÜKLENK, JOHANNES J. M. VAN DELDEN, JOCELYN DOWNIE,
SHEILA A. M. MCLEAN, ROSS UPSHUR AND DANIEL WEINSTOCK

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1.
2.
3.

Introductory Remarks and Objectives
Terminology
Outline

CHAPTER ONE: END-OF-LIFE CARE IN CANADA
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.

Introduction
Canadian Experience at the End of Life
a. Mortality and Life Expectancy Trends in Canada
b. Location of Death
c. Quality of and Access to Palliative Care
Expanding the Range of Palliative Care
a. Dementia
b. Chronic Kidney Disease
c. Congestive Heart Failure
d. Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease
e. Disability
Demographic Transition in Canada
a. Aging
b. Diversity
c. First Nations
Advance Directives and Substitute Decision-Making
Sedation Practices
Paediatric End of Life Care
Attitudes of Canadians Toward Voluntary Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide
a. General Public
b. Health Care Professionals
c. Patients
International Comparisons
Conclusions

Address for correspondence: Prof. Udo Schüklenk, Department of Philosophy, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario K7l 2G3, Canada. E-mail:
udo.schuklenk@gmail.com
Conflict of interest statement: No conflicts declared
Re-use of this article is permitted in accordance with the Terms and Conditions set out at http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/onlineopen#
OnlineOpen_Terms
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

2

Udo Schüklenk et al.

CHAPTER TWO: THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Introduction
Withholding and Withdrawal of Potentially Life-sustaining Treatment
a. Relatively Clear and Uncontroversial
b. Less Clear and More Controversial
c. Very Unclear and Very Controversial
Potentially Life-shortening Symptom Relief
a. Somewhat Clear and Relatively Uncontroversial
Terminal Sedation
a. Very Unclear and Potentially Very Controversial
Assisted Suicide
a. Very Clear and Very Controversial
Voluntary Euthanasia
a. Very Clear and Very Controversial
Conclusions

CHAPTER THREE: THE ETHICS OF END-OF-LIFE CARE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Introduction
Core Values
Autonomy
Moral and Legal Rights
Autonomy and Assisted Death
Limits to the Right to Medically Assisted Death
a. No Inference from the Right to Refuse Treatment to the Right to Assisted Death
b. A Priori Arguments: Suicide is not Choice-worthy
c. A Priori Arguments: Suicide Offends against Human Dignity
7. Arguments against the Legal Right to Assisted Death
a. Medical Professionals
b. Slippery Slopes and the Protection of the Vulnerable
8. Conclusions

CHAPTER FOUR: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH LAWS ON ASSISTED DYING
1.
2.

3.

Introduction
Mechanisms for Change to Law and/or Practice
a. Judicial Decisions (Netherlands, Montana)
b. Prosecutorial Charging Guidelines (Netherlands, United Kingdom)
c. New or Revised Laws
i. The Netherlands
ii. Belgium
iii. Luxemburg
iv. Oregon
v. Washington State
d. Evolution of Practice Without Legal Change (Switzerland)
Elements of Regulated Permissive Regimes

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

End-of-Life Decision-Making in Canada
4.

5.

Practical Experience
a. Data on Voluntary Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide
i. Netherlands
ii. Belgium
iii. Switzerland
iv. Oregon
v. Washington State
b. Slippery Slopes?
Conclusions

CHAPTER FIVE: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Introduction
Withholding and Withdrawal of Potentially Life-sustaining Treatment
a. Valid Refusals by Competent Adults (or Legally Authorized Substitute Decision-makers)
b. Mature Minors
c. Unilateral Withholding and Withdrawal
Advance Directives
Palliative Care
Potentially Life-shortening Symptom Relief
Terminal Sedation
Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia
a. Legal Mechanisms
i. Criminal Code Reform
ii. Prosecutorial Charging Guidelines
iii. Diversion Programs
b. Core Elements
i. Assisted Suicide and/or Voluntary Euthanasia
ii. Features of the Person
iii. Features of the Decision
iv. Features of the Person’s Condition
v. Features of the Request for Assistance
vi. Features of the Provider
vii. Oversight and Control

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

3

4

Keywords
Canada,
Royal Society report,
end-of-life,
quality of life,
assisted dying,
palliative care,
death

Udo Schüklenk et al.

ABSTRACT
This report on end-of-life decision-making in Canada was produced by
an international expert panel and commissioned by the Royal Society of
Canada. It consists of five chapters.
Chapter 1 reviews what is known about end-of-life care and opinions
about assisted dying in Canada.
Chapter 2 reviews the legal status quo in Canada with regard to various
forms of assisted death.
Chapter 3 reviews ethical issues pertaining to assisted death. The analysis is grounded in core values central to Canada’s constitutional order.
Chapter 4 reviews the experiences had in a number of jurisdictions that
have decriminalized or recently reviewed assisted dying in some shape or
form.
Chapter 5 provides recommendations with regard to the provision of
palliative care in Canada, as well as recommendations for reform with
respect to the various forms of assisted death covered in this document.

INTRODUCTION
1. Introductory Remarks and Objectives
The last comprehensive federal public policy report on
assisted death in Canada was published 15 years ago.1
Since then much has taken place in this area. Advance
directives legislation has been introduced and reformed in
a number of provinces and territories.2 A substantial
number of court cases have involved various aspects of
assisted death. A number of these high-profile cases have
captured public attention and been reported extensively
in the national press; the names of Nancy Morrison,
Samuel Golubchuk, Robert Latimer and Evelyn Martens
are but a few examples known to many Canadians
because of their connections to these widely reported,
high-profile end-of-life cases.3 Beyond our borders,
assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia is now legal in at
least seven jurisdictions. They are the Netherlands,
1

Canada, Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted
Suicide, Of Life and Death – Final Report (Ottawa: Special Senate
Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 1995), online: Senate of
Canada
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/351/euth/
rep/lad-e.htm>.[Accessed 2 August 2011].
2
An example of a new law is the Prince Edward Island Consent to
Treatment and Health Care Directives Act, R.S. P.E.I. 1998, c. C-17.2
(proclaimed 2000) and an example of recent law reform with respect to
advance directives is the Nova Scotia Personal Directives Act, S.N.S.
2008, c.8 and Personal Directives Regulations, N.S. Reg.31/2010.
3
R. v. Morrison, [1998] N.S.J. No. 75, R. v. Morrison, [1998] N.S.J. No.
441; Golubchuk v. Salvation Army Grace General Hospital, [2008] M.J.
54, 2008 MBQB 49; R. v. Latimer, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217; http://
www.cbc.ca/fifth/givedeathahand/life.html. [Accessed 26 July 2011].

Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Oregon, Washington
State, and Montana.4 In addition, prosecution policy in
England and Wales has been clarified to make it clear
that not all instances of assisted suicide will result in
prosecution.5
Despite all this activity, three very important features
of the landscape have not changed. First, public support
for the decriminalization of assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia remains high (a substantial majority
of Canadians support the decriminalization of assisted
dying). Second, the issue of decriminalization remains
very contentious and polarized. Third, regardless of this
support and no doubt in part because of this contentiousness, assisted suicide and euthanasia remain prohibited
activities under the Criminal Code of Canada.6

4

Netherlands, Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide
(Review Procedures) Act, online: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs –
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs <http://www.healthlaw.nl/
wtlovhz_eng.pdf> [Accessed 3 August 2011]; Belgium, The Belgian Act
on Euthanasia of May 28th, 2002, trans. by Dale Kidd, online: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Centre for Biomedical Ethics and Law <http://
www.kuleuven.ac.be/cbmer/page.php?LAN=E&FILE=subject&ID=
53&PAGE=1>; [Accessed 26 July 2011]; Switzerland, Criminal Code of
the Swiss Confederation, art. 115, online: Legislationline <http://www.
legislationline.org/legislations.php?jid=49&ltid=15>; [Accessed 26 July
2011].Oregon, The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 127 O.R.S. § 800 at
§§ 805, 810, 815, 825, 830, 835, 840 (2007); Washington, The Washington
Death with Dignity Act, Ch.70.245 RCW; Montana, Baxter v. State of
Montana, Montana First Judicial District Court December 2008 and
Supreme Court of Montana, 2009 MT449.
5
Details of this policy can be found at http://www.cps.gov.uk/
publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide.html [Accessed 26 July 2011].
6
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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It is, therefore, an apt time to revisit the public policy
questions surrounding assisted death, in the light of
new evidence and arguments. In 1995, a majority of the
Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted
Suicide recommended continuing to treat euthanasia as
murder (albeit with a lesser penalty), and the assisted
suicide provision in the Criminal Code.7 Would a careful
consideration of these issues in 2010 come to the same
conclusions?
In order to address this question, and to both catalyze
and contribute to a process of public reflection on these
critically important public policy issues, the Royal
Society of Canada established the Expert Panel on End of
Life Decision-Making (RSC EOL Panel) with the following objectives:
1. There is a large body of medical science evidence
that, if summarized for the public, would be helpful
to their consideration of the issue.
2. The public could also benefit from a presentation of
evidence about actual experience from the various
jurisdictions that permit physician-assisted death.
3. The public would also benefit greatly from having a
careful, balanced review of various pros and cons of
decriminalization of physician-assisted death from
well-reasoned ethical and legal standpoints.
4. Many medical personnel would also benefit from
having all the issues laid out in a comprehensive and
sensitive way.
5. The Panel should consider proposing policy recommendations for public consideration that are the
results of its review.
The members of the RSC EOL Panel were experts in the
following areas relevant to the issues the Panel was tasked
to address: bioethics, clinical medicine, health law and
policy, and philosophy.
The members of the Panel met in person and conducted business via e-mail and phone. Panel members
brought their own expertise and experience to the project
and additional research was conducted as required.
Drafts were circulated and edited through a collaborative
and iterative process.
This document presents the unanimous Final Report
of the RSC EOL Panel. The Panel trusts that it will serve
as a marker for the beginning of a new conversation
about end-of-life law, policy, and practice in Canada. The
Panel notes that the conversation will require mutual
attention and respect and acknowledges the many important interests at stake and values in play. Passions run
deep in discussions about end-of-life matters. However,
7

Canada, Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted
Suicide, Of Life and Death – Final Report (Ottawa: Special Senate
Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 1995), online: Senate
of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/351/euth/
rep/lad-e.htm>. [Accessed 2 August 2011].
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even in the face of profound disagreements (about, for
example, the values of autonomy and life), it is possible –
and indeed necessary – for those involved in the conversation to listen carefully to all positions presented and to
work together to find a policy position consistent with the
core features of Canada’s parliamentary democracy and
our Charter of Rights and Freedoms.8 The Panel hopes
that, through this conversation, all stakeholders will find
common ground to respond better to the wishes and
needs of Canadians at the end of their lives.

2. Terminology9
It is particularly important to define the terms employed
in discussions about assisted death. Frequently people
discuss these issues at cross-purposes, using the same
term to describe different practices or using different
terms to describe the same practice. This often leads to
unnecessary and unproductive confusion and conflict. As
there are, by necessity, no objectively true definitions of
the terms needed to discuss assisted death, the Panel
stipulates the following definitions for the purposes of
this Report:
•

‘Withholding of potentially life-sustaining treatment’ is
the failure to start treatment that has the potential to
sustain a person’s life. An example is not providing
cardiopulmonary resuscitation to a person having a
cardiac arrest.

• ‘Withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining treatment’ is
stopping treatment that has the potential to sustain
a person’s life. An example is the removal of a ventilator from a patient with a devastatingly severe head
injury after a motorcycle accident with no prospect of
improvement.
• ‘Advance directives’ are directions given by a competent individual concerning what and/or how and/or
by whom decisions should be made in the event that,
at some time in the future, the individual becomes
incompetent to make healthcare decisions. An
example is a woman who has signed a document that
states that, should she fall into a persistent vegetative
state, she does not wish to receive artificial hydration
or nutrition. Or, as another example, a man who
has signed a document that states that, when he is
8
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11.
9
These definitions are drawn (and sometimes modified) from Dying
Justice: A Case for Decriminalizing Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in
Canada.Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004 at 6–7 and Canada,
Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, Of Life
and Death – Final Report (Ottawa: Special Senate Committee on
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 1995), online: Senate of Canada
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/351/euth/rep/lad-e.
htm>. [Accessed 2 August 2011].
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incompetent, he wishes his wife to make all healthcare
decisions on his behalf. There are two kinds of
advance directives: instruction directives, which establish what and/or how healthcare decisions are to be
made; and proxy directives, which establish who is to
make healthcare decisions.

•

•

‘Potentially life-shortening symptom relief ’ is sufferingcontrol medication given in amounts that may – but
are not certain to – shorten a person’s life. An example
is giving ever-increasing levels of morphine necessary
to control an individual’s suffering from terminal
cancer when the morphine is known to potentially
depress respiration even to the point of causing death
(but it is not known precisely how much is too much
as the levels are slowly increased).

• ‘Non-voluntary’ means without the knowledge of the
wishes expressed by a competent person or through a
valid advance directive.
•

‘Involuntary’ means against the wishes expressed
by a competent person or through a valid advance
directive.

•

‘Assisted dying’ is an umbrella term used to describe
the full spectrum of conduct defined above that contributes to the death of an individual.

3. Outline
This Report proceeds as follows:
•

First, the Panel describes what is known about social
attitudes and practices with respect to the full spectrum of end-of-life care in Canada. The Panel considers: the Canadian experience at the end of life with
respect to mortality and life expectancy, location
of death, and quality of and access to palliative care;
expanding the range of palliative care beyond cancer;
demographic transition in Canada with respect to
aging and cultural and ethnic diversity; sedation practices; and paediatric end-of-life care. The Panel also
considers practices with respect to substitute decisionmaking for those who have never been or are no
longer capable of making their own health care decisions. This section ends with a review of survey results
of the attitudes to end-of-life issues among health professionals and the public in Canada and abroad.

•

Second, the Panel presents an overview of the legal
status of all of the various forms of assisted death
in Canada. The law is relatively clear and uncontroversial with respect to the withholding and withdrawal of
potentially life-sustaining treatment in some circumstances (for example, competent adults), but unclear
and controversial in others (such as withholding or
withdrawal from mature minors and unilateral withholding and withdrawal). The law is insufficiently
clear, but relatively uncontroversial, with respect to
potentially life-shortening symptom relief. It is unclear
and controversial with respect to terminal sedation.
And, finally, the law is clear and very controversial with
respect to assisted suicide and euthanasia.

•

Third, the Panel turns its attention to the ethics of
assisted death. It grounds the subsequent analysis in
core values central to Canada’s constitutional order,
explores ways in which legal rights can be argued for,
and shows how autonomy (the principal core value)
can best be protected through legal rights. Applying
this to the issues of assisted suicide and euthanasia,
it concludes that there is a strong argument for a moral
right to choose euthanasia and assisted suicide and that

‘Palliative sedation’ is an umbrella term used to
explain intermittent and continuous as well as superficial and deep sedation. The most contested subtype
of palliative sedation is known as ‘terminal sedation’.

• ‘Terminal sedation’ is potentially life-shortening deep
and continuous sedation intentionally combined with
the cessation of nutrition and hydration.
•

‘Assisted suicide’ is the act of intentionally killing
oneself with the assistance of another. An example is a
woman with advanced ALS who gets a prescription
from her physician for barbiturates and uses the drugs
to kill herself.

•

‘Voluntary Euthanasia’ is an act undertaken by one
person to kill another person whose life is no longer
worth living to them in accordance with the wishes of
that person. An example is a man bedridden with
many of the consequences of a massive stroke whose
physician, at his request, gives him a lethal injection of
barbiturates and muscle relaxants.

•

‘Unilateral’ means without the knowledge of or –
less commonly – against the wishes of the patient or
patient’s substitute decision-maker. An example is a
physician who writes a Do Not Resuscitate order on a
patient’s chart without consulting the patient or the
patient’s substitute decision-maker.

•

‘Competent’ means capable of understanding and
appreciating the relevant information and the nature
and consequences of the decision to be made. It is
important to note that competence is decision-, time-,
and place-specific and that individuals may be competent for one decision (such as what to eat and drink)
and not another (such as whether to refuse surgery)
and may be competent one day and not the next.

•

‘Voluntary’ means in accordance with the wishes
expressed by a competent person or through a valid
advance directive.

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

7

End-of-Life Decision-Making in Canada
the arguments others have proposed to support limiting these rights are flawed. The Panel considers arguments concerning autonomy and dignity. The Panel
also engages with a number of arguments that have
been particularly enduring in this area: for example,
the distinction between deliberately killing and letting
die; the doctrine of double-effect (also known as the
intention-foresight distinction); and arguments about
slippery slopes. A number of myths and logical errors
commonly found in the literature and public debate on
these topics are exposed in this chapter.
•

•

Fourth, having concluded that, on ethical grounds,
Canada should have a permissive yet carefully regulated and monitored system with respect to assisted
death, the Panel turns its attention to the question of
how to achieve such a system. To assist with answering that question, the Panel describes the regulation of
assisted death in those jurisdictions in the world where
assisted suicide and/or voluntary euthanasia have, to
some extent and by various means, become more permissible (whether by legislative changes such as in
Oregon, or changes in prosecution policy such as
in England and Wales). The experiences in the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Oregon,
Washington State, and Montana, are reviewed with a
particular focus on how permissive systems have been
designed – what legal mechanisms have been used and
what positions have been taken on key decision points
within permissive regimes – and what has happened
following the introduction of a permissive system.
Fifth and finally, the Panel provides recommendations
with regard to the provision of palliative care in
Canada, as well as recommendations for reform with
respect to the various forms of assisted death canvassed in the Report. These recommendations are
based on the critical foundation laid in the preceding
four chapters. The recommendations, of necessity,
are directed at a range of agents, since the jurisdiction
over these activities is dispersed among different levels
of government and sectors.

A review of the national press over the past eighteen
months reveals how topical the issue of assisted death is
in Canadian culture. In the Spring of 2011, three cases
were filed in British Columbia each, in effect albeit via
different paths, challenging the Criminal Code prohibitions against assisted suicide and euthanasia.10 On June 8,
2010, a major report was issued by Senator Sharon
10
Russel Ogden, Erling Christensen, Laurence Cattoire, John Lowman
and Paul Zollman on behalf of the Farewell Foundation for the Right
to Die v. Attorney General of Canada (April 8, 2011); Russel Ogden,
Erling Christensen, Laurence Cattoire, John Lowman and Paul
Zollman on behalf of the Farewell Foundation for the Right to Die v.
British Columbia Registrar of Companies (April 8, 2011); Lee Carter,

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Carstairs revealing ongoing problems with access to
quality palliative care for Canadians.11 On April 21, 2010,
the latest in a long string of private members’ bills
to decriminalize assisted suicide and euthanasia was
defeated in the House of Commons,12 despite a 2010 poll
indicating that a majority of Canadians support the legalization of euthanasia.13 In the Spring of 2010, a nonpartisan Committee of the Quebec National Assembly
studied the issues and launched a public consultation
process.14 These are strong indications that Canadians
are, and should be, engaged in a process of deliberation
over the legal status of assisted death in Canada. The
Panel offers this Report as its contribution to this important public policy debate.

CHAPTER ONE: END-OF-LIFE
CARE IN CANADA
bioe_1939_2
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1. INTRODUCTION
The spectrum of issues associated with end of life – such
as advance-care planning, assisted suicide and euthanasia
– are matters of great public interest and concern. Determining the relative merits of various policy and legislative
options depends as much upon a detailed understanding
of current social attitudes and contemporary realities
of death and dying in Canada as it depends upon legal
and philosophical analysis. For an informed discussion of
assisted suicide and euthanasia as last-resort interventions, it is important to understand current epidemiological, clinical and policy forces that can influence the need
or desire to access these modalities at the end of life.
End of life can be understood as a continuum of events
starting with the diagnosis of one or more serious illnesses
or injury. Each of these conditions has a trajectory, some
more predictable than others. The range of illnesses relevant to end-of-life decision-making is broad; this range
encompasses the leading causes of death in the population such as cardiovascular disease, pulmonary disease
and cancer. There are many transitions in health status
on the path from diagnosis to treatment and, finally,
death. Understanding how this process works and how
Hollis Johnson, Dr. William Shoichet, and the British Columbia Civil
Liberties Association v. Attorney General of Canada (April 26, 2011).
11
http://sen.parl.gc.ca/scarstairs/PalliativeCare/PalliativeCare_e.asp.
[Accessed 26 July 2011].
12
Bill C-384, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (right to die with
dignity), first reading May 13, 2009, defeated April 21, 2010.
13
Two-thirds of Canadians express support for legalizing euthanasia.
Angus Reid Global Monitor: Montreal; Feb 2010. http://www.angusreid.com/. [Accessed 26 July 2011]. ref
14
Assemblée Nationale Québec, Dying With Dignity, Consultation
document (May 2010).
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well it is managed in Canada will help to set the context
for the consideration of the legal and ethical issues that
attend decisions at the end of life. Facts inform the law
and ethics, but they do not determine them.
There is good reason to be concerned with the state of
end-of-life care in Canada. Canada ranked in the top 10
in a recent report from the Economist Intelligence Unit
comparing the quality of death in 40 countries. Canada
scored well for quality of end-of-life care and access to
opiates for pain control. However, it was in the middle of
the pack in terms of public awareness of end-of-life care
and scored poorly in terms of costs. The report states that
the ‘medicalization of death in Canada has engendered a
culture where many people are afraid to raise the topic
of death.’15
This chapter comprises several sections, including an
examination of how and where Canadians are dying, as
well as the changing demographic landscape (specifically
an aging and increasingly diverse population and exponential growth in chronic diseases relevant to end-of-life
discussions). This chapter includes a survey of research
and policy literature to identify important considerations
in the provision of quality end-of-life care. Several
elements of quality end-of-life care are important
here, including both access to palliative care services
to mitigate/ manage symptoms and provide comfort to
the dying, and the use of advance directives to ensure that
treatment wishes at the end of life are respected when an
individual is no longer competent to make decisions, or is
incapable of expressing wishes. In this chapter, Canadian
attitudes towards assisted suicide and euthanasia are
examined and compared with other nations.
The research in this section is drawn from the academic
literature and relevant non-academic sources such as government reports. Preference is given to Canadian reports,
data sources and published studies. Systematic reviews
of both relevant literature and recently published international studies are also included.

2. CANADIAN EXPERIENCE AT
THE END OF LIFE
a. Mortality and Life Expectancy
Trends in Canada
The latest data for deaths in Canada is from the Statistics
Canada report Deaths 2007 released on 23 February
2010. This report highlights significant changes in life
expectancy in Canada. Essentially, the most important
gain in the decade from 1995–97 to 2005–07 is an increase
of 2.3 years in life expectancy at birth. This gain was

higher among men; male life expectancy at birth rose by
2.9 years in this time frame; for women it increased by
only 1.8 years. Most significantly, life expectancy at age
65 is 19.8 years – meaning that a person at the age of 65
in 2007 has a life expectancy of about age 85. This is an
indication that Canadians are living longer, as increased
life expectancy of those at age 65 accounts for 70% of the
total increase in life expectancy at birth.
In 2007 there were 235,217 deaths, representing a
3.1% increase from the previous year. However the agestandardized death rate of seven deaths per 1,000
members of the population remained stable. In general,
the mortality rate is higher in men than women. The
mortality rate per 1,000 members of the population has a
J-shaped curve. The death rate per 1,000 members of the
population is 5.1 per 1,000 people under one year of age.
However, for those aged between one to four, and 35 to
39, the death rate per 1,000 members of the population is
under one per 1,000. The death rate generally tends to
increase dramatically after age 60. The mortality rates per
1,000 members of the population in 2007 were: 8.2 per
1,000 of those aged 60–64; 13.3 for those aged 65–69; 21.4
for those aged 70–74; 34.9 for those aged 75–79; 58.4 for
those aged 80–84; 100.6 for those aged 85–89; and 196.5
for those 90 years and over. This indicates clearly that the
vast majority of deaths occur in advanced age groups.
Among the top 10 leading causes of death in 2007,
chronic diseases predominate. Cancer, cardio/cerebrovascular diseases, and chronic lower respiratory diseases
account for 62% of deaths in Canada. Alzheimer’s disease
and kidney disease are also important causes of death.

b. Location of Death
Research suggests that most Canadians desire to die at
home. Studies conducted on locations of death over the
past decade have shown some trends in that direction;
however, the vast proportion of deaths – particularly
those associated with chronic diseases – occur in institutional settings. Statistics Canada data indicate that 68.6%
of Canadians die in a hospital and 31.4% die elsewhere.
There is, however, considerable variance across Canada.
Quebec and Manitoba have the highest rates of death in
hospital at 86% and British Columbia has the lowest at
49.5%.
Wilson and colleagues studied 1,806,318 deaths
from 1994–2004 across Canada (excluding Quebec).16 A
decline in hospitalized deaths was found (77.7% dropped
to 60.6%). These authors noted that this decline did
not vary by age, gender, marital status, or whether the
deceased lived in an urban or rural locale. Heyland and
16

15

Economist Intelligence Unit. The quality of death: Ranking end of life
care across the world 2010. Economist, London, 2010, 20.

Wilson DM, Truman CD, Thomas R, Fainsinger R, Kovacs-Burns
K, Froggatt K, et al. The rapidly changing location of death in Canada,
1994–2004. Social Science and Medicine. 2009 May; 68 (10): 1752–8.

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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colleagues note that the majority of deaths in Canada
occur in hospitals with a substantial proportion
occurring in special care units. They argue that this
phenomenon raises questions about the appropriateness
and quality of current end-of-life care practices in
Canada.17

in a ten-year report on the progress towards reaching
their goals, they note that, despite some success, most
Canadians still do not have access to palliative care
services. They state:
In 2007, the federal government disbanded the Endof-Life Care Secretariat and stopped work on the
national palliative and end-of-life care strategy.
Although palliative and end-of-life care have been
included in other national strategies, such as the
cancer, heart health and HIV/AIDS strategies, few
specific steps have been taken to enhance services for
people who are dying or to support their caregivers.21

c. Quality of and Access to Palliative Care
The Panel’s review of the literature indicates that most
Canadians die principally of old age and progressive ill
health. It is estimated that 95% of deaths would benefit
from palliative care, yet as many as 70% of Canadians
lack access because hospice and palliative care programs
are unevenly distributed across Canada. Thus, concerns
are expressed about uncoordinated and poor quality endof-life care, a point that recurs in the literature over the
past decade.18
As Chochinov and Kristjanson note, there will be an
approximate doubling in the number of seniors in the
next 20 years, largely driven by the baby boom, which
exacerbates the need for discussion of end of life issues.19
They conclude that costs at the end of life are considerable and that costs of care are highest the greater the
distance from the home setting. It should be noted that
family costs at the end of life are substantial and are often
not factored into cost analyses. Also, some treatments
given to dying patients are costly while yielding little
benefit. There are few financial supports for families to
take leave from work to assist in end-of-life care. Indeed
the Carstairs report identified several mechanisms to
reduce the financial burden of end-of-life care and facilitate family involvement in that care. Teno and colleagues,
in a study published in the Journal of the American Medicine Association in 2004, indicate that there are considerable unmet needs for symptom amelioration, physician
communication, and psychosocial support for dying individuals and their family members.20 Those who receive
palliative care services at home are more likely to report
a favourable dying experience.
In 2000, the Quality End-of-Life Care Coalition of
Canada released an action blueprint to ensure access to
high-quality palliative care for all Canadians. However,
17
Heyland DK, Lavery JV, Tranmer JE, Shortt SE, and Taylor SJ.
Dying in Canada: is it an institutionalized, technologically supported
experience? Journal of Palliative Care. 2000; 16 (suppl):S10–6.
18
Carstairs, Sharon Sen. Raising the Bar: A Roadmap for the Future
of Palliative Care in Canada. The Senate of Canada, Ottawa ON,
2010. Available at: http://sen.parl.gc.ca/scarstairs/PalliativeCare/
RaisingtheBarRecommendations_e.asp [Accessed 26 July 2011].
19
Chochinov HM, Kristjanson LJ. Dying to pay: the cost of end-of-life
care. Palliative Care. 1998; 1:5–15.
20
Teno JM, Clarridge BR, Casey V, Welch LC, Wetle T, Shield R, and
Mor V. Family perspectives on end-of-life care at the last place of care.
Journal of the American Medical Association. 2004 Jan 7; 291(1):88–93.
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3. EXPANDING THE RANGE OF
PALLIATIVE CARE
Historically, end-of-life decision-making and considerations of palliative care centred on the management of
end-stage cancer and the treatment of associated pain. An
aging population and the increase of chronic diseases have
expanded the need for end-of-life planning and palliative
care for a broader range of conditions. Four chronic
diseases pose particular challenges for end-of-life care.
They are dementia, kidney disease, heart disease (particularly chronic congestive heart failure), and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease. Recent Canadian studies
have noted significant unmet needs in patients with these
diseases and identified opportunities for improving care,
as well as noting the need for further research.

a. Dementia
Dementia and cognitive impairment raise particular
challenges for end-of-life care. Canadians are developing
dementia at such a rapid rate that dealing with the problem
will cost a total of more than C$870 billion ($835 billion)
over the next 30 years. The Alzheimer Society of Canada
states that more than 103,700 people developed dementia
in 2008 in Canada, a country of around 33 million.22 By
2038, 257,800 new cases per year are expected.
Dementia poses unique ethical challenges at the end of
life, as cognitive impairment often negates the capacity of
individuals to make and express autonomous choices.
Preferences expressed when competent may change as
21

Quality End-of Life Care Coalition of Canada, 10 years later: a
progress report on the Blueprint for Action 2000. Quality End-of
Life Care Coalition of Canada, Ottawa ON (2000). Available from:
http://www.cfpc.ca/projectassets/templates/resource.aspx?id=1176&
langType=4105 [Accessed 2 August 2011].
22
Alzheimers Society of Canada 2010. Rising Tide: The Impact of
Dementia in Canada. Alzheimers Society of Canada, Ottawa ON, 2010.
Available from: http://www.alzheimer.ca/english/rising_tide/rising_
tide_summary.htm [Accessed 26 July 2011].
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cognition declines, giving rise to complexities with
regards to ascertaining what the true preference for care
may be. The UK based Nuffield Council on Bioethics
produced a comprehensive report on ethical issues
surrounding dementia.23 The report, based on extensive
public consultation, provides a comprehensive overview
of the many ethical issues raised by the provision of
dementia care including a comprehensive discussion
of palliative care and end-of-life decision-making. The
Council notes that patients with dementia are less likely
to be offered palliative care services compared to those
without dementia.
In comparison to the UK, there is a relative lack of
research on the perspectives of Canadian patients with
dementia toward end-of-life care. This is a concern, given
the rapid rise of this disease in the aging population and
the corresponding need to equip healthcare practitioners
to manage these patients’ unique and complex needs
as the disease progresses to terminal status. A lack of
adequate training and education in palliative care (in
general and specifically related to patients with dementia)
across various healthcare disciplines is a constant theme
in the palliative care literature.24 Research on caregivers
of dementia patients is more widely available, and focuses
especially on the burdens – emotional, physical, psychological, and financial –associated with caring for these
patients. In a recent survey of Canadian caregivers of
patients with Alzheimer’s disease and other dementiarelated diseases, respondents reported negative effects on
emotional health including: increased depression; stress
and fatigue; stress on finances; and stress on their work
situation, including being forced to retire early or reduce
work hours.25 This survey also reports that the greatest
burden is placed on live-in caregivers versus those who do
not live with the patients.26 Canadian nurses in a longterm care setting have reported other factors in caring
for dying patients with dementia that complicate care
management. For example, the patient’s inability to recognize his or her own terminal decline, the difficulty
in predicting the disease trajectory, and dealing with
the ‘responsive, self-protective behaviour’ of the patients

23
Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2009, Dementia: The ethical issues.
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, London, UK, 2009. Available from:
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/Dementia_Report_for
_web.pdf Nuffield Council on Bioethics [Accessed 26 July 2011].
24
Roger KS. A literature review of palliative care, end of life, and
dementia. Palliative Support Care. 2006 Sept; 4(3):295–303.
25
Black SE, Gauthier S, Dalziel W, Keren R, Correia J, Hew H, et al.
Canadian Alzheimer’s disease caregiver survey: baby-boomer caregivers and burden of care. International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry.
2010 Aug; 25(8):807–813.
26
Black SE, Gauthier S, Dalziel W, Keren R, Correia J, Hew H, et al.
Canadian Alzheimer’s disease caregiver survey: baby-boomer caregivers and burden of care. International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry.
2010 Aug; 25(8):807–813

while trying to comfort them.27 These findings suggest the
need for interventions to help address the pressures on
caregivers of patients with dementia and the challenges in
managing their care.

b. Chronic Kidney Disease
Chronic kidney disease is another key cause of mortality in Canada. Davison evaluated the preferences of
patients with chronic kidney disease (CKD) related to
end-of-life care.28 She notes that little research has been
conducted to assess patients’ preferences, in spite of
the high mortality rate in this patient population. Her
survey of 584 CKD cases shows that participants rely on
the nephrology staff for extensive end-of-life care needs
not currently systematically integrated into their renal
care, such as pain and symptom management, advancedcare planning, and psychosocial and spiritual support.
Additionally, patients report poor knowledge of their
options with respect to palliative care as well as their
illness trajectory. Only a small minority of patients
(10%) said they had had a discussion about end-of-life
care with their nephrologist during the past 12 months.
Significantly, 61% of patients say they regretted their
decision to start dialysis. Davison concludes that the
needs of patients with CKD are not met by existing endof-life practices.

c. Congestive Heart Failure
A substantial number of deaths occur each year from
cardiovascular disease (CVD). In their recent study,
Howlett et al. note that the current model of care focuses
on acute exacerbations; a comprehensive approach to
managing the inevitable death that ensues from cardiovascular disease does not exist.29 They advocate the need
for a comprehensive strategy which would incorporate
end-of-life planning and care; this would foster earlier
and more integrated comprehensive care. The key elements of this strategy involve the provision of advancecare planning, palliative care, hospice care and advance
directives, with a focus on decision making and planning.
Howlett and colleagues argue that end-of-life planning
and care should be a routine part of the assessment of any
patient with CVD, and should be reassessed whenever
27
Kaasalainen S, Brazil K, Ploeg J, Martin LS. Nurses’ perceptions
around providing palliative care for long-term care residents with
dementia. Journal of Palliative Care. 2007 Autumn; 23(3):173–80.
28
Davison SN. End-of-life care preferences and needs: perceptions of
patients with chronic kidney disease. Clinical Journal of the American
Society of Nephrologists. 2010 Feb; 5(2):195–204.
29
Howlett J, Morin L, Fortin M, Heckman G, Strachan PH, Suskin N,
Shamian J, Lewanczuk R, Aurthur HM. End-of-life planning in heart
failure: It should be the end of the beginning. Canadian Journal of
Cardiologists. 2010 Mar; 26(3):135–41.
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important clinical changes occur. They note the need for
further research into effective end-of-life planning and
care and recommend that heart failure be considered an
ideal condition for implementing and testing of interventions to improve end-of-life planning and care.
Strachan and colleagues surveyed 106 patients with
advanced heart failure in five Canadian tertiary care
centres to elicit their perspectives about end-of-life care,
including their preferences and level of satisfaction with
different aspects of end-of-life care.30 The goal was to
identify key opportunities from the patients’ perspectives
for improving end-of-life care for patients with advanced
heart failure. A significant opportunity for improvement
is indicated by feedback on ‘patient fears about burdening their family with their increasing physical or emotional needs’.31 Another significant opportunity for
improvement arises from patient feedback about ‘the
lack of a clear plan of care and health services available at
the time of hospital discharge’.32 Here, the opportunity
is to develop an adequate, individualized plan of care
following hospital discharge. Further opportunities
for improvement pointed out by the study are to provide
effective pain and symptom relief as well as to promote
open and honest communication among patients, families, and care providers (for example, regarding the trajectory of the disease, risks and benefits of treatment
options, etc.). The three aspects ranked most important
by patients are: to avoid life support when there is no
hope of a meaningful recovery; to have doctors communicate information; and to avoid being a burden on their
family.

d. Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease
Rocker and colleagues surveyed 118 Canadian patients
with advanced chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD) to elicit their perspectives about end-of-life
care.33 They point out that little is known about what
quality end-of-life care entails from the perspectives of
patients with COPD.
30

Strachan PH, Ross H, Rocker GM, Dodek PM, Heyland DK; Canadian Researchers at the End of Life Network (CARENET). Mind the
gap: Opportunities for improving end-of-life care for patients with
advanced heart failure. Canadian Journal of Cardiology. 2009 Nov;
25(11):635–40.
31
Strachan PH, Ross H, Rocker GM, Dodek PM, Heyland DK; Canadian Researchers at the End of Life Network (CARENET). Mind the
gap: Opportunities for improving end-of-life care for patients with
advanced heart failure. Canadian Journal of Cardiology. 2009 Nov;
25(11):637.
32
Strachan PH, Ross H, Rocker GM, Dodek PM, Heyland DK; Canadian Researchers at the End of Life Network (CARENET). Mind the
gap: Opportunities for improving end-of-life care for patients with
advanced heart failure. Canadian Journal of Cardiology. 2009 Nov;
25(11):637.
33
Rocker GM, Dodek PM, and Heyland DK; Canadian Researchers at
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The results show that patients with COPD consider
these elements most important:
•
•
•
•
•

Not to be kept on life support when there is little hope
for a meaningful recovery (54.9%).
To have relief of symptoms (46.6%).
To have an adequate plan of care and health services
available upon discharge from the hospital (40.0%).
To have trust and confidence in physicians (39.7%).
Not to be a physical or emotional burden on their
family (39.6%).

With respect to patients’ current care, an important
finding is that less than one-third of patients: were completely satisfied with the adequacy of information they
received about their disease (including the risks and
benefits of treatment options); had confidence in their
physicians; and knew which physician was in charge
of their care. This finding strongly indicates areas for
improvement.
A qualitative study of Saskatchewan intensive care
unit (ICU) clinicians involved in end-stage COPD management sought perspectives on obstacles to providing
quality care for individuals with COPD who die within
the critical-care environment.34 Difficulties in palliating
dyspnea (breathlessness) and anxiety were associated
with caregiver feelings of helplessness, empathy and fears
about ‘killing the patient’. A sense of futility, concerns
about ‘torturing the patient’ and questions about the
patient/family’s understanding of treatment pervade
much of the discourse about caring for people with
advanced COPD in the ICU. The need to prioritize care
to the most unstable ICU patients meant that patients
with COPD discussed in the study did not always receive
the attention that clinicians thought they should ideally
have.

e. Disability
There is a dearth of empirical literature describing end of
life care, palliative care and attitudes towards assisted
suicide and euthanasia concerning disabled populations
in Canada. It is fair to say that there is no consensus
among this group. Some disability activists have raised
concerns that more permissive legislation will have a
negative impact on such groups, many of whom have
suffered from stigma, bias and marginalization. Furthermore, prevailing attitudes towards disability engrain
beliefs that consider such lives undesirable and erode
with advanced chronic obstructive pulmonary disease: insights from
a multicentre study. Canadian Respiratory Journal. 2008 Jul-Aug;
15(5):249–54.
34
Goodridge D, Duggleby W, Gjevre J, and Rennie D. Caring for
critically ill patients with advanced COPD at the end of life: a qualitative study. Intensive and Critical Care Nursing. 2008 Jun; 24(3):162–70.
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sufficient resistance to public policies that could hasten
death.35 Others, however, argue that persons living with
disabilities should have their autonomy respected (historically, there have been significant violations of their
autonomy) and that such respect includes respecting
their wishes in regard to assisted suicide and euthanasia.
Arguments against a permissive regime, they argue, disrespect their capacity for self-determination.
Stienstra and Chochinov note the comparative neglect
of the special considerations raised by disability in the
field of palliative care and propose a vulnerability model
of palliative care to incorporate the unique features of
disability in palliative care.36

4. DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
IN CANADA
a. Aging
With the current demographic transition and increasingly
effective medical therapy, individuals are living longer,
but are also accumulating more chronic diseases. This is
particularly true for people over the age of 65. This group
constitutes the fastest growing segment of the Canadian
population, and consumes the largest amount of healthcare resources, specifically in terms of physician visits,
home care resources, and pharmacotherapy. Chronic
disease management itself has been identified as an
important emerging issue in health care;37 81 per cent of
community-dwelling seniors report having a chronic
health condition.38
Policy documents project that the peak of the so-called
Baby Boom generation will surpass age 65 sometime
between 2015 and 2035, and this population-aging effect
– resulting from increases in life expectancy and past
cycles in fertility – will place pressure on the Canadian
healthcare system. The pressure on the health care system
stems from the substantial increase in healthcare needs
and expenditures once individuals reach age 65.39 Seniors
(people aged 65 and older) represent 12.7% of the population and account for roughly 30% ($36.3 billion) of the
total economic health care burden. This population has

the highest hospital care expenditures at $10.2 billion.
Seniors account for 22.8% ($2.7 billion) of physician care
expenditures, 20.2% ($2.5 billion) of drug expenditures,
and 33% ($11.0 billion) of mortality costs.
Greater reporting of long-term disability costs and the
greater number of elderly people with chronic conditions
account for the large difference between long-term and
short-term disability costs. Leading factors responsible
for long-term disability are musculoskeletal conditions,
followed by cardiovascular conditions, nervous system
conditions, and injuries. Seniors alone account for over
33% of the long-term disability for cardiovascular
diseases. With respect to prescription drug expenditures,
seniors account for 54.3% ($963 million) of expenditures
for cardiovascular diseases, followed by endocrine
and related diseases (34.8%), musculoskeletal diseases
(25.8%), digestive diseases (25.4%), respiratory diseases
(15.4%), and mental disorders (13.4%). Seniors account
for almost 50% ($413 million) of Canadian prescription
drug expenditures for hypertension and arthritis ($129
million), and for nearly 66% for ischemic heart disease
($331 million).40
These dramatic trends have also exposed limitations in
informal care and community care models and – with
attendant wait times in the health care system and the
decreasing availability of primary care physicians – have
led some to question who will care for the oldest Canadians.41 There are substantial issues regarding a profound
lack of understanding of the death and dying experiences
of older individuals. However, health status becomes
more heterogeneous in late-life. As Hallberg notes in a
critical literature review, empirical studies on the perspectives of older people – particularly the oldest age groups
– are few.42 A wide range of common themes emerged
in this review including readiness to talk about death
and dying, conceptions of death, after-death and dying,
and the impact on (and of) those close by. The latter topic
had both negative and positive connotations for respondents, especially related to balancing closeness with being
a burden and with dependency. Other topics included
death anxiety and its possible antecedents, the fine line
between natural sadness and suffering from depression,
and worry about the end-of-life phase.

35
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36
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2005.
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b. Diversity
As well as an aging population, Canada is becoming a
more culturally diverse nation with increasing heteroge40
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neity with respect to ethnic origin, languages, health practices, and core beliefs. A March 2010 Statistics Canada
report indicated that by 2031, between 25% and 28% of
the population could be foreign-born; 55% of this population is expected to be born in Asia; and between 29%
and 32% of the population could belong to a visible
minority group.43 Such diversity reinforces the need
for culturally sensitive end-of-life care and, ultimately, a
deeper understanding of the underlying values and preferences of minority groups related to death and dying.
For example, research has shown that some Chinese
Canadians – a large and diverse minority group whose
perspectives on health are often influenced by Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism – hold negative feelings
toward advance directives, believing that it is unrealistic
or even unwise to make predictions about one’s future
health when not currently facing health issues.44 It is commonly assumed that in Chinese culture the topic of death
and dying is largely avoided, or that Chinese families
prefer to conceal the prognosis from a dying relative to
avoid causing him or her harm (or vice versa).45 By contrast, Feser and Bon Bernard studied a group of Chinese
elders in Calgary and found that, contrary to cultural
stereotypes, many Chinese respondents who were educated about palliative care want to be informed about
illness.46
The Canadian South Asian population is another large
and growing minority group whose beliefs about death
and dying – as well as preferences about end-of-life care –
stem from different religious faiths including Islam, Hinduism and Sikhism. In a Health Canada-sponsored study
on advance-care planning led by Con, respondents from
South Asia viewed terminal illness as ‘God’s wish’, and so
they did not want to discuss or plan for their death.47
They also believed that attempting to predict one’s future
and end of life would ultimately draw it nearer, which
Con suggests points to the need to ask culturally sensitive
questions about end of life without explicitly revealing
that their purpose is that of advance-care planning.48
Further research is needed on cross-cultural perspectives
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to gain a clearer and more in-depth understanding of how
health practitioners can provide end-of-life care that is
culturally appropriate and does not inadvertently impose
dominant Western values regarding death and dying.49

c. First Nations
First Nations’ perspectives on end-of-life care and related
policies require special consideration in light of historical
disadvantage and injustice. Kelly and Minty conducted
a literature review of end-of-life issues in the care of
Aboriginal people.50 They highlighted the sparseness of
rigorous studies in this field and noted that many traditional Aboriginal perspectives differ from the viewpoints
of other Canadians. Some elderly Aboriginals, for
example, believe that truth-telling about diagnosis may
be dangerous to one’s health, which contrasts with mainstream Canadian values, and further creates a challenging communication barrier at the end of life.51 There is
also a diversity of beliefs between and within Aboriginal
communities, owing to differences of ‘traditional, acculturated or religious perspectives’.52
Currently, many Aboriginal people living in remote
communities are transported to large urban centres to
die, despite a study showing that the majority of Aboriginals interviewed would prefer to die at home, in the
company of friends, family and their culture.53 It is crucial
that non-Aboriginal Canadians seek to understand better
the unique and diverse preferences and values of Aboriginal people toward the end of life so that their interests
are better served. Ellerby and others outlined important
guidelines for caring for Aboriginal people, including:
respecting the individual; practising conscious communication; using interpreters; involving the family;
recognizing alternatives to truth-telling; practising noninterference; and allowing for Aboriginal medicine.54
49
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5. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND
SUBSTITUTE DECISION-MAKING
Advance directives are one form of advance care planning. They permit competent individuals to state their
preferences for end-of-life care at a time in the future
when they are no longer competent or able to speak for
themselves. Advance directives take many forms. They
can be instruction directives or proxy directives. Instruction directives contain information about what decisions
should be made or how (e.g. about values, goals of
therapy and preferences for care in a variety of clinical
scenarios), whereas proxy directives indicate the individual(s) who will make decisions on behalf of the patient
should the patient lose competence. Advance directives
statutes are found in almost all jurisdictions in Canada,
though there are variations between provinces and territories with respect to the processes to be followed. Details
on the legal status of advance directives and substitute
decision-making are presented in Chapter Two.
Studies consistently show that, although competent
adults wish to be involved in making decisions about their
health care, so that their preferences can be respected, and
although they trust family members and others to be
substitute decision-makers, they fail to complete advance
directives or communicate their preferences for end-of-life
care to family members or significant others.
In its 2010 draft framework for advance care planning,55 the Canadian Hospice and Palliative Care Association noted that the Canadian public supports advance
care planning but a relatively small number of Canadians
actually engage in it. A poll conducted by the Association
in 2004 found:
•
•
•

•
•

Eight in ten Canadians agree that people should start
planning for end of life when they are healthy.
70% of Canadians surveyed have not prepared a living
will.
47% of Canadians have not designated a substitute
decision-maker to make healthcare decisions for them
if they are unable.
Fewer than 44% Canadians have discussed end-of-life
care with a family member.
Although Canadians feel that end-of life care is an
important discussion to have with a physician, only
9% have done so.

Martin, Emanuel, and Singer, in the November 2000
volume of the medical journal The Lancet, describe a
patient-centred approach to advance-care planning.56

This includes specification of the goal of advance-care
planning and the role of advance directives as an assisting tool (and not the central defining feature of advancecare planning). The best form of advance directive
contains both instruction and proxy directives and
ensures that the people who should be involved in care
planning should include not only loved ones but healthcare professionals who are involved in the care of the
patient. Successful advance-care planning should be
evaluated not simply in terms of completion of the paper
form, but also in terms of the extent to which patients
feel in control of their destinies and family members
feel relief from the burdens of decision-making at the
end of life.
Research also indicates that advance directives, even if
completed, are often not followed. For example, a study
examining nurses by Levoix, Blondeau, and Godin shows
that the knowledge of the patient’s wishes has a significant effect on nurses’ choice of level of care in the absence
of a living will.57 59% of nurses would choose the more
intensive level of care that would result in potentially
over-aggressive therapy, whereas, in the presence of a
living will, only 31% would choose this level of aggressive
care. However, it is important to note that 31% would
still choose the more aggressive course even in the presence of an advance directive instructing a contrary
course.
Many studies have been done to improve the implementation and uptake of advance directives. Two systematic reviews have been completed. Bravo, Dubois and
Wagneur reviewed evidence regarding the effectiveness of
interventions in promoting advance directives for health
care as well as research.58 This review of 55 studies was
conducted because of the uncertainty around what works
best and in what patient populations. Most groups
of subjects were educated in a single session led by one
health care professional. The largest set of single-arm
studies revealed an overall advance directive completion
rate of 45.6%. Multi-variable analyses identified that providing oral information over multiple sessions is the most
successful intervention; this indicates the importance of
educational interventions in increasing the use of advance
directives.
Patel, Sinuff and Cook conducted a systematic review
of educational advance-care planning interventions
directed at patients without terminal illness to determine their influence on the completion rate of advance
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directives.59 The review was based on nine randomized
controlled trials, involving 3026 patients, and tested a
variety of interventions delivered by healthcare professionals, designed to educate patients about advance
directives. The effectiveness of these interventions is both
clinically important and statistically significant, as
reflected by the 3.71 (1.46; 9.40) overall odds ratio for the
completion of an advance directive. The authors of the
study conclude that advance directive completion rates –
documenting patient preferences for end-of-life care –
may be increased by simple patient-directed educational
interventions.
Molloy and colleagues, in a randomized controlled
trial on implementing an advance directive, demonstrated an increase in completed advance directives by
participants when they are educated about them.60 They
also demonstrated statistically significant reductions in
health costs with fewer hospitalizations per resident and
less resource-use per patient in the intervention than
in the control group. They also documented that completion of an advance directive is not associated with
increased mortality.
Health care providers in Canada are generally supportive of the use of advance directives. Kelner and colleagues
interviewed 20 physicians and 20 nurses at a major Canadian teaching hospital to elicit their views and experiences
related to the use of advance directives in clinical care.61
All but one of the physicians and all of the nurses supported the use of advance directives – both instruction
and proxy directives. The participants said that advance
directives are helpful for: resolving disagreements
between patients and their families about treatment
options; making patients more physically and psychologically comfortable during the process of dying; and
opening up communication and trust among patients,
their families and health care professionals. The participants, however, raised the following concerns about the
use of advance directives: the lack of clarity in some
patients’ instructions (such as when the advance directive
is not clearly worded or is too vague); the possible interference with a practitioner’s clinical judgement (such as
when there is a conflict between a patient’s instructions
and the practitioner’s clinical judgement); the adequacy
and appropriateness of patients’ information about their

circumstances (such as when it appears that the patient
did not have sufficient information about the clinical situation and options to make an informed decision about
future treatment); and the type of intervention requested
by patients (for example, if the patient indicates that
active measures be taken to end his/her life, the participants felt that such a request could not be honoured).
Hughes and colleagues explored Ontario family physicians’ attitudes, experience, and knowledge related to
advance directives in a 1992 study.62 The results show
that 86% of the physicians surveyed support the use of
advance directives, but only 19% had ever discussed them
with more than 10 patients. 80% of physicians surveyed
had never used advance directives in managing an incompetent patient, and of the physicians who had done so,
more than half report that they had not always followed
the directions contained in the directive.
Blondeau and colleagues assessed the beliefs that
influence nurses’ intention to respect or not respect
an advance directive document.63 306 nurses who work
either in a long-term care centre or in a hospital centre
offering general and specialized care completed a multistatement questionnaire. The results show that nurses
have a strong intention to comply with advance directives
written by patients. Blondeau and colleagues also studied
the concordance between health care providers and
patients with respect to advance directives.64 In a survey
of 921 participants (123 patients, 167 physicians, 340
nurses and 291 administrators of health care institutions)
they noted that the general attitude of each population is
favourable to the use of advance directives. However,
physicians’ attitudes towards advance directives are
shown to be less positive than patients’ attitudes.
A recent US American study examined the prevalence
of advance directives and assessed the concordance
between patient preferences as stated in the directive and
the actual care the patient received.65 Patients who had
advance directives were more likely to want limited
health care intervention (92.7%) or palliative care
(96.2%). The study found that 83.2% of subjects who
requested limited care and 97.1% of subjects who
requested comfort care received care consistent with their
preferences. As noted above, such data is not available
for Canada, but this study does suggest, contrary to
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recent scepticism, that the use of advance directives may
be an effective means of assuring that patient preferences
are met.

6. SEDATION PRACTICES
The use of sedation at the end of life has recently come
under considerable scrutiny. A number of terms are used
in the literature – palliative sedation, terminal sedation,
deep continuous sedation – to describe the varied practices. While this report provides precise definitions
for palliative and terminal sedation in the terminology
section above, there is inconsistent use of descriptors
of sedation practices in the literature. Therefore, in this
section they are referred to generically as sedation
practices.
There is scant empirical research on sedation practices
in Canada. In one study, Blondeau and colleagues evaluated the influence of prognosis and suffering on clinicians’ attitudes to the use of sedation.66 The results of this
survey – 124 clinicians working in palliative care environments in Quebec were included – demonstrate that ‘the
type of suffering influences a subject’s attitude to endof-life sedation.’ Physical suffering was associated with
respondents being in favour of the use of sedation.
However, clinicians were not in favour of the use of
sedation for existential suffering. The authors note ‘that
health professionals are uncomfortable when confronted
with their patients’ existential suffering.’67
Blondeau and colleagues, in another study, assessed
the attitudes of a small cohort of Quebec palliative care
physicians.68 The authors noted that there are few guidelines in Quebec on end-of-life sedation. Furthermore, the
normative justification for using sedation is not explicit.
They found that Quebec physicians undertand sedation
as a measure to relieve the patient’s suffering; not to
hasten death. Most physicians viewed euthanasia and
sedation as distinctly different practices. The motivation
to proceed with sedation was strongest when treating
refractory physical symptoms. Physicians were divided
on whether emotional or existential suffering were
adequate reasons to proceed with sedation, and some
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were strongly opposed to proceeding on such a basis. The
authors suggest the need for research aimed at developing
a clear definition of existential suffering and the ethical
basis of using sedation to treat it.
A small study of Manitoba palliative care nurses
uses the metaphor of a quagmire to describe the decisionmaking landscape; it indicates that sedation raises
complex and difficult moral challenges.69 Hawyrluk and
colleagues offer a set of guidelines for the use of analgesia
and sedation on dying ICU patients.70 The guidelines
were developed to help distinguish palliative care from
euthanasia as well as to reduce the risks of undertreatment, such as: pain and suffering; the risk of
over-treatment; and prosecution for euthanasia. Their
guidelines indicate a general consensus among those
surveyed with regards to:
•

The role of palliative care in the ICU (for example, to
relieve pain and suffering of each patient, not just
dying patients).
• The management of pain and suffering (for example,
when to use pharmacological versus nonpharmacological methods).
• Ways to improve palliative care in the ICU (for
example, a major problem is the difficulty in assessing
the patient’s pain and suffering, so open discussions
with all members of the health care team and family,
improvements in education and training, and research
are needed).
Berger has recently shown that there is a lack of consensus in published guidelines on the use of sedation at the
end of life.71 While all guidelines agree that sedation is
permitted in the context of a terminal condition with
refractory and intolerable symptoms, they differ with
respect to the length of life-expectancy and the acceptability of existential suffering as a basis for provision of
sedation. He argues for greater clarity and consistency in
guidance documents on the use of sedation.

7. PAEDIATRIC END OF LIFE CARE
Paediatric palliative care needs remain relatively understudied in a Canadian context. Widger and colleagues
conducted a multi-centre study to obtain knowledge
about Canadian children who received care from the
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eight dedicated paediatric palliative care programs in
Canada during 2002.72 The results showed:
•

48.6% of the patients were younger than five years old,
and about half of these were younger than one year
old.
• Diagnoses were wide-ranging, but the most common
included disorders of the nervous system (39.1%),
malignancies (22.1%), and conditions arising in the
peri-natal period just before and after birth or congenital anomalies (22.1%).
• In terms of the location of death, a large number of
children (43.9%) died at home. Centres with more
comprehensive home care services reported higher
percentages of home deaths.
• The most significant finding was the small percentage
of children who receive care from a paediatric palliative care program in Canada. Using various methods,
the authors estimated that between only 5% and 12%
of the children who might benefit from the services of
a paediatric palliative care program actually received
these services.
The authors conclude that their study ‘reveals that
most Canadian children who may benefit are not referred
to existing paediatric palliative care services or do not
have access to services because of geographic availability.’ They rightly note that the need for further research in
this area is a high priority.
Steele and colleagues, in a Canadian study, identified
research priorities considered highly important for
advancing knowledge in paediatric end-of-life care
among researchers and frontline palliative care clinicians.73 The four most significant research questions
identified were the following:
•
•
•
•

What matters most for patients and parents receiving
paediatric palliative services?
What are the best practice standards in pain and
symptom management?
What bereavement needs do the families in paediatric
palliative care have?
What are effective strategies to alleviate suffering at
the end of life?

A recent US American study surveying 141 parents of
children who died of cancer estimates the frequency of

72
Widger K, Davies D, Drouin DJ, Beaune L, Daoust L, Farran RP,
Humbert N, Nalewajek F, Rattray M, Rugg M, Bishop M. Pediatric
patients receiving palliative care in Canada: results of a multicenter
review. Archives of Pediatric Adolescent Medicine. 2007 Jun; 161(6):
597–602.
73
Steele R, Bosma H, Johnston MF, Cadell S, Davies B, Siden H,
Straatman L. Research priorities in pediatric palliative care: a Delphi
study. Journal of Palliative Care. 2008 Winter; 24(4):229–39.

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

17

discussions about hastening death.74 The authors sought
data both to describe the level of parental support for
hastening death and intensive symptom management,
and to determine whether such discussions and support
were influenced by the level of children’s pain. The results
showed that:
•

•
•

•

13% of parents considered requesting hastened death
for their child at his or her end of life and 9% actually
discussed hastening death.
Consideration of hastening death generally increased
as the child’s suffering increased.
34% of parents reported that they would have considered hastening their child’s death if the child had been
in uncontrollable pain, while 15% or less would consider hastening death for non-physical suffering.
The results also showed that, in response to vignettes
portraying children with end-stage cancer, 50% of
parents supported hastening death, while 94% supported intensive pain management.

The study concludes that a child’s level of pain is a
major factor in parents’ consideration of hastening death.
The authors suggest that to ease parents’ consideration of
hastening death, it is important to point out the sources
of suffering, and to explain the effectiveness of intensive
symptom management as an alternative approach.

8. ATTITUDES OF CANADIANS TOWARD
VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA AND
ASSISTED SUICIDE
a. General Public
Recent surveys show significant public support for both
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. In a 2010
Angus Reid survey of a national sample of 1,003 Canadians, a large percentage (67%) of respondents was in
favour of legalizing voluntary euthanasia.75 In this
survey, more than 85% of Canadians said they believe
legalizing voluntary euthanasia can provide people who
are suffering with a chance to ease their pain, and 76%
said they believe doing so would establish clearer guidelines for physicians dealing with end-of-life decisions.
Additionally, about two-thirds (66%) of Canadians
thought legalizing voluntary euthanasia would not send
the message that the lives of sick or disabled people are
less valuable. Overall, roughly half (41%) of respondents
74
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said they believe that people who assist a person to
commit suicide should be free from prosecution.
Strong support for legalizing voluntary euthanasia was
also found in a 2009 Angus Reid national survey of 1,006
Canadians; nearly three-quarters (71%) of respondents
favoured such legalization.76 Similar results were
obtained by a 2007 national survey by Ipsos Reid of 1,005
Canadians; this survey found that 76% of respondents
support the right to die for patients suffering from an
incurable disease.77 People in Quebec showed the strongest support (87%), while people in Alberta showed the
least support (66%).
The high level of public support for legalizing voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide under certain circumstances has scarcely changed over the past decade and a
half. In a 1995 cross-sectional survey of 2,019 Canadians,
Singer and colleagues found that a majority of respondents support legalizing voluntary euthanasia (66%) and
assisted suicide (58%) if the person is competent and
unlikely to recover from his or her illness.78 Support is
only slightly less (58%) for legalizing voluntary euthanasia if the family of an incompetent person who is unlikely
to recover (but whose wishes about end of life are
unknown) request euthanasia for that person. By contrast, most respondents disapprove of a law allowing voluntary euthanasia (78%) or assisted suicide (79%) if the
person is incompetent but likely to recover.
These results can be compared to those of a 1994
survey by Genuis et al. of 356 people in Edmonton, which
revealed a high degree of public support (65%) for voluntary euthanasia for elderly, terminally ill people in
severe pain, but significant opposition to this practice for
people in other circumstances.79 That is, 65% oppose voluntary euthanasia for elderly disabled people who say
they feel like a burden on their family, 83% oppose voluntary euthanasia for elderly disabled people who say
they feel lonely and have only minor physical ailments,
and 75% oppose voluntary euthanasia for people with
chronic depression resistant to treatment. In this survey,
although the public was generally supportive of voluntary euthanasia for terminally ill patients, a roughly equal
number of respondents (63%) said they believe that legalizing this practice for such patients would lead to euthanasia for several other, unsupported reasons.
76
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It can be inferred, based on the different surveys
described above, that the majority of the Canadian public
would support legislation permitting voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide for people suffering from an
incurable physical illness.

b. Health Care Professionals
Recent data on the attitudes of Canadian health care
professionals toward euthanasia and assisted suicide are
lacking, but opinion surveys published in the 1990s, of
which there were only a few, are nonetheless informative.
In a 1996 survey of more than 1700 physicians from
across Canada, roughly a quarter of respondents indicated their willingness to practise voluntary euthanasia
(24%) or assisted suicide (23%) if it were legal to do so,
while the majority (55%) said they would not practise
either.80 Overall, these physicians were more willing to
refer patients to a colleague for voluntary euthanasia
(44%) and assisted suicide (41%) than to carry out such
acts personally.
Suarez-Almazor and colleagues obtained similar
results in a 1997 survey in which, of 179 physicians surveyed in Edmonton, only a small minority of respondents
stated that they would be willing to perform voluntary
euthanasia or assisted suicide (14% to 27% depending on
the end-of-life circumstances) if such practices were
allowed by law, while most indicated that they would be
unwilling to do so (68% to 75% depending on the end-of
life circumstances).81 In this survey, roughly 60% to 80%
of all physicians were opposed to legalizing voluntary
euthanasia or assisted suicide.
In contrast to physicians, nurses and social workers are
significantly more supportive of voluntary euthanasia
and assisted suicide, according to two surveys. In 1998,
Young and Ogden surveyed 160 nurses and found that
nearly three-quarters (73%) of respondents said they
believe the law should be amended to permit physicians
to practice voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide.82
As well, more than half (53%) thought that nurses, too,
should be allowed to practice such acts. In the same year,
these authors surveyed 527 social workers in British
Columbia and found that most respondents believed voluntary euthanasia (75.9%) and assisted suicide (78.2%)

80

Wysong P. Doctors divided on euthanasia acceptance: preference is
to refer euthanasia to another doctor. Medical Post 1996 Oct; 32(34):1.
81
Suarez-Almazor ME, Belzile M, Bruera E. Euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide: a comparative survey of physicians, terminally ill cancer patients, and the general population. Journal of Clinical
Oncology. 1997 Feb;15(2):418–27.
82
Young MG, Ogden RD. End-of-life issues: a survey of Englishspeaking Canadian nurses in AIDS care. Journal of the Association of
Nursing and AIDS Care. 1998 Mar-Apr; 9(2):18–25.

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

End-of-Life Decision-Making in Canada
should be legal under certain conditions.83 21% of the
social workers had been consulted by a patient about
these acts; six social workers reported assisting in the
death of a patient through voluntary euthanasia.
A 2009 poll of 2,025 medical specialists in the Quebec
found that 75% said they were ‘certainly’ or ‘probably’ in
favour of legalizing euthanasia, as long as the practice
were regulated.84
In October 2009, the College of Physicians in Quebec
released a report entitled Physicians, Appropriate Care
and the Debate on Euthanasia, calling for an open discussion on the question of euthanasia in the context of endof-life care. The report states that if euthanasia is to be
permitted it should be conducted in the context of care
and considered a medical act.85

c. Patients
Patients are those most directly affected by laws governing voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, so their
attitudes toward these practices warrant careful consideration. In 2007, Wilson and others conducted a study of
238 terminally ill cancer patients in palliative care and
found that a majority (62.8%) of such patients support
legalizing voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide.86
Further, about 40% of patients could foresee possibly
making a request for physician-assisted suicide in the
future. Physical and psychological suffering, extreme
loss of functions, dependence on others, hopelessness, or
being a burden on family members were cited by patients
as factors that might motivate them to make such a
request. As well, about 6% of patients reported that they
would actually request physician-assisted suicide in their
present circumstances if it were legally accessible. The
study’s authors determined that these patients based
their desire to end their lives on a combination of factors
ranging from a feeling of futility about their deteriorating
and functionally-limited state of health, to physical and
psychological suffering, to feeling like a burden on others
or a drain on health care resources.
83
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This study’s findings match those of an earlier study,
conducted by Wilson and colleagues in 2000, of 70 terminally ill cancer patients in which almost two-thirds (64%)
of respondents said they thought both voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are acceptable and
should be legalized.87 Whereas these patients cited pain
(43%) and a person’s right to choose (43%) as the principal reasons for legalizing such practices, those patients
who were against legalization (21%) cited religious beliefs
(50%) and moral objections (38%) as their chief concerns.
In this study, over half of respondents (58%) indicated
that, if legally available, they might request euthanasia or
assisted suicide in the future, citing possible uncontrollable pain (47%) and other physical symptoms (34%) as
the main motivating factors. Overall, 8 of the 70 patients
said they would actually have requested a physicianhastened death at the time the study was done had it been
legal. Perhaps unexpectedly, Wilson and others found
that pain was cited by only one of these eight patients as
a contributing reason; instead, half or more of these
patients based their desire to end their lives on factors
such as their recognition and acceptance of their terminal
illness, having a diminished quality of life, their right
to exercise control over their deaths, or their belief that
voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide would be an
easier way to die than what they were currently facing.
The findings of the two studies described above are
similar to those obtained in Achille and Ogloff’s 2003
study of 44 terminally ill patients with Amyotrophic
Lateral Sclerosis (ALS).88 Of such patients 70% thought
that assisted suicide was morally acceptable and 60%
favoured its legalization. Those who supported its legalization emphasized a person’s right to self-determination,
the preservation of one’s dignity, and freedom from
dependence or being a burden on others. Those who
opposed its legalization feared it might lead to involuntary euthanasia, said they believed that death should
occur naturally, and were also more likely to be heavily
involved in religious practice. Additionally, the majority
(60%) of patients could foresee circumstances that would
make them consider assisted suicide in the future if it were
legally available, and three of the 44 patients indicated
that since their diagnosis, they would already have asked
for assisted suicide if it had been legal.
Finally, Lavery and colleagues conducted a study in
2001 of 32 patients with HIV or AIDS and, using a more
interpretive approach to analysis, determined that three
main factors led to many of the respondents’ desire for
87
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voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide.89 The first was
disintegration, a process during which the patients
experience a loss of functions and increased symptoms
associated with their disease. The second was loss of community, a process by which the patients’ loss of mobility
and exclusion or alienation by others results in difficulty
maintaining, or the erosion of, close personal relationships. These two factors together led to the third factor,
the patients’ loss of self, that is, the feeling that their
fundamental nature had been or is at risk of being completely worn away.

9. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
In Canada, the level of public support for legalizing voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide is comparable to
that in the United Kingdom, but markedly higher than
that in the United States, according to a 2009 Angus Reid
survey of national samples.90 In this survey, Canadians
demonstrated slightly less support (71%) than that of
Britons (77%) and nearly twice that of US Americans
(45%). By a measure of public support, Canada appears
to be roughly equal to The Netherlands,91 where both
voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are
carried out legally. Further, in a 2006 study, Rietjens and
others found a clear link between the Dutch public’s
support for voluntary euthanasia and a number of features it considers important for a ‘good death’.92 These
include an influence on the dying process through personal decisions about treatment and the time of death,
avoiding being a burden on relatives, and preventing
severe suffering and loss of dignity.
When compared with the general public, physicians
not only in Canada (as indicated above), but also in the
United States93 and the United Kingdom,94,95 are signifi89
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cantly less supportive of legalizing voluntary euthanasia
or assisted suicide, and many are opposed. Although the
reasons for such opposition have not been sufficiently
explored among Canadian physicians, studies of American physicians96 and British physicians97,98 suggest a
strong association between opposition to legalizing
physician-assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia and
religious belief. Further, in surveys of physicians in the
United Kingdom, opponents were also more likely to be
palliative care specialists,99 or those caring for the
dying.100 The views of physicians in The Netherlands contrast with those of physicians in Canada, the United
States, and the United Kingdom, in that a large majority
– 84% – of Dutch physicians support physician-assisted
suicide and/or voluntary euthanasia.101
The attitudes of patients in Canada toward voluntary
euthanasia and assisted suicide (as described above) are
comparable to those in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and The Netherlands. Most notable is that
patients in all of these countries cite similar reasons for
considering or asking for physician-assisted suicide and
voluntary euthanasia. In 2009, Ganzani and colleagues
studied 56 patients from the state of Oregon (where
eligible patients receive help legally from physicians to
commit suicide), who had requested physician-assisted
suicide or had contacted a physician-assisted suicide
advocacy organization.102 The authors found that the
main reasons for such requests were the patients’ desire to
influence the circumstances of their death, loss of independence, worries about future pain, poor quality of life,
and inability to care for themselves. Similarly, in 2006,
Chapple and others interviewed 18 terminally ill patients
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decisions: survey among the Dutch general public and physicians.
Social Sciences and Medicine. 2005 Oct; 61(8):1723–32.
102
Ganzini L, Goy ER, Dobscha SK. Oregonians’ reasons for requesting physician aid in dying. Archives of Internal Medicine. 2009
Mar 9;169(5):489–92. Erratum in: Arch Intern Med. 2009 March
23;169(6):571.

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

21

End-of-Life Decision-Making in Canada
in the United Kingdom, and found that those who
support legalizing voluntary euthanasia or assisted
suicide emphasized concerns about future pain, fear of
indignity, loss of control, and cognitive impairment.103
Finally, in a 2009 study by Pasman and colleagues, Dutch
patients who had formally requested aid in dying said
that their ‘unbearable suffering’ (which is one of several
conditions for receiving euthanasia in The Netherlands)
consisted of physical elements, including pain, but, more
often, non-physical elements, including dependence, an
inability to lead a normal daily life, and mental suffering
over steady deterioration.104
The results of these studies suggest that these patients, generally, like Canadian patients, are interested
in or request euthanasia or assisted suicide not because
of any singular reason; instead, their motivation arises
from a complex combination of physical, psychosocial,
and existential suffering – importantly, this is a type
of suffering that has objective as well as subjective
elements.

10. CONCLUSIONS

increasing clarity on the appropriateness of various
kinds of sedation in various circumstances. There
is a pressing need for a set of national consensus
guidelines.
6. A significant majority of the Canadian population
appears to support a more permissive legislative
framework for voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide.
One final note must be made with respect to this
literature review. The literature seems to cluster in
the mid-1990s to early 2000s, around the time of the
last Senate Sub-Committee on Euthanasia and End
of Life. The Panel sees the need for much of this
research to be updated with a greater focus on public
engagement strategies that would provide the opportunity for deeper deliberations and more nuanced discussion than can be found in many of the studies
conducted to date.

CHAPTER TWO: THE LEGAL
LANDSCAPE
bioe_1939_3

21..93

In this review of the literature, the Panel identifies the
following key features:
1. The vast majority of Canadians die in institutions in
their old age.
2. The Canadian population is rapidly changing –
it is becoming increasingly aged, but also more
diverse.
3. Literature suggests that the attitudes and perspectives of the very old toward assisted suicide and
euthanasia have not been ascertained, nor is the literature well-attuned to First Nations and the ethnically and culturally diverse populations now found in
Canada. Hearing these voices is integral to an
informed debate on end-of-life care.
4. Advance-care planning still remains a topic not sufficiently discussed by individuals, their families and
their health care providers, with the vast majority of
Canadians having neither proxy nor instruction
directives. The absence of explicit dialogue between
patients and health care providers is of concern to the
Panel.
5. The use of sedation as a modality of care at the end of
life appears to be increasing without concurrent
103

Chapple A, Ziebland S, McPherson A, Herxheimer A. What people
close to death say about euthanasia and assisted suicide: a qualitative
study. Journal of Medical Ethics. 2006 Dec; 32(12):706–10.
104
Pasman HR, Rurup ML, Willems DL, Onwuteaka-Philipsen BD.
Concept of unbearable suffering in context of ungranted requests for
euthanasia: qualitative interviews with patients and physicians. Boston
Medical Journal. 2009 Nov; 16 (339):b4362.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of end-of-life law in
Canada. As with the previous chapter and, given the
interplay between the categories of assisted dying, the
Panel recognizes the need to review the full spectrum of
end of life care. In this chapter, the Panel describes the
legal status of the withholding and withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining treatment, advance directives, the
provision of potentially life-shortening symptom relief,
terminal sedation, assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. The focus here is not on whether the law is defensible (that will come later), but rather on what the law is
with all its inherent clarity, confusion, and controversy.

2. WITHHOLDING AND WITHDRAWAL
OF POTENTIALLY LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT
a. Relatively Clear and Uncontroversial
A 78-year-old man is admitted to hospital after a fall
at home. Following x-rays to identify the nature of
the injuries caused by his fall, his physicians diagnose
advanced lung cancer. They discuss the various treatment options with him including chemotherapy followed
by radiation therapy, surgery to remove some of the
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tumours and relieve pressure, and doing nothing apart
from managing pain and any other discomfort that might
arise. He understands that the chemotherapy has a
70% chance of extending his life expectancy by two
years beyond that which would be expected without any
treatment. He refuses treatment (in particular citing the
physical burden of chemotherapy) and indicates that he
wants to go home. Is it legal for the physicians to respect
this refusal, knowing that treatment could extend his
life?

At first glance it might appear that refusals of treatment
are not permissible under Canadian law. Section 215 of
the Criminal Code of Canada establishes a duty to provide
the necessaries of life; these have been found to include
medical treatment.105 Section 215(2) establishes that it is
an offence to fail to meet the duty to provide necessaries
of life ‘without lawful excuse’ if such failure ‘endangers
the life of the person to whom the duty is owed or causes
or is likely to cause the health of that person to be injured
permanently.106 Section 217 establishes a duty to continue
an undertaken act.107 Section 219 establishes that ‘(1)
[E]very one is criminally negligent who (a) in doing anything, or (b) in omitting to do anything that it is his duty
to do, shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or
safety of other persons.’108 Withholding or withdrawal of
potentially life-sustaining treatment while showing
wanton or reckless disregard for the life or safety of the
person from whom treatment is being withheld or withdrawn could, therefore, constitute criminal negligence.
However, these sections of the Criminal Code must be
read in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s statements about a common law right to refuse treatment. For
example:
Canadian courts have recognized a common law right
of patients to refuse consent to medical treatment, or
to demand that treatment, once commenced, be withdrawn or discontinued. This right has been specifically
recognized to exist even if the withdrawal from or
refusal of treatment may result in death.109
The Supreme Court of Canada’s position is grounded
in a deep commitment to the value of autonomy and the
consequential belief that competent individuals should be
free to chart their own course and their wishes should be
respected with a few exceptions (such as where this would
cause harm to others).
105

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.217.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.215(2).
107
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.217.
108
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.219.
109
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R.
519 at 156, quoting from Ciarlariello v. Schacter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119,
Nancy B. v. Hôtel-Dieu de Québec (1992), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (Que.
S.C.); and Malette v. Shulman (1990), 72 O.R. (2d) 417.
106

Given that conduct consistent with the common law
right set out above would probably not be found to constitute wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or
safety of others (assuming the conduct is not negligent in
some other way – and might be found to constitute
‘lawful excuse’), it can be concluded that, under Canadian law, health care professionals must respect refusals
of treatment from competent adults.
A 4-year-old girl is taken to hospital following a car
accident. She has massive internal bleeding and has sustained severe head trauma. The health care team stabilizes her and she is admitted to the ICU on a ventilator.
She is treated for a period of time but ultimately diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state. While she
is no longer on a ventilator, she requires artificial hydration and nutrition. Her parents come to the healthcare
team and ask that all treatment (including the hydration
and nutrition) be stopped. Is it legal for the team to do so?
Canadian courts and statutes have also clarified that
health care professionals must respect refusals made on
behalf of incompetent persons, without valid instruction
directives, by their legally authorized substitute decisionmakers.110 Substitute decision-makers are charged with
making decisions according to prior competent wishes
or, where applicable wishes are or could not be known,
according to what the substitute decision-maker believes
to be in the person’s best interests. Respecting refusals
based on the former standard is grounded in the commitment to the value of autonomy (understood as including bodily integrity)111 described above. Respecting
refusals based on the latter standard is grounded in the
belief that it can be in a person’s best interests to be
allowed to die.112
It must also be noted here that the law draws no
distinction between withholding and withdrawal.113 Nor
does it treat artificial hydration and nutrition any
differently than other technological or pharmaceutical
interventions (for example, mechanical ventilation or
antibiotics).114 It does not restrict refusals to situations
involving terminal illness or imminent death.115
110

Legal authority may come from a statute (for example, provincial/
territorial health care consent legislation or provincial/territorial proxy
directives legislation) or a court order.
111
Ciarlariello v. Schacter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119 at 135.
112
Gilmour J. “Death, Dying and Decision-Making about End of Life
Care” in Downie J, Caulfield T, Flood C (eds.). Canadian Health Law
and Policy 3d ed. Toronto: LexisNexis, 2007, 437 at 454.
113
Gilmour J. “Death, Dying and Decision-Making about End of Life
Care” in Downie J, Caulfield T, Flood C (eds.). Canadian Health Law
and Policy 3d ed. Toronto: LexisNexis, 2007, at 448.
114
Gilmour J. “Death, Dying and Decision-Making about End of Life
Care” in Downie J, Caulfield T, Flood C (eds.). Canadian Health Law
and Policy 3d ed. Toronto: LexisNexis, 2007, at 449.
115
See, for example, Malette v. Shulman (1990), 72 O.R. (2d) 417. In
this case, a physician was found liable for not respecting a woman’s
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It can therefore be concluded that there is considerable
clarity and very little controversy concerning the law as it
relates to withholding and withdrawal of potentially lifesustaining treatment from competent adults, or on behalf
of incompetent persons without valid advance directives
by their legally authorized substitute-decision-makers.
Health care providers must respect valid refusals. Despite
this, there remains some confusion. Not all health care
providers or members of the public understand their legal
rights and responsibilities.116 As a result, as mentioned in
the preceding chapter, it is possible that some legally valid
refusals of treatment are not being respected and that
potentially scarce medical resources are being wasted on
care not consented to by patients or their legally authorized substitute decision-makers.
A 64-year old woman goes to her family doctor and
presents him with a carefully drafted document setting
out which treatments she would like to receive or not at
a point in the future when she is no longer competent to
make decisions on her own behalf. For example, she
states that if she were to be in a persistent vegetative
state, she would not want antibiotics for infection or
artificial hydration or nutrition. She asks him whether he
will be willing and legally able to respect her wishes.
Some courts embraced advance directives even before
advance directives legislation was passed. For example,
the Ontario Court of Appeal has held that:
A patient, in anticipation of circumstances wherein he
or she may be unconscious or otherwise incapacitated
and thus unable to contemporaneously express his or
her wishes about a particular form of medical treatment, may specify in advance his or her refusal to
consent to the proposed treatment. A doctor is not free
to disregard such advance instructions, even in an
emergency. The patient’s right to forgo treatment, in
the absence of some overriding societal interest,
is paramount to the doctor’s obligation to provide
medical care. This right must be honoured, even
though the treatment may be beneficial or necessary to
preserve the patient’s life or health, and regardless of
how ill-advised the patient’s decision may appear to
others.117

rejection of blood transfusions (through a Jehovah’s Witness card) even
though she was not, but for her need of blood, imminently dying.
116
“Survey Results of Public, Health Care Provider, and Media Awareness Concerning End-of-Life Law and Policy in Canada, Final Report
2004” available online http://as01.ucis.dal.ca/dhli/cmp_documents/
default.cfm?fuseaction=shwDocs2 [Accessed 26 July 2011]. This confusion may be exacerbated if individuals are aware that euthanasia is
illegal and they are not clear on the distinction between euthanasia and
the withholding and withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining treatment.
117
Fleming v. Reid 82 D.L.R. (4th) 298 (Ont.C.A.), 1991 CanLII 2728
(On.C.A.)
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Furthermore, statutes require respect for one or both
of instruction and proxy directives in almost all jurisdictions.118 There is, however, some variation across jurisdictions. For example, some jurisdictions do not allow
minors to complete advance directives while others do.119
Nonetheless, the core principle that the prior-expressed
wishes of previously competent adults should be
respected when it comes to end of life decision-making is
consistent across the jurisdictions. Thus it can be concluded that the law here is relatively clear.
That said, there have certainly been difficulties
with implementation. Many people have not completed
advance directives, have completed directives that do not
provide clear direction, or have appointed proxies who
are unlikely to actually know their past wishes.120 These
issues have been canvassed in Chapter One and so will
not be repeated here. It is worth noting that there has
been debate, particularly in the philosophical literature,
about the legitimacy of the core principle behind requiring respect for advance directives. There has been some
rejection of the notion that an individual should be able
to direct what happens to them once they become incompetent.121 However, the legal status of advance directives
has not been the subject of significant calls for reform so
the Panel has determined the legal status of advance
directives to be relatively clear and uncontroversial.

b. Less Clear and More Controversial
A 15-year-old girl is dying of leukaemia. She refuses
further blood transfusions after three unsuccessful and
gruelling rounds of chemotherapy. If she is able to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of her
decision (as well as the alternatives available to her), is
it legal for her refusal to be respected? Must her decision
be respected?
118
British Columbia, Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.
405, Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 181; Alberta, Personal Directives Act, R.S.A. 2000,
c. P-6; Saskatchewan, Health Care Directives and Substitute Health Care
Decision Makers Act, S.S. 1997, c. H-0.001; Manitoba, Health Care
Directives Act, C.C.S.M. c. H27, Child and Family Services Act,
C.C.S.M. c. C80, s. 25; Ontario, Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O.
1996, c. 2, Sch. A, Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30;
Quebec, Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 10–25, 2130–2185;
New Brunswick, Infirm Persons Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. I-8; Nova Scotia,
Personal Directives Act S.N.S. 2008, c.8; Prince Edward Island: Consent
to Treatment and Health Care Directives Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-17.2;
Newfoundland and Labrador, Advance Health Care Directives Act,
S.N.L. 1995, c. A-4.1; Yukon Territory, Care Consent Act R.S.Y. 2003,
c.21; Northwest Territories, Personal Directives Act, S.N.W.T. 2005,
c.16; Nunavut, no legislation.
119
For example, the Yukon sets the age at 16 (s. 27(1) while Alberta sets
the age at 18 (s.3.1).
120
See the studies referenced in Chapter One.
121
See, for example, papers in 81 Texas Law Review (2003).
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A 15-year-old girl who has been quadriplegic for five
years refuses antibiotics for a simple pneumonia. If she is
able to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of the decision she is making and the alternatives
available to her, is it legal to respect her refusal? Must
her refusal be respected?

There remains uncertainty and controversy within
Canadian law regarding withholding and withdrawal of
potentially life-sustaining treatment from mature minors.
Mature minors are those who, while under the age of
majority,122 are able to understand and appreciate the
nature and consequences of a decision to refuse potentially life-sustaining treatment. If such a minor refuses
such treatment, must the patient’s refusal be respected or
only when others see his or her decision as being in his or
her best interests?
To answer these questions, a number of sources must
be consulted. These include the common law mature
minor rule,123 the courts’ overall jurisdiction to protect
the vulnerable,124 provincial/territorial child and family
services legislation, provincial/territorial consent legislation, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
There are also prior cases interpreting these various
sources of legal authority. A review of these authorities
suggests that it is legally permissible (if not required) to
respect the refusal in the first case. This position, like that
of withholding or withdrawal from adults, is grounded in
a commitment to autonomy and the view that autonomy
does not directly correlate with age and, for some, that
this decision is in her best interests. In contrast, whether
it is legally permissible or required to respect the refusal
in the second case is much less clear. The level of confusion depends, in part, on the province or territory, as
some have legislation and case law and some do not.125
A recent Supreme Court of Canada decision on mature
minors126 has relieved some of the confusion resulting
from conflicting decisions by provincial courts of

appeal.127 It is clear now that, in some circumstances,
mature minors’ refusals may be overridden. For example,
the court may override if it determines the medical decisions being made by the minor are not in the minor’s best
interests (with the level of maturity taken into account
in the court’s assessment of the minor’s best interests).
While this gives some clarity, there remains, unfortunately, considerable confusion. This is both because the
decision is itself somewhat unclear, and because the issue
continues to be complicated by the various interlocking
sources of legal authority listed above.
Controversy also remains as debates continue about
whether the consent of mature minors should be considered both necessary and sufficient, or as not sufficient
for treatment decisions. Some believe that if the minor
understands and appreciates the nature and consequences of the decision to be made (here a refusal of
potentially life-sustaining treatment), then it is irrelevant
how others view his or her decision.128 Others believe that,
even if the minor understands the nature and consequences of the refusal, the refusal should only be
respected if it can be seen by others (such as her parents,
the health care team, or the court) to be in her best
interests.129

c. Very Unclear and Very Controversial
A 65-year-old man is in hospital in a persistent vegetative state. His family believes that he would have wanted,
and it would be in his best interests, for him to be resuscitated should he have a cardiac arrest. The health care
team says to attempt resuscitation would be futile and
refuses to do it. The team is going to put a Do Not
Resuscitate Order on the chart. Is it legally permissible
for the team to do this?
There is a great deal of confusion and controversy
regarding the legality of unilateral withholding and with-
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The age of majority is established through statute in the provinces
and territories (see, for example, British Columbia Age of Majority Act
R.S.B.C. 1996, c-7).
123
A rule which establishes that an individual under the age of majority,
but capable of understanding and appreciating the nature and consequences of a decision to be made, should, at least in some circumstances,
have that decision respected. This rule is grounded in respect for
autonomy and, insofar as this respect is limited, tempered by concerns
about protecting minors from making bad decisions.
124
This ancient jurisdiction provides the courts with the authority to act
to protect those unable to protect themselves. Historically, and particularly, this encompasses the young and the mentally disabled or ill. See
Downie J. Dying Justice: A Case for Decriminalizing Euthanasia and
Assisted Suicide in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004,
at 81–84.
125
Gilmour J. “Death, Dying and Decision-Making about End of Life
Care” in Downie J, Caulfield T, Flood C (eds.). Canadian Health Law
and Policy 3d ed. Toronto: LexisNexis, 2007, 437 at 441–445.
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A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC
30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181. It should be noted here that in this case, the

Supreme Court of Canada considered the mature minor issue in the
context of child protection proceedings (a context in which the potential
consequences for the minor are, by definition, very serious).
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Joan Gilmour, “Death, Dying and Decision-Making about End of
Life Care” in J. Downie, T. Caulfield, and C. Flood (eds.) Canadian
Health Law and Policy 3d ed. Toronto: LexisNexis, 2007, 437 at 441–
445. For example, Johnston v. Wellesley Hospital (1971), 17 D.L.R. (3d)
139 (Ont. H.C.), J.S.C. Wren, [1987] 2 W.W.R. 669 (Alta.C.A.), C.A.S.
Metro Toronto v. K. (1985), 48 R.F.L. (2d) 164 (Ont. Fam.Ct.), Re
Y.(A.) (1993), 111 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 91, Walker (Litigation Guardian of)
v. Region 2 Hospital Corp. (1994) 116 D.L.R. (4th) 477 (N.B.C.A.), Ney
v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] B.C.J. No. 993 May 3, 1993
B.C.S.C., Kennett Estate v. Manitoba (Attorney-General), [1988] M.J.
No. 131, 18 March 1998, Van Mol (Guardian ad litem of) v. Ashmore,
[1999] B.C.J. No. 31 (B.C.C.A.).
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See, for example, David C. Day, “The Capable Minor’s Healthcare:
Who Decides?” 86:3 (2007) Canadian Bar Review 379–420.
129
This position is reflected in, for example, the Infants Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 223 s.17.
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drawal of potentially life-sustaining treatment. The issue
here is whether health care professionals have the legal
authority to withhold or withdraw treatment against the
wishes (or without the knowledge) of the patient or the
patient’s substitute decision-maker.
In a few cases, courts have found that a physician did
have the authority to unilaterally withhold or withdraw
treatment.130 More commonly, however, the courts have
found that the issue of unilateral withholding and withdrawal is unsettled in law.131 In policy statements and
academic literature, there are statements to the effect that
health care providers do have legal authority to unilaterally withhold or withdraw treatment but there are also
statements that say the law is unclear.132
There is extraordinary conflict over what the law on
this matter should be. Many papers have been published
in the ethics133 and medical literature;134 many columns of
ink have been spilled in the popular press.135 It has been
argued in the literature that, if the health care team
believes requests for specific treatments by substitute
decision-makers are not in the best interests of the

patient, the decision to withhold or withdraw treatment
should rest with the health care providers.136 Others maintain that the decision should rest with the substitute
decision-makers, or that conflicts between the health care
team and the substitute decision-makers should be
resolved by society (through the courts or some form of
specialized tribunals).137 Statements from the courts or
the legislatures will be needed to resolve the confusion
and controversy in this area.

3. POTENTIALLY LIFE-SHORTENING
SYMPTOM RELIEF
a. Somewhat Clear and Relatively
Uncontroversial
A 75-year-old man is dying of stomach cancer. He is
suffering greatly despite being on morphine for a week.
His daughter asks the doctor to increase the morphine
(frequency and dosage). The physician explains that he
cannot be sure that such an increase will not in fact
shorten her father’s life, because of the potential for
depression of her father’s respiration. The man’s daughter begs the doctor to increase the morphine anyway,
saying that she cannot bear to see her father suffering
like this and that she knows from conversations with her
father that he would have chosen the risk of earlier death
over ongoing pain had he been competent.
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See, for example, Child and Family Services of Manitoba v. R.L.,
[1997] M.J. 568, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 409; I.H.V. Estate (Re), [2008] A.J.
545, 2008 ABQB 250.
131
See, for example, Sawatzky v. Riverview Health Centre Inc., [1998]
M.J. 506, 167 D.L.R. (4th) 359; Scardoni v. Hawryluck, [2004] O.J. 300,
69 O.R. (3d) 700; L.I.C. (Re), [2006] A.J. 190, 2006 ABQB 130; Yeung
v. Capital District Health Authority (Dec. 15, 2006 – case concluded),
Halifax HFX273970, (N.S.S.C.(T.D.)); Jin v. Calgary Health Region,
[2007] A.J. 1100, 2007 ABQB 593; Golubchuk v. Salvation Army Grace
General Hospital, [2008] M.J. 54, 2008 MBQB 49; Rotaru v. Vancouver
General Hospital Intensive Care Unit, [2008] B.C.J. 456, 2008 BCSC 318,
at paragraph four; Barbulov v. Cirone, [2009] O.J. 1439.
132
Policy statements include: the Manitoba College of Physicians and
Surgeons, Position Statement, 1602, “Withholding and Withdrawal of
Life-Sustaining Treatment” (2008), online: http://www.bioethics.ca/
statement.pdf [Accessed 2 August 2011]; the Canadian Medical Association, Canadian Nurses Association, Canadian Health Care
Association, and Catholic Healthcare Association of Canada “Joint
Statement on Resuscitative Interventions (Update 1995)” online:
<http://policybase.cma.ca/policypdf/PD95–03.pdf>; [Accessed 26 July
2011]; the Canadian Medical Association, Canadian Nurses Association, Canadian Health Care Association, and Catholic Healthcare
Association of Canada, “Joint Statement on Preventing and Resolving
Ethical Conflicts Involving Health Care Providers and Persons Receiving Care” online: http://policybase.cma.ca/dbtw-wpd/PolicyPDF/
PD99–03.pdf> [Accessed 26 July 2011]. For an illustrative professional
report, see the Manitoba Law Reform Commissions report, “Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment” 2003
(Report 109) online: http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/mlrc/reports/109.pdf
[Accessed 2 August 2011]. For an illustrative academic paper, see
Downie J., McEwenK. “The Manitoba College of Physicians and Surgeons Position Statement on Withholding and Withdrawal of LifeSustaining Treatment (2008): Three Problems and a Solution” Health
Law Journal.2010; 17:115–138.
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See, for a recent example, a series of comments in 10:3 American
Journal of Bioethics.2010 Mar.
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A PubMed search for “futility ethics” returned 1263 hits.
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See, for example, the volume and nature of media coverage by
searching “Samuel Golubchuk” on the internet.
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The question here is whether someone who provides
potentially life-shortening symptom relief could be convicted under the Criminal Code with criminal negligence
causing death (for example, culpable homicide).138 No
case that is directly on point has reached the Supreme
Court of Canada. However, there are some relevant comments to be found in the assisted suicide case involving
Sue Rodriguez (Canada’s most famous assisted suicide
case about which more will be said in a later section of
this chapter).139 For the majority in Rodriguez, the late
Justice Sopinka wrote:
[t]he administration of drugs designed for pain control
in dosages which the physician knows will hasten death
constitutes active contribution to death by any standard. However, the distinction drawn here is one based
136

See, for example, the Manitoba College of Physicians and Surgeons,
Position Statement, 1602, “Withholding and Withdrawal of LifeSustaining Treatment” (2008), online: Canadian Bioethics Society
<http://www.bioethics.ca/statement.pdf>[Accessed 26 July 2011].
137
See, for example, Downie J, McEwen K. “The Manitoba College of
Physicians and Surgeons Position Statement on Withholding and Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment (2008): Three Problems and a
Solution” Health Law Journal. 2010; 17:115–138.
138
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.220.
139
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R.
519.
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upon intention – in the case of palliative care the intention is to ease pain, which has the effect of hastening
death, while in the case of assisted suicide, the intention is undeniably to cause death. . . . In my view, distinctions based upon intent are important, and in fact
form the basis of our criminal law. While factually the
distinction may, at times, be difficult to draw, legally it
is clear.140

It can be argued, on the basis of this judgment, that the
provision of potentially life-shortening symptom relief is
legal if the intention is to ease pain.
Despite this, much remains uncertain: How much
medication is too much? Are there limits on who can be
given such treatment? Must the person be terminally ill?
Must suffering be physical or can it be psychological? Are
there limits on when such treatment can be given? Must
someone be imminently dying? Many questions such as
these remain unanswered by the law. Some uncertainty is
addressed through guidelines (specifically, for example,
the Ontario Chief Coroner’s Guidelines and the British
Columbia Crown Counsel Guidelines for the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion).141 However, these are little
known, have limited scope, and are still quite vague.
Many healthcare providers and members of the public
are confused and, as a result, patients may not be receiving appropriate and adequate symptom relief.142

4. TERMINAL SEDATION
a. Very Unclear and Potentially
Very Controversial
A 55-year-old woman with pancreatic cancer is admitted
to hospital with pain that has become unmanageable
at home. Her healthcare providers attempt to control her
pain through intensive analgesia. However, this is ineffective. Her family approaches the woman’s physician
and say that they have read about deep and continuous
sedation in their newspaper and would like that for her.
They say they realize it will reduce her consciousness
140

Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R.
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(perhaps render her completely unconscious), but they
are confident that this is what she would want were she
competent. They also realize that this would mean she
could only receive food and water artificially, but they
refuse artificial hydration and nutrition on her behalf;
they realize this will shorten her life (with artificial
hydration and nutrition she is expected to live approximately three more months). Is it legal for the physician
to provide the sedation and withhold the hydration and
nutrition?
The legal status of each of the two elements of terminal
sedation can be assessed independently but the legal
status of terminal sedation can only be determined by
combining them.
The first element is deep and continuous sedation. This
is considered legally acceptable care for some patients; an
example is a patient with terminal bone cancer who is
suffering intractable pain that cannot be relieved through
any other means. However, the limits on acceptability are
not clear. Does it matter whether the suffering is psychological rather than physical? Does it matter if it is in
response to physical vs. mental illness? The courts have
not addressed either of these questions, nor are they
addressed explicitly by legislation. While the general
framework for addressing consent to treatment would be
applied by the courts, it is not clear what conclusions
would be drawn. The second element under consideration
here is withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition
and hydration. As noted earlier, this is legally permissible
no matter the reason, as long as a competent patient
makes a free and informed refusal. When the two elements of terminal sedation are paired, the legality
becomes both unclear and controversial. To put a very
fine point on it: could a physician legally respect a free
and informed request, from a competent person who is
not imminently dying but rather has a bipolar disorder
and believes that death would be preferable to living with
her condition, for deep and continuous sedation in order
to create the physical need for artificial hydration and
nutrition and a refusal of artificial hydration and nutrition, thus ensuring that she will die within one to two
weeks? Would this be treated as just another refusal of
treatment case accepted in law or would it be considered
a slow form of assisted suicide not accepted in law? The
answers to these questions are not clear and would surely
be controversial.

5. ASSISTED SUICIDE
a. Very Clear and Very Controversial
A 44-year-old man has advanced Multiple Sclerosis.
He is still living at home with supportive care. He is
concerned his quality of life will decline to the point at
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which he will be entirely dependent on others to care for
him and he will no longer be able to do any of the things
that bring him pleasure in life. He asks his physician to
write him a prescription for a barbiturate and to give him
instructions for how to use the drugs prescribed to kill
himself at the time in the near future when he wants to die.
Is it legal for his physician to provide the prescription?
The law on assisted suicide is clear. Under section
241(b) of the Criminal Code it is illegal to aid or abet a
person to commit suicide (although suicide is legal).143
The constitutionality of the Criminal Code prohibition
on assisted suicide has been tested and, in Rodriguez in
1993,144 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that it did
not violate the Charter. There have been three convictions for assisted suicide after which the defendants were
sent to jail.145 There have been at least 17 other cases that
are known to have come to the attention of the authorities in which a charge was either not laid,146 stayed or
dropped,147 or the defendants were found not guilty148
or, where convicted, given suspended or conditional sentences or probation.149 In one of these cases, a man took
his wife to Switzerland for an assisted suicide with the
143
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help of Dignitas.150 The police investigated the case, but
ultimately decided not to lay any charges. This is consistent with the principle that, barring an explicit exception
in the law, you cannot be tried for things that you do in
another country when they are legal in that country even
if they are illegal in Canada. It is not known how many
other cases of assisted suicide have come to the attention
of the authorities but not the public or have simply happened without the knowledge of the police.
While the law is clear on assisted suicide, there is certainly a great deal of controversy about it. As detailed in
Chapter One, some believe that the law is appropriate
and no law reform is required.151 Others believe that
assisted suicide should be permitted in some circumstances and, accordingly, the Criminal Code should be
revised to allow assisted suicide, under a regulated
regime.152 There have been a number of attempts to
change the Criminal Code through bills introduced in
federal parliament (one such bill was considered as
recently as May 2010), but none have been successful.153
As mentioned earlier, in April 2011, three cases were
launched in British Columbia challenging the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Criminal Code that
prohibits assisted suicide.154 It remains to be seen whether
any or all of them will be successful.

6. VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA
a. Very Clear and Very Controversial
A woman is suffering from advanced amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (ALS, also known as Lou Gehrig’s disease).
<http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/01/27/suicide-helper060127.
html>; [Accessed 26 July 2011]; Ramesh Sharma (2006) “B.C. doctor
charged with assisting suicide attempt” CBC News (2 August 2006),
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She is paralyzed from the neck down and can no longer
swallow or breathe on her own She has decided that,
given her condition, her life is no longer worth living and
that she would rather die than continue in this irreversible state of irremediable suffering. Using a method of
communication by eye blinking developed by her occupational therapist, she asks her physician to give her a
lethal injection. Is it legal for him to do so?

Voluntary euthanasia, like assisted suicide, is quite
clearly illegal in Canada. It is prohibited by section 229
of the Criminal Code. Motive is irrelevant and consent
(either from the individual or a substitute decisionmaker) does not provide a defence.155 It is unlikely that an
attempt to argue the defence of necessity would succeed.156 First-degree murder carries with it a mandatory
minimum life sentence with no possibility of parole for 25
years. Second-degree murder carries with it a mandatory
minimum life sentence with no possibility of parole for
ten years.157 Someone who commits voluntary euthanasia
could be convicted of first or second degree murder.
Clearly this is a serious prohibition.
That said, there have been at least eighteen cases
in which charges were laid against individuals:158 one
individual fled the country;159 one was not taken past the
preliminary hearing;160 three were acquitted;161 seven were
convicted with suspended sentences (plea bargains from
murder to administration of a noxious substance or manslaughter);162 four were convicted on the lesser charges of
manslaughter or administration of a noxious substance
(one with two years probation,163 one with three years
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probation,164 one with two years in jail,165 and one with
five years in jail);166 and two were convicted of murder,
both with life sentences.167
As with assisted suicide, while the law is clear on voluntary euthanasia, it is also the subject of great controversy. As detailed in Chapter One, some believe that the
law is appropriate and no law reform is required.168
Others believe that voluntary euthanasia should remain
illegal but a third degree of murder (without the mandatory minimum life sentence) or a statutory defence to a
charge of murder in cases of euthanasia should be introduced.169 Others still believe that voluntary euthanasia
should be permitted in some circumstances and that the
Criminal Code should be revised so that voluntary euthanasia could, under a regulated regime, take place.170
Again, there have been a number of attempts to change
the Criminal Code through bills introduced in the federal
parliament, but none have been successful.171 One of the
three court challenges mentioned above in the discussion
of assisted suicide also explicitly challenges the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Criminal Code that
prohibit euthanasia.172 Again, time will tell whether the
provisions can withstand judicial scrutiny.

7. CONCLUSIONS
It can be concluded that the legal status of some forms
of conduct is clear, such as withholding and withdrawal
of potentially life-sustaining treatment at the request of
competent adults, assisted suicide, and voluntary euthanasia. Some are unclear, such as unilateral withholding
and withdrawal, and terminal sedation. Some are very
hotly contested, such as unilateral withholding and withdrawal, assisted suicide, and voluntary euthanasia. The
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Panel now turns to a consideration of the ethics of the
controversial forms of conduct. In the next chapter,
the Panel shifts the Report’s attention from exploring
what the legal status is to an ethical analysis of what kind
of normative grounding public policy should have and
where that grounding takes us with respect to what the
law should be.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ETHICS OF
END OF LIFE CARE
bioe_1939_4

29..101

1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters offer a clear picture of some of the
challenges that lie ahead for Canada’s health care system.
Canada is undergoing a demographic shift that is changing the health profile of its population. Canadians are
living longer and, as a greater proportion of the population reaches ages that only a small fraction of the population reached just a few generations ago, Canada’s
health system will need to address a broad range of issues
that reflect the changing disease profile of its population.
These issues do not just deal with the wishes of patients
in the last few days of incurable disease, but also with
patients suffering from chronic diseases and progressive
cognitive impairment. For example, there are urgent
questions to be addressed by policy makers regarding the
lack of access to quality palliative care and the low rates
of completion of valid and useful advance directives.
Chapter Two shows how unclear and unsatisfactory
the existing legal framework for a significant range of
end-of-life care decisions is. It is imperative that Canadians address the legal uncertainties and controversies that
currently make decision-making so difficult for healthcare professionals, patients, and their families. The Canadian legal system’s stance on a number of end-of-life
issues is unclear because it leaves important questions
unanswered. For example, who has the final say over the
question of whether treatment should be withdrawn
when the physicians want to stop treatment but the
family disagrees? And how should the use of terminal
sedation be viewed through existing legal categories? It is
controversial, as there is a significant disconnect between
the opinions of the majority of Canadians and the law as
it now stands with respect to assisted suicide and euthanasia. There are also extremely strongly held (and,
indeed, often polarized) positions with respect to what
the law should be on a number of end-of-life decisions.
How should these issues be addressed? The Panel
strongly asserts that they must be addressed in the
context of responsible and rigorous ethical reflection.
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Canada is a pluralist liberal democracy. Its vigorous
defence of its citizens’ basic freedoms, including freedoms
of conscience, association and expression, give rise to a
situation in which Canadians predictably reach a wide
range of conclusions about ethical issues. As far as the
source of ethics is concerned, some Canadians believe
that ethics should be grounded in the will of God, while
others believe that it should have more secular bases.
Canadians citizens reflecting on important ethical issues
in a context of freedom of thought and expression also
reach quite diverse conclusions as to the contents of
ethics, of the values that ought to have pride of place.
Some believe that it should be about the protection
of individual autonomy. Others think that it should
ultimately aim to maximize happiness and well-being.
The Panel holds that in the context of such reasonable
pluralism, the kind of ethical reflection that it engages in
ought to be guided by values over which there is some
significant degree of consensus within Canadian society.173 It ought to avoid taking sides on the kinds of deep
disagreements that divide Canadians as far as the source
and contents of ethics is concerned. In order to promote
democratic discussion among Canadians, the Panel has
sought to identify values over which Canadians broadly
agree, and to trace what the implications of those values
are for the issues related to end-of-life care.
How do we indentify the ethical consensuses that
exist in a democratic society like Canada in the context of
deep and durable disagreement as to the ultimate grounds
and ends of ethics? The Panel holds that this should be
done by looking to the ethical cornerstones of Canada’s
institutional order as a liberal democracy. A particularly
rich fount of such values is our Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, as well as the almost thirty years of legal and
ethical reasoning that it has given rise to.
Of course, ethical reflection must also be informed by
publically ascertainable facts (for instance, by epidemiological data such as is canvassed in Chapter One of this
Report, and data from countries which have begun to
deal with the issues identified above such as will be provided in Chapter Four). Canadians will only arrive at
sensible policies and laws when ethicists and philosophers
collaborate with empirical researchers, and make careful
and responsible use of the data that they produce in order
to enrich and to structure public debate. The facts matter;
the uses made of them must not be clouded by prior
ideological commitments.
To solve the problems identified in earlier chapters, our
society’s commitments to a range of central values must
where possible be connected with the specific issues that
arise in the context of end-of-life decision-making. This
requires careful philosophical reasoning whereby the
173
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Panel tries to tease out, through argument, what the
implications of our general ethical commitments are in
specific issue areas. These philosophical arguments will,
if successful, achieve a certain level of coherence both
between general ethical commitments – as expressed, for
example, in the language of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms – and laws and policies across different policy
areas such as that of end-of-life care.
For some issues, these values, combined with the facts,
leads us to justifiable conclusions about what the law
should be. The Panel holds that there is both sufficient
consensus with respect to core values in the Canadian
policy context and a sufficient grasp of the relevant facts
that justifiable conclusions can be drawn about what the
legal status of assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia
should be. Detailed arguments in support of these
conclusions are therefore presented in this chapter and
recommendations grounded in these arguments are
presented in Chapter Five.
For some issues, however, consensus on how to resolve
competing ethical commitments or disagreements as to
the relevant available facts is not yet available. Indeed,
the values that, in the Panel’s view, constitute the unquestioned core of Canadian public political culture, do not
speak to all moral issues and in particular they do not
speak clearly to the debate surrounding assisted death
in non-voluntary contexts, that is in cases of individuals
who are no longer, or who have never been, able competently to formulate wishes relating to end of life care. The
Panel fully acknowledges that the consensus that we identify in Canada’s political culture as a liberal democracy,
and more specifically in its foundational texts and judicial
decisions, occurs against the backdrop of a pluralism of
reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good, some
religiously grounded, others secular in nature. The Panel
also recognizes that the considerations contained in this
report are not exhaustive of the philosophical landscape.
Clearly some of these moral frameworks are comprehensive enough to apply to non-voluntary contexts. They
are however insufficiently widely shared to constitute
the basis for the kind of argument the Panel wishes to
develop here, which attempts to ground substantive positions on the issue of assisted death in broad normative
consensus.
For these reasons, the Panel does not for example
address the conclusions that might be derived from the
tradition of consequentialist philosophical theorizing
that gives pride of place to the notion of well-being. Very
generally speaking, such theories are united by a commitment to the idea that actions and policies are justified in
as much as they promote aggregate well-being. Now, as
has recently been argued very eloquently by the Canadian
consequentialist philosopher Wayne Sumner, autonomybased and well-being-based arguments tend to converge
in the case of competent individuals, because they are

best situated to know what their level of well-being is, and
how it should be promoted.174 But one of the implications
of well-being-based theories is that they allow the theorists who hold them to extend arguments about assisted
death into non-voluntary contexts, that is, into contexts
in which individuals are no longer, or have never been,
capable of competently formulating their wills.
While the Panel fully recognizes the importance of the
contribution made by well-being-based arguments to
the philosophical literature on assisted death, it holds
the view that such arguments are not sufficiently well
grounded in Canadian public culture to allow grounding
this analysis in such considerations. Conceptions of wellbeing are at present too diverse to ground a publically
justifiable practice of assisted death in non-voluntary
contexts on the basis of third-party assessments of the
quality of life of a non-competent individual. Nor does
the panel find guidance as to consensuses surrounding the
concept of well-being that might exist in Canadian public
political culture that might allow the Panel to make the
kind of argument in non-voluntary contexts that it feels
able to make in voluntary ones. To repeat, the intention
of the Panel is to articulate the implications of public
values that are deeply ingrained in the Canadian public
political culture and institutions.
Rigorous ethical reflection is required in order to
achieve coherence between various ethical commitments.
Democratic deliberation is required where a society’s
ethical commitments are unclear.175 Decision-making
about euthanasia will not always be able to ground itself
in the value of individual autonomy, as there will be
occasions when decisions will have to be made, for
example, for patients in advanced stages of dementia and
for patients who are in persistent vegetative states neither
of whom have valid and relevant advance directives.
It is clear that these decisions cannot always be made
by referring to the patient’s clearly expressed wishes
(whether contemporaneous or prior). It is therefore not
yet clear enough what values should guide decisionmaking about non-voluntary euthanasia in this category
of cases which, as the epidemiological data presented
in Chapter One have made plain, will be increasingly
frequently encountered in the years to come.
Canadians have experimented successfully with democratic deliberative mechanisms on a range of issues such
as electoral reform176 and many others.177 This experience
can be usefully drawn upon to organize deliberation on
174
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these issues in years to come. The Panel’s opinion is that
an Expert Panel, such as this one, should not dictate the
general compass Canadian society ought to use in
addressing contested issues of value. The Panel therefore
does not deal with non-voluntary euthanasia as it is an
issue that cannot yet be resolved through reference to the
kind of consensus that exists to address voluntary contexts and to facts that provide a sufficient base for justifiable conclusions.
This chapter examines the implications of what the
Panel takes to be core normative commitments of Canadians as evinced by their constitutional framework with
regards to the issue of assisted death. The structure of the
chapter is as follows. First (section 2), the chapter identifies the core values that are sufficiently well grounded in
Canadian political and legal culture to form the basis of
an argument concerning assisted death in the case of
competent agents. The Panel holds that respect for individual autonomy and self-determination represents such
a core value. The Panel also recognizes the importance
that the protection of vulnerable citizens and the promotion of ‘human dignity’ have in our constitutional
tradition, and in particular in Supreme Court decisions
surrounding end-of-life care. This chapter therefore
attempts to interrogate critically and to articulate these
core values so as to give rise to a set of recommendations
that best coheres with these core moral commitments.
Second (section 3), the Panel connects the conception of
autonomy at work in the context of debates over assisted
death with a conception that is already well entrenched in
the theory and the practice of voluntary and informed
consent. Third, (section 4), an important distinction
between moral and legal rights is introduced, according
to which the determination of whether or not there exists
a moral right to assisted death establishes only a presumptive, or prima facie case for the desirability of
establishing a legal right. Fourth (section 5), the chapter
sets out the basic argument in favour of decriminalizing
assisted death in the case of competent agents on the basis
of the value ascribed by Canadian political and constitutional culture to the value of autonomy. In sections 6
and 7, the Panel considers the main arguments against
decriminalization. Some of these arguments, considered ,
in section 6, are a priori, in that they contest that there is
a prima facie, moral right to assisted death. In particular,
some arguments grounded in the value of human dignity
take this form. As human dignity has been invoked often
by the Supreme Court of Canada, the Panel devotes
particular attention to this concept.
Other arguments against the decriminalization of
the right to assisted death are a posteriori, in that they
concede the existence of a prima facie moral right but
hold that other considerations weigh heavily against
the recognition of a corresponding legal right. These
arguments are considered in section 7.
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One of these arguments is grounded in the concern that
the decriminalization of assisted death in the case of competent agents might set us down a ‘slippery slope’ that will
unavoidably place vulnerable persons at risk. Given the
importance that the concern with the protection of the
vulnerable rightly possesses in Canadian constitutional
culture in general, and in the Rodriguez decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada, that still forms the backdrop to
much discussion of the right to assisted death in Canada,
particular attention is devoted to such arguments.

2. CORE VALUES
What are the values over which there is broad societal
consensus as evinced by Canada’s foundational texts and
institutions? The Panel holds that the value of individual
autonomy or self-determination (we use these two terms
interchangeably in the context of this Report) should be
seen as paramount, though not as exclusive. Let us begin,
then, by establishing the case for the paramount status of
the value of individual autonomy.
There are several ways in which to establish the centrality of autonomy to a liberal democratic regime such
as Canada. One way would be to advert to the history of
political thought to see just how central the value of
individual autonomy has been to the ethical and philosophical justification of liberal democracy. Whether one
looks to John Stuart Mill’s argument according to which
one of the main functions of the State is to protect individuals’ sovereignty with respect to their ‘self-regarding’
actions, to Immanuel Kant’s definition of Enlightenment
as ‘man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity’,
where immaturity is defined as ‘the inability to use one’s
own understanding without the guidance of another’,
and where the responsibility of enlightened political
institutions is to promote the enlightenment of citizens,
or to Rousseau’s ascription of a foundational status to
autonomy for the ideal political order he envisaged, it has
been clear to thinkers of liberal democracy that individual autonomy and liberal democracy are inextricably
linked, with autonomy serving both as the normative
ground and as the goal of liberal democratic political and
legal institutions.178
Another way is by reflecting on the important status
that individual rights protections have in modern liberal
democracies. Though there are debates about whether
such goods as health and welfare ought to be protected
by rights, there is no debate about certain core civil and
178
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political rights that have to do with the protection of
the individual’s freedom of thought, conscience and association, as well as her bodily integrity, from unauthorized
interference by the state, and with the capacity of individuals to exercise self-determination in the social and
political arena. Clearly, the importance that liberal
democratic thought and practice ascribe to these rights
only makes sense if individual self-determination is
given similar importance. Individual self-determination
accounts for the central place that individual rights
occupy in the institutional orders of liberal democracies.
The philosophical and institutional importance of
individual autonomy for liberal democracies is clearly
reflected in the decisions that have been taken by the
Supreme Court of Canada since 1982, when a Charter of
Rights and Freedoms was entrenched in Canada’s Constitution, and in the language that the members of the Court
have chosen to employ in order to justify their decisions.
What is striking for present purposes is just how central
they have taken individual self-determination to be, in
particular in decisions that relate to the area of health
care. Thus, for example, in Ciarlariello v. Schachter, the
Court affirmed patients’ rights to refuse treatment and to
have treatment withdrawn even after it has begun, Justice
Cory, writing for the Court wrote: ‘It should not be forgotten that every patient has a right to bodily integrity.
This encompasses the right to determine what medical
procedures will be accepted and the extent to which they
will be accepted. Everyone has the right to decide what is
to be done to one’s own body. This includes the right to
be free from medical treatment to which the individual
does not consent. This concept of individual autonomy is
fundamental to the common law’.179 The centrality is,
importantly, also affirmed in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), the case that reaffirmed the criminal status of physician-assisted death, where Justice
Sopinka refers to the importance of ‘control over one’s
physical and psychological integrity’.180
Thus, whether we look at the matter historically,
philosophically, or by adverting to the practice of the
Canadian Supreme Court, it seems clear that the value of
autonomy occupies a paramount place among the values
of Canada’s constitutional order. To the extent that the
Charter enjoys broad support among Canadians as a
framework within which to work out difficult questions
of political morality in a fair and equitable manner,
it follows that the cornerstone value of individual
autonomy is at the centre of this consensus.
The value of autonomy of course does not stand alone
among the values embodied in our constitutional and

institutional order. Autonomy is properly conditioned
and limited by considerations to do with (to use Justice
Dickson’s language in R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd.),
‘public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others’.181 Equality is clearly
also a core value in our constitutional order, and the
language of ‘human dignity’ also pervades the language
of many Supreme Court decisions. In particular, it has
been viewed by the Court as intrinsically connected to the
value of equality. Indeed, the equality provisions of the
Charter are seen as aiming above all for Canadians to
enjoy equal dignity.182 (Dignity has also been connected
by the Supreme Court to the value of individual selfdetermination, and to a host of other Charter values, a
fact that makes it of dubious value in attempting to
become clear on the specific ethical stakes that are present
in the debates surrounding end-of-life care in general,
and assisted dying in particular, a fact to which we shall
return below). Thus, the Panel will be led to examining
the ways in which these other constitutional values
condition and limit autonomy-based arguments.
The task of this chapter is to spell out the implications
of the broad normative commitments latent in the institutional culture of Canadian society, an institutional
culture around which there is broad and stable societal
consensus for the debate surrounding assisted death in
voluntary contexts, that is in contexts in which individuals are capable of articulating their wishes competently.
We consider, that is, whether a commitment to individual
autonomy entails a prima facie right to choose assisted
death on the part of ‘competent’ individuals (we will take
up the concept of ‘competence’ below). If this implication
were to hold, we then ask whether any of the other constitutional values that properly condition the value of
individual autonomy should be taken as overriding the
prima facie right.
Before we address these central questions, a pair of
preliminary sets of remarks must be made. The first have
to do with the nature of the concept of autonomy that we
will be employing in the context of this Report. The second
have to do with the various ways in which values can be
used in arguments grounding and limiting legal rights.

3. AUTONOMY
There are many conceptions of autonomy.183 Some are
purely procedural. These maintain that an individual
181
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is autonomous insofar as he is allowed to do what he
wishes. This purely formal conception places no constraints on the procedures whereby a person has come to
decide what they want. Whim, passing desire, and sober
reflection are all protected by a conception of autonomy
that merely seeks to protect the individual’s ability to
do his or her will against outside interference. At the
other end of the spectrum lie substantive conceptions of
autonomy that only protect individual choice when that
choice has been the result of a very specific kind of reasoning. Immanuel Kant, the philosopher whose name is
(perhaps misleadingly) most often associated with the
concept of autonomy, thought autonomy requires that
the rules which govern people’s autonomous wills should
be ‘universalizable’. Myriad conceptions lie in between
these two extremes.
The ethical stakes involved in selecting a particular
conception of autonomy are considerable. The more
we tend toward the procedural end of the continuum of
conceptions, the more we run the risk of claiming, even
of a person who is in the grips of a passing whim or
a compulsion, that they are autonomous. This is
counter-intuitive, because implicit in the idea of ‘selfdetermination’ is the idea of a self who makes decisions
about her actions on the basis of some standing set of
convictions, plans of life, intentions, and the like. Arguably, we are ‘not ourselves’ when we merely succumb
to a passing desire (unless we have deliberately made it
into a policy to follow passing desires) or when we act
compulsively.
But the more we tend toward the substantive end
of the spectrum, the more we risk justifying a great deal
of paternalism under the cover of a commitment to
autonomy. For example, if we hold that only people
who are operating in conditions of full information and
ideal rationality are fully autonomous, we risk making
autonomy into an unrealizable ideal. We also risk countenancing a great deal of difficulty to justify strong paternalistic intervention into the choices of individuals who
do not meet the exacting standards of a highly demanding
conception of autonomy.
Clearly, a morally attractive and operationalizable
conception of autonomy would need to strike a reasonable middle ground between these two extremes. In deciding what conception of autonomy to make central to the
argument of this Report, the Panel was once again guided
by the concern that it should connect with values that are
already deeply enshrined in central Canadian institutional commitments, and it should avoid imposing values
that are not already settled parts of our ethical landscape.
In this context, the Panel has chosen to be guided by
the doctrine of informed choice that constitutes a central
pillar of contemporary health ethics and of Canadian
health law. Informed choice is grounded in autonomy; it
seeks to apply the abstract value of autonomous decision-
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making to the context of health care. It requires that
competent patients must not be subjected to treatment
unless they have consented to it.184 That consent is subject
to three conditions: first, it must be uncoerced; second,
it must result from the decision-making capacity of a
cognitively competent individual; and third, it must be
informed. A conception of autonomy can thus be read in
informed choice as the cornerstone of modern medical
ethics and Canadian health law. An autonomous person
would, according to this conception, be a substantively
cognitively competent and uncoerced individual who
arrives at his or her decisions after having been offered
relevant information about the decision at hand.
Each of the conditions that constitute the modern
doctrine of informed choice is subject to controversy.
How much information is enough and what information
is relevant? At what point does the cognitive decline of an
individual become such as to detract from the appropriateness of thinking of him as autonomous? What role
does the social construction of needs and wants play in a
person’s competence? Does the forceful attempt to persuade count as coercion? Does the absence of options
constrain choice? All of these matters are subject to
intense philosophical discussion that lie beyond the scope
of this Report. But for the purposes at hand, the Panel
considers it sufficient to link this conception of autonomy
with the concept of informed choice that is deeply
embedded in Canadian institutions, and to adopt the
conception of informed choice that is presently at work
in Canadian health law and in Canadian health care institutions. Any conception of autonomy that coheres with
the doctrine of informed choice will incorporate a significant cognitive dimension, emphasizing the capacity to
understand and appreciate the information at his or her
disposal, the provision of information, and the voluntariness of the decision-making. The Panel’s understanding
of autonomy will not be purely procedural; that is, it will
not take just any wish expressed by an individual as a
manifestation of his or her autonomous decision-making
capacity.

4. MORAL AND LEGAL RIGHTS
Should the criminal ban on medically assisted death be
lifted? Should individuals possess a right to request of
medical professionals that they assist them in dying? A
first step in determining whether such a right should exist
consists in determining whether or not there is a moral
right to choose assisted death. The Panel takes a moral
right to be a moral entitlement of a kind. For the purpose
of determining whether such a moral entitlement exists
184
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we look at the moral values at stake, and determine
whether, on balance, they justify a moral right.
Determining whether a legal right exists is a separate
question. It does not follow from the fact that an individual has a moral right to X that she should also have
the legal right thereto, nor does it follow that if she does
not have the moral right to X, then she should not have
the legal right to X. The existence of a moral right establishes a presumption in favour of the establishment of a
legal right, but that presumption can be overturned by
other considerations.
To see this, consider the argument put forward concerning such matters as recreational drug use and sex
work. Some people believe that these activities should be
made legal because, first, they hold a moral commitment
to autonomy, and to the accompanying idea according to
which individuals should be allowed to engage in whatever activities they see fit so long as no third parties are
thereby harmed, and second, they hold that there are no
countervailing reasons to ground a legal right upon the
aforementioned moral right.
Some people may believe however that, first, the commercialization of sex and the use of recreational drugs are
morally problematic, and thus should not ground a moral
right, but that, second, there are reasons to recognize a
duly constrained legal right to buy and sell sexual services
or to engage in the purchase, sale and use of recreational
drugs. They might affirm this second claim because they
believe that certain core values, to do for example with
the security of persons, are best realized through a regime
of decriminalization and regulation rather than in a situation in which these practices generate harms because
they are conducted in the absence of any regulation, and
because the laws that criminalize the activities in question
are unenforceable.
Opponents of certain legal rights may also argue to
their conclusions by following one of two routes. They
can claim that there is no moral right to X, and no
reasons analogous to those that according to some exist
in the case of sex work and recreational drug use, to grant
a legal right. Or they can claim that there is a moral right
to X, but that there exist countervailing considerations
that justify that that right not be given legal expression.
This point is important in the context of the Canadian
debate over medically assisted death because all of these
positions have defenders in that debate, though the different logical structures of their different arguments are
not always distinguished perspicuously. It is particularly
important that we identify the nature of one of the central
disagreements between the majority and the dissent in the
Rodriguez case. To wit, they agreed that a prohibition on
assisted suicide limited a person’s right to autonomy but
they disagreed about whether allowing the exercise of
that legal right poses a threat to vulnerable persons, that
is to persons who do not satisfy the criteria for autonomy

described above, or whose request for physician-assisted
death is not fully voluntary.

5. AUTONOMY AND ASSISTED DEATH
If autonomy is, as we claim that it is, a central constitutional value, then it quite clearly grounds the right to
request assistance in dying according to one’s considered
and stable views about when one’s own life is not worth
living any longer.
The argument for this conclusion is fairly straightforward. If we believe that one of the roles of the state is to
provide people with the institutional framework within
which they can lead autonomous lives, that is, lives that
reflect their values, convictions, and conceptions of what
makes life worth living, it follows that the state should
to the degree that it is able to protect citizens against
obstacles to their being able to live their lives according to
their own lights.
What’s more, the state should be particularly vigilant
in protecting citizens in this way with respect to the
important choices in their lives. It is far more important
that the state protect the citizen in her ability to choose a
life partner than it is that it protect her in being able to
choose certain breakfast cereals rather than others. Who
to marry, what religion to profess, if any, whether to have
children or not, these are choices that contribute powerfully to an individual’s being able to view her life as one
that corresponds to her ‘conception of the good life’.
Deciding how one will die clearly belongs to the choices
that ought to be protected by the state, given our
commitment to individual autonomy. The manner of our
dying indeed reflects our sense of what is important just
as much as do the other central decisions in our lives.
Indeed, it seems contradictory to deny a person the right
to live according to the values she thinks most important
at the moment of her death after having put in place
institutional mechanisms allowing her to follow these
values in all other decisions of her life.
The commitment to autonomy, which as we have seen
is a cornerstone of our constitutional order, thus quite
naturally yields a prima facie right to choose the time and
conditions of one’s death, and thus, as a corollary, to
request aid in dying from medical professionals.

6. LIMITS TO THE RIGHT TO MEDICALLY
ASSISTED DEATH
We need now to address two distinct types of arguments.
The first denies the conclusion that has just been argued
for, claiming that the prima facie moral right that we have
just argued for does not exist. The least ambitious such
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argument attempts to block the inference that many have
made between the widely accepted claim that competent
adults have the right to refuse medical treatment, or
to have medical treatment interrupted once it has been
started, even when it seems clear that abstaining from
medical treatment will result in death, and the claim that
competent individuals should have the right to choose
assisted death. Indeed, some have argued that once one
accepts the former practice, there is no moral ground
for refusing the second. The argument against this view
appeals to a pair of related distinctions, between intending a consequence and (merely) foreseeing it, and between
doing and allowing. The argument is the least ambitious
because while it establishes, if successful, that we cannot
merely piggyback the moral acceptability of assisted
death on that of the right to refuse treatment or to have it
withdrawn, it does not tell us why assisted death is wrong.
Two further families of argument will then be considered that attempt to establish exactly that point. One
such argument affirms the importance of autonomy, but
argues that there are certain acts that autonomous choosers should never choose. The second holds that there
are values that trump autonomy. We will in particular be
focussing on the dignity-based argument against the
prima facie right to choose assisted death, because dignity
is a value that is quite regularly cited by the Supreme
Court as central to the Canadian constitutional order.
The second set of arguments claims that though the
prima facie moral right may very well exist, countervailing considerations exist that require that we abstain from
giving legal expression to it. These arguments are paradigmatically expressed as ‘slippery slope’ arguments to
the effect that if medically assisted death is legalized, it
will be impossible for the state to protect its most vulnerable citizens, and thus to realize another important constitutional value, that has to do with the security of its
residents.

They must claim that it is worse to bring about a person’s
death than it is to omit an act so as to prevent a person’s
death. They must also defend the view that there is a
moral distinction between killing and simply letting die.
Finally, they must hold that an individual is not morally
responsible for the bad ends that they merely foresee will
result from an action, but that they do not intend to
occur. Do these distinctions withstand critical scrutiny?
The Acts and Omissions Doctrine (AOD) holds, essentially, that there is a moral difference between actively
killing a patient and omitting to keep a patient alive when
one could have acted, at a reasonable cost to oneself, to
produce that same outcome. This view holds that omitting to keep, for instance, a terminally ill patient alive
who does not wish to be kept alive is sometimes less – or
not at all – morally objectionable than actively killing a
terminally ill patient who requests active assistance in his
or her dying. Robert Young offers a possible rationale for
this point of view in more abstract terms:

a. No Inference from the Right to Refuse
Treatment to the Right to Assisted Death

This latter view has been criticized as conceptually indefensible by numerous scholars. Jonathan Glover argues
that the AOD relies on accepting the claim ‘that there is
a moral difference between acts and omissions with the
same total consequences.’186 He offers a number of possible rationales for such a view, including: the idea that
acts are more likely to translate into certain outcomes
than omissions; the view that actions more clearly result
in identifiable victims than do omissions; that someone
who acts is usually more causally connected to a particular outcome than someone who omits to act; and
that someone who acts usually acts intentionally, while

The Panel will be reviewing in what follows a number of
influential conceptual frameworks frequently invoked
in discussions on end-of-life decision-making. These
concepts do not necessarily have a bearing on the
autonomy based analysis offered in this Report. Some
have been included merely to ensure that the review
of influential conceptual frameworks is reasonably
comprehensive.
If healthcare professionals not only can, but must,
adhere to the wishes of a patient who no longer wishes to
be treated, does it not stand to reason that they should
also be permitted to assist that patient in dying? Those
who deny this logical implication must drive a hard
conceptual and moral line between action and omission.
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Those who conceive of morality exclusively, or a least
predominantly, within a traditional (deontological)
framework claim, that doing something harmful is
intrinsically morally wrong – that is, is morally wrong
in itself, regardless of any good consequences it may
produce. By contrast, when something similarly
harmful is allowed to happen, a lesser intrinsic wrong is
thought to be involved. . . . Those who think acts of
killing are intrinsically worse [than letting die] can
agree that a killing typically has extrinsic features that
are lacking in an instance of letting die – malice, violation of the victim’s rights, violence and so on – and
that the presence of these features generally makes
a killing far more reprehensible. What they insist,
however, is that even in medical settings, where such
extrinsic features are not normally present, it is intrinsically worse to do something harmful than to allow
something harmful to occur.185
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someone who omits to act does not.187 Are these kinds
of reasons persuasive? Arguably not. If one were to
compare actions and omissions using the same criteria,
it becomes apparent that none of these arguments
succeed. For instance, it is not necessarily the case that
an omission to act is less likely than an action to guarantee a particular outcome. Similarly, it is not necessarily true that someone who omits to act is less causally
connected to a particular outcome than someone who
acted to achieve that same outcome. All of these suppositions depend upon the particularities of each case.
There may very well be situations in which these differences are reversed, for example that an omission will
more readily contribute to a particular outcome than an
action. Imagine, on the one hand, that an individual
omits to remove a baby from a shallow pond in which
he or she may drown. In this case, that individual’s
omission has a clearly identifiable victim. Imagine, on
the other hand, that an individual throws water balloons into a crowded room, knowing that they will
damage the clothes of some people in the room, but not
knowing which one. Indeed, for any reason provided by
Glover to indicate why people might think that there
are features about acting that impart greater responsibility than omitting to act, it is possible to construct
cases with the opposite conclusion.
The distinction between action and omission falls
apart. Both can be brought about by the same intention:
that of bringing about a state of the world in which a
patient will be dead rather than alive. Omissions can
sometimes result not from intention, but from negligence.
Though there are cases of people who have neglected to
do something less responsible than had they intended and
planned to do that thing (less responsible, but not completely exempt from responsibility), this is not the case
when the omission is deliberate, as in the case where one
passes by the baby drowning in the shallow pond, deliberates about whether or not to rescue it, and decides not
to. Intending to omit to do something, with the intention
of bringing about a consequence, seems not to have any
of the features that would make an individual less likely
to ascribe moral responsibility to certain omissions than
to actions.
It is because intending to omit in order to bring about
a result does not seem, morally, very different from
intending to act in order to bring about that same result,
that the AOD does not seem to have much relevance to
end-of-life decision-making in clinical contexts. Indeed,
though negligence does occur in clinical contexts, the
types of cases considered in this Report are ones in which
healthcare professionals omit to treat their patients in full
knowledge that doing so might hasten their deaths (after
187
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having consulted with their patients about the course
of action that they desire). The Panel analyzed whether,
when both intention and outcome are held constant,
there is something morally relevant that distinguishes
action and inaction. The Panel asserts that there is not,
and that attribution of responsibility must occur on a
case-by-case basis, rather than on the basis of a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing, or between
killing and letting die.
Another avenue that has been proposed to account for
both the moral acceptability of current medical practice
(for example, withholding treatment, use of potentially
life-shortening analgesics and sedatives) and the moral
condemnation of medically-assisted death, is the invocation of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) and the associated intention-foresight distinction (IFD).
Before analysing the tenability of the DDE, the Panel
notes that in daily medical practice there is usually no
need to invoke this doctrine to justify the use of palliative
measures by a physician. In most cases, the dosages of
drugs used are carefully modulated in such a way that
no life-shortening effect needs to be assumed. Moreover,
patients in severe pain can tolerate drug dosages that
would quickly kill people who are not suffering pain. And
even the reverse could happen as drug administration for
pain control can itself prolong life rather than hasten
death. In all such cases, physicians are not hastening the
death of their patient so there is no need to invoke DDE
to justify such treatment.
However, things are different when patients do die
quickly after the administration of drugs and certainly
when physicians administer sharply increasing dosages
of pain medication with the clear knowledge that this
administration is likely or even certain to hasten the
patient’s death. Here the DDE is sometimes invoked to
justify the life-shortening effect of the intervention by the
physician. The Panel analyses now whether the doctrine
can be successfully used for that purpose.
The DDE and the IFD distinguish between the
intended outcome of predictable (or foreseeable) actions
and outcomes and those actions and outcomes that are
not intended. Consider a healthcare professional who
decides to prescribe a life-shortening amount of painkilling medicine; a sanctity-of-life doctrine-supporting
observer subscribing to the DDE would want to know
whether the healthcare professional was intent on shortening the patient’s life or whether he or she was intent
on relieving the patient’s suffering. The same act leading
to the same outcome could easily translate into diametrically opposing ethical evaluations, depending on the
doctor’s intentions. It is somewhat doubtful that this
argument can be successful. After all, a person is dead
and that death was caused unequivocally by the doctor’s
decision to give a certain amount of pain-killing drugs.
To claim that there is an important moral difference
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between doing ‘x’ in order to bring about ‘y’, and doing
‘x’ in order to do ‘z’ – but in the full knowledge that it
will bring about ‘y’ – is to split hairs much more finely
than is realistic in the context of real-life decisionmaking.
The DDE, historically, goes back to an argument
advanced by St. Thomas Aquinas. He used the example
of permissible homicide in self-defence. Aquinas imagined a situation where someone’s intention is to fend
off an attacker. However, while he or she succeeds in
fending off the attacker, the attacker dies as a result
of the defender’s actions. The attacker’s death was unintentional, and, according to Aquinas, is permissible
‘because self-preservation is a legitimate aim and a
person who is unjustly attacked has a greater duty to
preserve his own life than he has to preserve the life of
the attacker.’188 The morally important claim here is that
the person who is attacked permits the death of the
attacker to occur, but does not intend for it to happen.
The implicit understanding is that the death of the
attacker is something that is undesirable and ought to
be avoided. One assumption here is that the victim – the
attacked person – is acting from good motives; or, as
Suzanne Uniacke puts it, the ‘acts of double-effect are
morally well-motivated.’189 The argument from the DDE
relies on accepting a further concept, namely the IFD.
This distinction upholds the view that there is a moral
difference between intending a patient’s death and foreseeing that it might happen, but not intending for it to
happen. It is logically possible to maintain that, while
one knows that to give a certain amount of pain-killers
will lead to the death of the patient, one does not intend
to kill the patient, and that one merely intends to alleviate the patient’s suffering.
Views on the morality or immorality of what amounts
practically to assisted dying are necessarily affected by
arguments from the DDE and the IFD. Consequentialists will maintain that both the DDE and the IFD are
irrelevant considerations in our evaluation of the morality of assisted dying. Either it is a morally good thing to
offer assistance in dying to some people or it is not.
Whether an individual foresees or intends for their action
to assist a patient to die is morally uninteresting. What
matters, on the background of the autonomy based
ethical rationale laid out in this Report, is whether the
result of the occurring assistance, namely the death of the
patient, is what the patient desires.
Looking at matters more closely, the IFD – that is
critical to the success of the DDE – poses problems for
188
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even its proponents. There are at least two reasons why
this is the case. First, while the strict distinction between
intended consequence and foreseen consequence may be
plausible in theory, it is, in practice, extremely difficult
to identify people’s intentions with that level of precision. A person’s exact motives are often somewhat
opaque even to that individual; it would be wrong to
ascribe complete reliability to the agent’s capacity to
know with complete certainty whether something that
he or she knew would happen as a result of his or her
action formed no part of the reason for which he or she
did it. This problem is all the more significant when
ascribing motives to others. A view of moral responsibility (grounded in a distinction that, in most ordinary
cases, would render the attribution of responsibility
impossible) should be rejected even by a deontologist.
There is every reason to reject theories that are premised
on exaggerated claims about the epistemic abilities of the
people or institutions that will end up having to judge
the rightness or wrongness of an action.
The second reason has to do with the undesirable consequences that an insistence on the IFD might have on a
sense of moral responsibility. Do we want agents to feel
as morally detached from the foreseeable consequences
of their actions as the IFD would seem to represent? In
general, people need to care about the foreseeable consequences of their actions. It is not desirable that they
should invoke the fact that ‘they didn’t do it on purpose’
as a way of getting out of moral liability. To the extent
that people are expected to be morally responsible for the
foreseeable consequences of their actions, it is strange to
invoke a doctrine that does exactly the opposite in order
to account both for the moral permissibility of widely
accepted medical practices (use of sedatives and analgesics, withdrawal of treatment), and the putative unacceptability of actions that are done with the intention of
killing (assisted suicide, voluntary euthanasia).

b. A Priori Arguments: Suicide is not
Choice-worthy
Is there a case, based solely on self-regarding obligations,
for claiming that suicide constitutes harm to oneself sufficient to negate one’s autonomy-based prima facie right
to choose assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. Do
people have an obligation to themselves not to end their
lives? Such a case seems difficult to discern because, in the
types of cases that interest this Report, the competent,
informed, and uncoerced individual who constitutes our
paradigm case does not view death as harm given her
assessment that her life is no longer worth living for her.
The influential German enlightenment philosopher
Immanuel Kant thought that there is an obligation to self
not to commit suicide because suicide is a denial of one’s
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rational nature. Kant’s argument for this conclusion is
not usually thought of as meriting too much attention,
resting as it does on a notoriously tortured use of the idea
that one should only act on maxims, or rules of conduct,
that can be universalized. Part of Kant’s point is,
however, worth attending to: Kant believed that by committing suicide, an individual is somehow giving in to
human inclinations (the inclination an individual might
feel, for example, to turn their back on a difficult situation they could confront more forthrightly). To use
modern parlance, Kant’s view is that the person committing suicide takes the easy way out, where reason would
dictate that he or she face their problems. It is in this
respect that Kant thought that committing suicide turns
against rational nature.
It is possible that some suicides conform to the
Kantian picture. But again, in considering the situation
of a person who has rationally reflected upon her situation and arrived at the conclusion that he or she wanted
to end their life, the decision to commit suicide can be
seen as a paradigmatic manifestation of rational agency
rather than as its denial. If, as suggested above, the
manner of one’s dying is among the decisions that can
reflect an individual’s deepest values and commitments,
then it would seem that Kant was wrong that in deciding
to commit suicide, an individual was, in all cases, simply
giving up and surrendering to inclination.
What of the person who does decide to commit suicide,
or to request of others that they aid him in committing
suicide, for reasons that might appear as frivolous?
Do we not want to protect people against their selfdestructively bad ideas? An obvious objection to the
Panel’s view according to which autonomous individuals
should be permitted to determine for themselves when
their life is no longer worth continuing, is that autonomous people sometimes make bad choices. It is conceivable, so the objection might continue, that a person
might request assistance in dying for what could be illconsidered or frivolous reasons. Surely, the objection
would conclude, such demands should not be met by an
obliging health-care professional, nor should they be permitted by law. After all, permitting such bad choices
would result in the destruction of someone’s long-term
ability to make autonomous choices in order to boast –
one last time – her occurrent autonomy. If we value
autonomy, so the argument might continue, we should
aim to maximize it. Permitting someone to sacrifice their
ability to make autonomous choices in the long-term in
order to make one autonomous, but ill-advised, choice in
the short-term does not seem to be sensible public policy.
This line of argument can be met in at least two ways.
First, while this is the type of example philosophers are
wont to invent to highlight purely logical problems with a
philosophical position, it does not seem particularly plausible or indeed likely that competent people would request

assistance in dying for no sound reason at all. Indeed, the
empirical evidence available from jurisdictions in which a
permissive regime exists (as described in Chapter Four)
provides no basis for believing that individuals seek assistance for ill-considered or frivolous reasons. Remember
that our account of autonomy is not purely procedural.
That is, it does not require that we respect just any choice
that individuals make while in the throes of whim or
compulsion. The justification of assisted death in this
Report concerns individuals who have been provided sufficient information to understand the nature and consequences of their decisions, and who possess the various
cognitive abilities that constitute competence.
What of the theoretically possible though unlikely case
of an uncoerced competent person who with sufficient
information nonetheless decides to die for frivolous
reasons. Our commitment to autonomy requires that we
bite this theoretical bullet. Respect for autonomy requires
respect for what others might consider to be bad decisions
as long as those decisions are free and informed and made
by competent individuals. This is reflected in bioethical
and legal analyses of potentially fatal decisions ranging
from refusals of potentially life-sustaining treatment,
to participation in risky behaviour (including cosmetic
surgery and climbing Mount Everest), to suicide.
We must now consider a third kind of a priori argument aiming at denying that there exists a presumptive
right to choose assisted suicide. This argument is to the
effect that such a presumptive right would be contrary to
human dignity. Given the historical prominence of this
argument in the debate surrounding euthanasia, we have
chosen to consider it at particularly great length.

c. A Priori Arguments: Suicide Offends
against Human Dignity
This section evaluates the suitability of arguments
grounded in human dignity as a means of meaningfully
addressing normative issues that affect end-of-life
decision-making. The Panel’s conclusion is that while the
language of human dignity is seemingly universal, there
is currently no consensus on the moral basis or on the
precise meaning of human dignity. It is unclear whether it
should best be understood as a basic, or primitive, term of
moral language or whether it might reasonably be derived
from a moral theory of mainstream appeal. Unsurprisingly, given its vagueness human dignity is currently
being deployed in ethical, political, and even legal contexts in support of diametrically opposing points of view.
In this section, the Panel concludes that the concept of
human dignity is an unsuitable tool for settling normative
questions pertaining to end-of-life decision-making.
The Panel approaches the task at hand by sketching the
notion’s historical use as well as its significance in a recent
landmark Canadian Supreme Court ruling. The last part
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of this section provides an ethical analysis of different
influential philosophical approaches to human dignity. In
all three instances examined here, dignity is used to encompass a variety of quite distinct normative considerations.
The section ends with a call for arguments to be made on
the basis of these normative considerations, rather than in
terms of dignity, which too often functions as a rhetorical
tool to gain assent to normative positions that would
otherwise seem controversial and unacceptable to some or
many Canadians. The length of this section is a direct
reflection of the significant role that the concept of dignity
plays in debates about voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide and the need to get past it if we are to make any
progress in breaking the apparent deadlock that grips
discussion of public policy on these issues.
The trope of human dignity pervades debates about
end-of-life decision-making and is present in many other
spheres of social life. David A. Hyman notes:
. . . in every generation, philosophers, ethicists, religious figures, politicians, and professional worrywarts
have cited human dignity as a reason to restrict
innovation or prohibit it outright. Consider a few
examples. Galileo was forced to recant his heliocentric
views because the Roman Catholic Church had
already embraced the Ptolemaic system as more consistent with Biblical revelation and with man’s dignity
as God’s creation. Indoor plumbing, the printing
press, skyscrapers, the suburbs, automobiles, television, the Sony Walkman™, and the franchise for
women were all met with the objection that they were
inconsistent with human dignity. The Industrial Revolution, which laid the foundation for the modern
world, was criticized because machines were expected
to destroy human dignity.190
In the context of end-of-life decision-making, arguments about the question of whether particular tools
and mechanisms designed to bring about the death of a
patient are dignity-violating continue unabated.191,192
Sensen adds that ‘human dignity is currently presented as
the justification for human rights.’193 In the medical
context, human dignity holds a prominent place. The
World Medical Association’s Declaration of Geneva
demands that doctors treat their patients with ‘compas190
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sion and respect for human dignity’.194 This requirement
was eventually extended to cover biomedical researchers’
treatment of participants in clinical trials.195 Similar
pronouncements have been made by the World Health
Organization.196 In Canada, the Tri-Council’s Policy
Statement notes that respect for human dignity ‘has been
an underlying value of the Tri-Council Policy Statement:
Ethics Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS
or the Policy) since its inception.’197
Van der Graaf and colleagues, among others, have
attempted to categorize different historical understandings of dignity.198,199 Their contributions show that the
language of ‘human dignity’ is used in the healthcare
context from Roman antiquity to today. Throughout
history, human dignity has been used in a variety of
different, and often overlapping, contexts. From antiquity to the Middle Ages, through the Renaissance and,
arguably, to Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant, human
dignity was used to emphasize human beings’ special
place in the universe. The criteria drawn on to make this
case were typically the capacity to reason, the ability to
make use of freedoms and the ability to give intellectual
direction and order to one’s life. This, so it was argued,
distinguishes humans from non-human animals. This,
most obviously, leaves open the question of whether
humans without these dispositions do not possess
human dignity. Indeed, philosophers of very different
backgrounds – utilitarian and Kantian respectively –
have concluded that this rationale for a different moral
status of non-human animals is anything but convincing.200 The traditional paradigm of human dignity seems
to have little in common with today’s, however vague,
understanding. For instance, dignity in the traditional
understanding does not serve as a moral basis of rights’
194
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claims. Dignity, according to the traditional understanding, is more concerned with ensuring that humans live up
to a standard of ethical living that is required by an
inherent dignity within.
Today dignity is frequently understood as some kind
of intrinsic, morally relevant value that places a moral
obligation on the individual (and on others) to respect
someone by virtue of their dignity.201 Sensen points out
that human dignity, in this contemporary understanding,
forms the moral ground of human rights in UN documents. For instance, in the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, human rights are grounded in ‘the recognition of the inherent dignity [. . .] of all members of
the human family.’202 Sensen sees a problem in the UN
approach on this issue:
[i]n documents like these [UN declarations, covenants]
key terms are deliberately kept vague, since one can
only secure an agreement among so many parties at the
price of a certain ambiguity. If one were to specify the
meaning and grounding force of human dignity, it
might be at odds with some parties’ deeply entrenched
opinions and beliefs. In this case the whole project
might fail. Accordingly, there is no explicit attempt to
clarify or justify human dignity in these documents.203
A good example of this, in the field of bioethics, is the
UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights.
It deploys human dignity to ground the substantive
policy guidance contained in this document.204 David
Benatar agrees with Sensen’s take on the popularity of
vague language in this dignity-centred declaration. He
argues, ‘[t]he other way to gloss over disagreement is to
choose formulations that are sufficiently vague that each
person can interpret them consistently with his or her
own views.’205 The Panel returns to this problem throughout this section as it has significant ramifications for the
subject matter of this Report.
It is evident, from this brief survey, that there is no
consensus among experts on what the moral basis of
human dignity is, if any, and what its specific meaning in
the health care context should be taken to be. It is thus
not surprising to find the term invoked on both sides of
the debate over assisted dying. The Panel’s survey of the
201
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meanings of this term – both its current and historical
usages – suggests there is no way to point to a canonical,
or ideal, conceptualization; it cannot be proven that
either side of the assisted dying debate is properly applying the concept. Indeed, it is uncertain that there is
unequivocally a concept to begin with.
On one side of the ledger, certain religious organizations and institutions have used the language of human
dignity as a means to reject any suggestion that assisted
dying should be decriminalized. For instance, the
Roman Catholic Church considers assisted suicide
and euthanasia to be a ‘violation of the divine law, an
offence against the dignity of the human person, a crime
against life, and an attack on humanity.’206 Recently
Margaret Somerville insisted that, ‘the concept of
dignity must be used to maintain respect for the life of
each person, and for human life and for the essence
of our humanness, in general. The current danger is that
in the euthanasia debate it could be used to realize
precisely the opposite outcomes.’207 Accordingly, Somerville believes the decriminalization of assisted suicide
and voluntary euthanasia would be such undesirable
outcomes.
On the other side of the argument, Raphael CohenAlmagor, to name but one example, has published The
Right to Die with Dignity, a monograph proposing
the decriminalization of assisted suicide on the basis of
considerations of dignity.208 What’s more, organizations
campaigning in favour of the decriminalization of
assisted dying (in some shape or form) do not hesitate to
campaign in the name of ‘human dignity’. Indeed, some,
like the well-known Swiss organization Dignitas offer
assisted-dying services to terminally ill patients.209 Joel
Feinberg offers some justification for this view when
he writes, ‘human dignity is not possible without the
acknowledgment of personal sovereignty.’210 This strategic positioning and the attempt at taking ideological ownership of the term human dignity is unsurprising, given its
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near-universal appeal. However, as will become evident
from currently available analyses of the term, neither
proponents nor opponents of assisted dying will be able
to resort to language of ‘human dignity’ as some kind of
trump in support of their views.
To determine whether things are any clearer in the
usage that is made of the term in Canadian jurisprudence
the Panel examined the Supreme Court of Canada decision in the case of Sue Rodriguez, in which the term was
used frequently in both the majority and in the minority
opinions.
In September 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada
decided on the petition by Sue Rodriguez – a terminally
ill patient in advanced stages of amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (ALS) – to declare invalid section 241 (b) of
the Criminal Code which criminalizes assisting people
to commit suicide.211 Ms. Rodriguez argued that section
241(b) of the Criminal Code violated her rights under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Specifically,
Ms Rodriguez argued that denying her access to assisted
suicide denied her constitutional rights as granted under
sub-sections 7, 12 and 15 (that is the right not to be
deprived of the rights to life, liberty and security except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, the
right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to equal treatment under the law).212
The Supreme Court of Canada, in a five to four majority
decision, denied the appeal.213
Surprisingly judges in both the majority and minority
made reference to human dignity to justify their respective decisions. The majority decision reads, in part:
[a]s members of a society based upon respect for the
intrinsic value of human life and on the inherent dignity
of every human being, can we incorporate within the
Constitution which embodies our most fundamental
values a right to terminate one’s own life in any
circumstances? [emphasis added]214
The majority of Supreme Court of Canada judges’
answered this question with an unequivocal no.
The judges who wrote to grant Sue Rodriguez’s appeal
also framed their arguments partly in terms of dignity.
Justice Cory expressed his stance this way:
. . . the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
has granted the constitutional right to Canadians to
life, liberty and the security of the person. It [s.7] is a
provision which emphasizes the innate dignity of human
211
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existence [emphasis added]. . . . [It] follows that the
right to die with dignity should be as well protected as
any other aspect of the right to life.215
Justice Beverley McLachlin (as she then was) wrote:
Security of the person has an element of personal
autonomy, protecting the dignity and privacy of individuals with respect to decisions concerning their own
body. It is part of the persona and dignity of the
human being that he or she have the autonomy to
decide what is best for his or her body [emphasis
added].216
The judges of the Supreme Court of Canada availed
themselves of the language of human dignity as a means
to support diametrically opposed results, namely the
continuing criminalization of assisted suicide on the one
hand, and the decriminalization of assisted suicide on
the other. The majority of judges on the Supreme Court
of Canada expressed a particular understanding of the
dignity of human beings. Pullman argues that they were
concerned that ‘a liberal assessment of individual cases
eventually will erode society’s perception of the intrinsic
worth of human life in general.’217 One of the dissenting
opinions of the court saw individual dignity as disrespected when the individual’s right to self-determination
is ignored. Justice McLachlin (as she then was) asked at
the time: ‘What value is there, in life without the choice to
do what one wants with one’s life?’218
Thus, just as no conceptual clarity on the concept of
dignity is gained by looking at historical sources, it is also
impossible to move forward by examining the use to
which the concept of dignity has been put in the main
Canadian Supreme Court decision addressing the issue of
assisted suicide.
Might an examination of contemporary moral theory
address this conceptual quagmire? It is possible, after all,
that one of the opposing sides claiming human dignity as
its own is just wrong in its use of the term, and that moral
philosophy will provide contours of the concept that will
enable a decision on which of the two camps is closer to
what human dignity really denotes.
It is worth approaching the analysis of the concept of
human dignity in the context of assisted dying by asking,
first, whether it is either a primitive (or self-evident) term
of moral language or whether it is derived from a substantive moral theory with significant general appeal.
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Once the moral foundation of human dignity is understood, the Panel can address the question of the validity
of its guidance.
Robert Goodin argues, in an influential account of
human dignity, that it is impossible to ground human
dignity in a moral theory. However, he insists that we
should accept ‘human dignity’ as a logical primitive, ‘a
fundamental axiom in our individualistic ethical system’.219 This, of course, is begging the question. Goodin,
after conceding that dignity cannot sensibly be derived
from an ethical framework, suggests that we should
accept it as a primitive term of moral language. The
problem is, unfortunately, that the meaning of the term is
not self-evident to begin with and so, in that sense, the
question is left unanswered.
Broadly speaking, in addition to the contemporary,
intuitionist account of human dignity, there are arguments in moral philosophy about whether human dignity
is a species-related concept that is applicable to all human
beings as human beings regardless of a given member
of our species’ dispositional capabilities,220 or whether
human dignity applies only to a person capable of
making rational choices.221
Historically, species-related dignity claims have been
derived from a religious idea, as expressed in the Book of
Genesis, suggesting that God made the human species the
apex of earthly creation. This metaphysical claim rests on
‘the Judeo-Christian appeal to the imago dei [image of
God] as the basis of human dignity.’222 It has been suggested that this traditional understanding of human
dignity was first explicated by Pope Leo I. He reportedly
said, “[r]ealize, o Christian, your dignity. Once made a
‘partaker in the divine nature’, do not return to your
former baseness by a life unworthy [of that dignity].
. . . Recall that you have been made ‘according to the
image of God’.”223 On a policy level, such claims translate
into stances such as this, taken by the Canadian Salvation
Army:
Human life is a sacred gift from God. The Salvation
Army believes, as a consequence, that euthanasia and
assisted suicide are morally wrong. . . . Euthanasia
undermines, rather than enhances, human dignity.

. . . Assisted suicide undermines, rather than enhances,
human dignity.224
Ethics has at least two primary functions: to guide our
actions, and to provide justification for the guidance
given. This approach to human dignity seems to meet the
guidance criterion. Most of those appealing to this understanding of dignity reject any kind of assisted suicide or
euthanasia. The reason frequently provided is that the
God in question is the sole arbiter of life and death and
that mere mortals are not permitted to interfere with
God’s master plan. God is understood to have given
humans life, and humanity is not entitled to take this gift
away on its own accord.
The underlying premise – namely that all humans are
possessed of dignity in virtue of a special relationship to a
God – is, however, incapable of being used as a basis of
public policy proven in the context of a democratic, multicultural and multi-faith society that must cleave to the
strictures of public reason in ethical deliberation. In the
absence of a societal consensus in favour of, or incontrovertible proof of the existence of the God in question,
and, therefore, the absence of overwhelming societal
support for the metaphysical claims underlying this
grounding of dignity, this account of human dignity
cannot be relied upon to justify normative guidance on
assisted dying on a societal level. Religious people might
choose to avail themselves of the guidance provided by
their respective religions, but it is unreasonable to enforce
normative views, derived from claims about a God, uniformly on a societal level given the multicultural and
multi-faith nature of Canada in the 21st century.
The same holds true for secular accounts arguing
against the decriminalization of assisted dying on speciesmembership accounts. Leon Kass’ account is probably
the best-known of these approaches. He famously argued
that ‘the deepest ethical principle restraining the physician’s power is not the autonomy or freedom of the
patient; neither is it his own compassion or good intention. Rather, it is the dignity and mysterious power of life
itself.’225 This approach to human dignity is again metaphysical in nature. It asserts that species-wide dignity is a
kind of ethical primitive that imposes limits on all other
ethical theories, as Richard E. Ashcroft has suggested.
He notes that
this approach is set out in direct challenge to the dominant ‘personhood’ account, which starts from what is
morally valuable in paradigm cases of humans and
then generalizes to other entities with similar features,
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while restricting concern (to varying degrees) to entities lacking some or all of the features of personhood.
The dignity approach rejects this strategy, in part
because it undermines the moral status of ‘marginal’
humans (such as embryos and people in a persistent
vegetative state), and in part because it holds that
dignity (or humanity) is ‘primitive’ in that it cannot be
analyzed further into contributory components. Personhood is not ‘primitive’ in this sense, and the arguments about who does or does not possess it are widely
criticized by non-bioethicists as attacks on vulnerable
people. On the other hand, Kass’ metaphysical dignity
is equally obscure, precisely because it is held to be a
primitive term.226
The challenge for non-theological, species-wide
conceptions of dignity is that once the argument about
having been made by and in the image of God is taken
away, it seems impossible to point to some trait possessed
by all humans, and only by humans, that grounds the
attribution of dignity to them. Species-wide conceptions
of dignity are thus, it would seem, questionable.
Kurt Bayertz rightly points out that such appeals to
human dignity and to the sanctity of human life have, for
all practical intents and purposes, become efficient stop
signs both in philosophical discourse and public policy
debates. These appeals are aimed at pre-empting any
further debate on the matter.227 Attempts at linking
appeals to dignity and the sanctity of human life have
been widely criticized by philosophers from various,
often even competing, philosophical traditions during the
last few decades. In a similar vein, court judgments have
repeatedly and explicitly rejected a fundamental assumption inherent in claims about human dignity and the sanctity of human life, namely that continued existence is
always of benefit to the person in question.228
Immanuel Kant developed not a species-specific, but
a person-specific account of human dignity. Respect for
dignity, according to his understanding, is owed to us not
as a result of our membership of our species but rather, to
our the human capacity for living a life based on rational
choices as a dignified existence requiring moral respect. It
is that which distinguishes us from non-human animals
because it permits us to overcome natural necessity. In
Kant’s ethics, all persons with the disposition to reason
are ends in themselves; they have intrinsic, infinite value.
One implication of this view is that persons must never be
used as mere means by others, and that they must never

treat themselves as mere means either. The latter point,
particularly, could have serious consequences for the
debate on assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia.
The point of this view is that humans ought to respect
persons’ dignity because of the value ascribed to their
capacity to make rational, moral choices, and to respect
them for who they are as self-conscious beings.
But if this is what grounds dignity, then it is unclear
why it should (as Kant thought it did) be viewed as part
of an argument against the right to determine the circumstances of one’s dying. Indeed, if people’s ability to
reason is respected, then their ability to reason about the
ends of life, and about the end of life, must be respected
as well. Why is the decision to request aid in dying in the
face of a subjective conclusion that one’s life is no longer
worth living (and in full cognizance of the facts about
one’s circumstances) a denial, rather than an affirmation,
of dignity?
Kant clearly thought that an autonomous person – a
person who made use of his or her rational capacities in
order to determine his or her course of action – would
never choose to commit suicide. But this, as has been
noted, was based on his somewhat tortured reasoning
according to which, necessarily, a person who chooses to
die in order to put an end to suffering is treating him or
herself as a means rather than as an end:
If he destroys himself in order to escape from a difficult
situation, then he is making use of his person merely as
a means so as to maintain a tolerable condition until
the end of his life. However, a human is not a thing and
hence is not something to be used merely as a means;
one must in all one’s actions always be regarded as an
end in itself. Therefore, I cannot dispose of a human
being in my own person by mutilating, damaging, or
killing him.229
J. David Velleman, a current-day Kantian agrees.
According to his analysis, we ought to value the person in
a particular special way that does not, by definition,
permit us to balance dignity against other values (like
respect for a patient’s autonomous choices – a choice
Frances M. Kamm considers to be protected). Velleman
summarizes his argument thus:
The question is whether the self-interested choice of
suicide can really be a ‘reasoned choice’ – this question
being foundational, in Kantian ethics, to the question
whether such a choice is morally permitted. The
answer is that the self-interested choice of suicide
cannot be an exercise of rationality, because it entails
treating oneself as an instrument of one’s interests,
which is incoherent. That’s why this choice is not
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morally protected. One’s value as a rational being
cannot require that others defer to one’s irrational
disregard for that same value.230

Velleman similarly maintains that pain and suffering
are not sufficient dignity-related reasons for legalizing
assisted dying. His argument follows these lines of thinking: dignity of persons is abused if the person is eliminated in order to end her pain and suffering, that is if it is
used purely as a means to achieve another end. The intention to act in such a manner is not only disrespectful to
an individual’s own dignity as a person, but also to the
dignity of similar persons. In that sense, the intention is
not merely self-regarding but also other-regarding.
That this is not an obvious implication of Kant’s commitment to autonomy is evidenced by the fact that some
influential contemporary Kantian moral philosophers are
critical of this conclusion.231 Kamm argues that when ‘life
involves such unbearable pain that one’s whole life is
focused on that pain,’ dignity, as a person, is, arguably,
lost. Her well-known analysis begins with the observation
that persons have a right to life, and, as a corollary, a
right not to be killed. However, persons are entitled to
waive their right to life. Waiving this right, according
to Kamm ‘releases others from a duty not to kill him’.232
She continues,
[s]uppose life involves such unbearable pain that one’s
whole life is focused on that pain. In such circumstances, one could, I believe, decline the honour of
being a person. [. . .] We might acknowledge the great
(and normally overriding) value of being a person
[. . . and yet] allow that some bad conditions may overshadow its very great value.’233
Kamm subscribes to the view that respect for selfregarding decisions as moral agents is what is required by
human dignity, whereas Velleman holds that dignity is
incompatible with making certain decisions, the decision
to commit suicide is such a decision.234
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One plausible diagnosis of this apparent failure among
Kantians to fix on a roughly similar conception of dignity
is that they have different things in mind. They are invoking their favoured moral considerations and cloaking
them in the (rhetorically compelling) language of dignity.
Kamm tightly ties dignity to the ability to exercise personal autonomy. This tendency among Kantians has
prompted medical ethicist Ruth Macklin to suggest that
dignity collapses altogether into respect for personal
autonomy, and, for that same reason, notions of dignity
should be discarded and replaced with respect for
personal autonomy.235
It is clear that Kantians like Velleman have not moved
their analysis significantly beyond Kass in simply pointing to a dignity that inheres within us and that limits the
decisions we can take. The problem is that, in the absence
of a theological grounding for this claim, it is metaphysical in the pejorative sense of the term and is rooted in
neither argument nor observation.
It is evident that the influential Kantian approach to
ethics does not provide an unequivocal ethical guidance
and justification on the issue of assisted dying. Society
holds diverse and often contradictory views on what
constitutes a life worth living, and, more importantly,
on what constitutes dignified or undignified death. Not
unexpectedly, among Kantians there is no consensus on
whether or not reference to human dignity is a suitable
tool to settle the question of whether or not assisted dying
could be ethical.
To summarize thus far, the Panel has examined historical sources, Canadian Supreme Court decisions, and
recent moral philosophy. The Panel has observed the
same pattern running through all three, namely a tendency to make dignity mean one thing and its opposite,
and to cloak potentially controversial moral consideration – individual autonomy on the one hand, and some
quality inherent within agents, in virtue of their being
human on the other – in the pleasing language of dignity.
In light of this conclusion, the Panel asserts it is best that
debate about moral issues, such as assisted death, absent
discussions of human dignity; rather, the values that
lie behind this concept, on both sides of the debate, be
explicitly considered.
More pointedly, there is a challenge for those theorists
and activists who would limit the individual’s right to
make informed and rational decisions on the conditions
of his or her death in the name of some normative consideration that inheres in individuals as either rational
beings or as members of the human species. This challenge is to specify what that normative consideration is
without invoking the language of dignity and without
invoking considerations that are either implicitly or
235
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explicitly theological, and, thus, are unacceptable given
the canons of public reason that are essential for public
debate in multicultural and multi-faith societies such as
Canada. While the Panel does not foreclose the possibility that such an argumentative hurdle can be cleared, the
Panel does not at present see that any contribution to
the debate has actually done so.

7. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE LEGAL
RIGHT TO ASSISTED DEATH
The Panel takes itself to have established in the previous
section that extant a priori arguments against the prima
facie moral right to assisted death are unpersuasive. Note
that this conclusion is weaker than would be the claim
that it is in principle impossible to articulate a publically
acceptable argument against even a prima facie right.
Given the importance of autonomy in our constitutional
order, the burden of proof is quite substantial.
We must now consider arguments to the effect that
though there may very well exist a prima facie right to
assisted death, this right is defeated by countervailing
considerations, such as the rights of third parties.
How might such an argument be mounted? Clearly,
one’s suicide affects others in ways that are often quite
tragic. A person who chooses to die leaves behind loved
ones whose grief might immense. Might this kind of interest which third parties have in an individual not being
permitted to exercise a prima facie right to assisted death
be the kind of third-party interest that might block the
recognition of a legal right?
We can dispense of this kind of argument quite readily.
Though there is no denying the suffering that suicide
can cause among a person’s family and friends, we have
chosen not to let such considerations constitute a legal
break upon individuals being permitted to act on their
autonomous choices, especially with respect to life’s most
important decisions. In addition, we allow individuals to
leave their families even in cases where their departure
causes great grief or hardship. There is no reason to treat
the case of assisted suicide any differently.
More to the point is the impact that allowing assisted
suicide might have upon vulnerable others. A concern
voiced at least as often as the concern, considered above,
that suicide offends against human dignity, is that by
allowing assisted suicide in the case of competent individuals, we will set in motion a ‘slippery slope’ that will
lead us inexorably to employing euthanasia unacceptably
in non-voluntary contexts. This line of argument warrants our attention because it invokes a value that clearly
has the same kind of foundational status that autonomy
has in our constitutional moral order. That value is that
of the safety and security of the Canadian population,
and in particular of its most vulnerable members.
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Another line of argument that might block the move
from the moral right to suicide to the legal right to assisted
suicide has to do with the rights and interests of medical
professionals. What we are trying to determine is not
whether there exists a right to suicide but rather whether
there is a legal right to be aided by medical professionals
in ending one’s life. The first right may very well exist, but
it only gives rise to the second in the case there is no
legitimate claim that we might make to the effect that
medical personnel ought not to aid their patients to avail
themselves of their right to choose suicide.
The following section will be devoted to the consideration of the claim that, whatever the status of the right to
suicide, there is no right to choose assisted suicide because
medical professionals are under an obligation not to
assist their patients in dying. We will then consider arguments to the effect that the recognition of the legal right
to choose assisted suicide would set up a slippery slope
that would end up sacrificing the important value of
safety and security of our most vulnerable fellow citizens.

a. Medical Professionals
If the arguments canvassed so far are at all plausible, then
it follows that respect for individual autonomy grounds a
moral right not to be interfered with in requesting voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide, and that this moral
right is not defeated by obligations that the individual
making the request might have toward himself, or by
considerations of human dignity.
The next task is to determine what the status of healthcare professionals is with respect to this right. Ought they
to provide assistance with suicide or voluntary euthanasia? Are they, on the contrary, duty-bound not to accede
to requests for assistance with suicide or voluntary
euthanasia in light of independent moral considerations?
The Panel defends and takes an intermediate position
in this section: healthcare professionals may accede to the
request made by an autonomous individual for assistance
with suicide or voluntary euthanasia, though they are
not professionally duty-bound to do so. For reasons
which will be explained below, their right not to accede to
the request is limited in the following way: if they choose
not to assist a competent and fully informed patient who
has made an uncoerced request for assisted suicide or
voluntary euthanasia, they are duty-bound to refer them
in a timely fashion to a healthcare professional who will.
It has been argued that, although patients may formulate a morally legitimate request for assisted suicide or
voluntary euthanasia, healthcare professionals have the
obligation not to accede to their wish. It is claimed, for
example, that assisting another person in dying is incompatible with the professional ethical obligations of a
healthcare professional, who traditionally is understood
to be morally obligated to heal rather than to kill. It is
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also claimed that an erosion of trust between the general
population and the medical establishment would ensue
if health care professionals came to assist their patients
in dying as a matter of routine.236 Rather than trying
to determine whether there is some deep incompatibility within the ethics guiding healthcare professionals’
conduct, it is helpful to proceed by examining whether
assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia are compatible
with acts that healthcare professionals already perform as
a matter of course, and which are widely accepted both in
Canadian law and in ethics.
The practice of medicine has evolved in such a manner
as to legitimate healthcare professionals providing their
patients with assistance in dying. Patients and healthcare
professionals already discuss whether a patient’s best
interests are promoted by continued living when questions of termination of treatment arise. The patient’s
rights most decidedly include the right to refuse treatment
and the right to interrupt treatment even after it has been
initiated. Decisions to terminate treatment are routinely
taken by patients following discussions with their doctors
and nurses, who attempt to paint as clear a picture as they
can of their patient’s prognosis in order to allow for an
informed decision. When the patient decides that the time
has come to suspend treatment, healthcare professionals
are duty-bound to accede to their wishes, even when it is
clear that termination of treatment will hasten death. It is
uncontroversial then that it is accepted in the healthcare
professions today that the healthcare professional’s role
is not limited to providing therapy.
The Panel concludes that there is both a moral right
on the part of informed and competent patients who do
not consider their lives worth living any longer, to noninterference in assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia,
and a moral permission on the part of healthcare professionals to provide assistance with suicide or voluntary
euthanasia. It is worth noting in this context that the
Panel has deliberately chosen to analyse the involvement of healthcare professionals as opposed to only the
involvement of medical doctors.
A question may arise as to whether the Panel considers
there to appropriately be a permission rather than an
obligation on the part of healthcare professionals to
provide assistance with suicide or voluntary euthanasia
to those who have decided to die. Society has a significant
interest that if the practices of assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia are carried out at all, they must be
carried out securely, and with appropriate mechanisms of
oversight, protection, and control. Where does this leave
healthcare professionals? An obligation on healthcare
professionals would obviously bring their professional
as well as their personal autonomy into play. A question

may also arise as to whether the Panel considers there to
appropriately be a restriction on healthcare professionals
in the provision of assistance with suicide or voluntary
euthanasia. These two questions are interrelated, as
they both implicate the interests of others beyond the
individual seeking assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia and the answer to one affects the answer to the other.
If healthcare professionals are obligated to provide
assistance, then their autonomy is evidently limited. It
is worth noting, however, that obligations imposed
on professionals are not as such morally questionable,
indeed they are not unusual. Limitations of professional
autonomy are the traditional societal response aimed at
regulating the professions. The question is whether any
given obligation placed on professionals is justifiable.
It arguably would constitute a limitation of healthcare professionals’ liberty or freedom of conscience and
religion if they were required to accede to the voluntary
request for assistance with suicide or the request for voluntary euthanasia, even if the request was formulated by
a competent and informed patient.237 Today’s procedural
solution to this problem is, in Canada as well as many
other jurisdictions, that healthcare professionals may
provide certain reproductive health services that some
religious healthcare professionals object to on conscientious grounds, however, they do not have to provide those
services, in case the provision of those services would
violate their conscience. Such objecting healthcare professionals are required to transfer an assistance seeking
person on to other healthcare professionals who will
provide the required services in a timely manner. The
underlying rationale for this procedural solution lies
in this kind of reasoning: If only healthcare professionals
are permitted to provide assistance but they are not obligated to do so, then their autonomy is not limited but the
autonomy of those seeking assistance could potentially
be unfairly limited. Hence the requirement on conscientious objectors to refer assistance seekers to colleagues
who are prepared to oblige them. If individuals other
than healthcare professionals are permitted to provide
the assistance, then the autonomy of healthcare professionals and those seeking assistance is not limited.
However, there could be legitimate concerns over how
society could regulate the actions of non-healthcare professionals in this context in order to limit the risk of abuse.
The best way to balance these particular competing
rights and interests is not yet clear. Conclusions about
the best way to balance rest not so much on an unresolved conflict of values but more so on many logistical
factors that cannot be addressed in the context of this
Report. For example, is it the case that only healthcare
237
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professionals are competent to ensure that the conditions
for permissible assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia
are met? Can the balancing be achieved through requiring
some involvement of healthcare professionals (e.g. in
cognitive capacity assessments, providing information,
and prescription writing) but not excluding others from
also playing some role (e.g. delivering a lethal drug mixed
in orange juice for the individual to drink as a means
of committing suicide)? Can the oversight necessary
to ensure the conditions for a morally justifiable legal
regime are met be achieved only through limiting those
who can provide assistance to suicide or voluntary euthanasia to healthcare professionals? Would individuals who
desire assistance be able to gain access to assistance if the
permission was restricted to healthcare professionals and
they were not required to provide assistance when asked?
These and related questions require further information
gathering and analysis of possible models of a regulated
permissive regime.
The framework set out in the preceding sections is
not sufficient to support a position on the issues of
restricting the permission to provide assistance in suicide
or voluntary euthanasia to healthcare professionals. The
framework supports the conclusion that health care professionals should be permitted to provide assistance but
requires further information-gathering and deliberation
to take place before adopting a position on whether the
permission to provide assistance should be limited to
healthcare professionals.

b. Slippery Slopes and the Protection
of the Vulnerable
The arguments canvassed so far show that and why people
have the right to take actions to end their lives when their
lives are no longer worth living to them. The analysis
demonstrates that the moral standard implicit in current
medical practices implies that health care professionals
may accede to the requests of their patients who, in these
circumstances, decide that they wish to end their lives.
But, as we have seen, the morality of assisted dying does
not settle the question of whether it should be decriminalized. The main reason that might block the passage from
morality to legality has to do with the concern that, while
it is possible to isolate precise conditions under which
assisted dying might be morally justifiable, it would be
difficult or impossible to design institutional mechanisms
overseeing the decriminalized practice that would cleave
precisely to those conditions. The fear is that assisted
suicide and voluntary euthanasia will occur in circumstances that fall outside the morally acceptable range. For
example, a fear might be that assistance with suicide or
voluntary euthanasia will be administered to less than
fully competent patients. A fear might be that the practice
of assisting those who voluntarily choose to die might give
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rise to a situation in which people who fail to satisfy
the voluntariness condition are put to death.238 In other
words, some people may fear that decriminalizing morally
permissible cases of assisted suicide and euthanasia will
create a slippery slope that could lead to the practice being
abused, and to assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia
occurring in morally impermissible circumstances.
Along with arguments surrounding the concept of
human dignity, arguments invoking slippery slopes are
among the most ubiquitous in debates about assisted
suicide and euthanasia. Arguments concerning dignity
attempt to show that assisted suicide and euthanasia are
wrong in and of themselves, and independently of the
consequences that they might have. Slippery slope arguments tacitly concede that certain cases of assisted suicide
and euthanasia are morally permissible, but cast doubt
on our ability to institutionalize them without producing
catastrophic consequences.
Slippery slope arguments are ubiquitous in public
debate. Hardly a day goes by without some radio talk
show pundit, intent upon convincing listeners that a
policy he opposes should not be adopted, argues that if
we allow the policy in question, then another, far more
noxious one, will inexorably follow in its train. This
Report canvasses empirical evidence on this issue in
Chapter 4. Academics arguing about controversial moral
and policy issues are not immune to the lure of such
arguments. For example, opponents of genetic testing
and screening say that there is no way to control the
slippery slope from therapeutic uses of these new techniques to eugenic ones.239 Similarly, opponents of assisted
suicide argue that the decriminalization of this practice
will elicit a slide into involuntary euthanasia.240
The ubiquity of such arguments, especially among
academics, is surprising. After all, they are, in almost all
cases, logically invalid arguments. When slippery slope
238

It is appropriate to note at this point that the decision not to grant
Sue Rodriguez the right to receive medically assisted death was
grounded not in the Justices’ denial of the value of individual
autonomy, but in large measure on slippery slope reasoning on the part
of the majority Justices. It is quite likely that the same Supreme Court
would have decided the issue differently, given the fact that two of the
reasons that the Court had this worry–namely that no other country
had decriminalized it and there was no data to either confirm or disprove the worry–now no longer exist. See Jocelyn D and Bern S. “Rodriguez Redux”. Health Law Journal. 2008;16:27–54. On the general
appropriateness of the Supreme Court engaging in slippery slope reasoning, given that it does not have the wherewithal with which to handle
the relevant evidence, see Freedman B. “The Rodriguez Case: Sticky
Questions and Slippery Answers” McGill L.J. 39:644.
239
Nicholson R. “We are some way down a slippery slope”, in The
Guardian, at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2003/jun/20/genetics.
uknews1>. (Nicholson is the editor of the Bulletin of Medical Ethics).
[Accessed 26 July 2011].
240
Somerville M. “Euthanasia’s Slippery Slope”, in The Mark
at <http://www.themarknews.com/articles/1146-euthanasia-s-slipperyslope>. [Accessed 26 July 2011].

48

Udo Schüklenk et al.

arguments are invoked, it is almost always to change the
subject. Rather than providing grounds for thinking that
a proposed policy or principle is morally unacceptable,
these arguments trade on the widely acknowledged inappropriateness of some other policy or principle, and then
tar the matter under discussion with the acknowledged
problems of the latter. These arguments do so by drawing
some empirical or causal connection between the two.
But as the subsequent analysis shows, these connections
are almost impossible to vindicate.
Literature on the logic of argumentation distinguishes
two basic forms of slippery slope argument. Both types are
present in the assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia
debate. Some slippery slopes are conceptual. They claim
the concepts used to set up criteria governing a practice are
fuzzy, and that this conceptual vagueness will lead to the
practice being abused. Others are causal. They claim that if
a certain decision or policy is implemented, that could in
and of itself be morally acceptable, causal mechanisms will
be put in motion that will unavoidably lead to making
other, much more morally dubious, decisions.
The first task at hand is to examine specifically conceptual slippery slope arguments against assisted suicide and
euthanasia. According to such arguments, many of the
concepts employed in order to create guidelines and
criteria to limit the practice to morally acceptable cases
are vague. A good example is the concept of competence.
The argument of this Report proposes that the practice
should be limited to competent individuals. Philosophical
literature on the subject and clinical practice show the
concept of competence is notoriously difficult to pin
down. The line between competence and incompetence is
ambiguous at best.
The conceptual slippery slope argument against
assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia takes the ambiguity of the concept as the premise of an argument
that practicing assisted dying on incompetent people is
unavoidable. The argument takes the form of what in
philosophy is called a sorites paradox: for every competent person, there will be one just slightly less competent,
where the difference between the two hardly seems significant enough to ground the claim that one is competent
whereas the other is not. But then, there will be a person
just slightly less competent than the second, and then
another just slightly less competent than the third, and
quickly, medically assisted dying is being practised on
patients of whom it would be very difficult indeed to
claim that they are competent. Frequently the spectre of
the Nazis’ murder of intellectually disabled people is
invoked in order to indicate where this slippery slope
would inexorably lead any society that decriminalized
assisted dying in some form or shape.
The conceptual slippery slope argument against
assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia points to a real
problem. But it is a problem that is ubiquitous across the

full range of areas in which public policy and laws are
enacted. Seeing it as a reason to rescind from enacting
such laws and policies would lead to stasis. Consider a
much less dramatic area of policy such as the determination of the age at which individuals can obtain a driver’s
license. There is no bright conceptual line that separates
the competence and reliability of a person of 15 years and
364 days and a person of 16 years. The gain in competence from one day to the next is infinitesimally small.
Since it is not acceptable, as a matter of policy, not to
grant people drivers’ licences because of our inability to
determine thresholds of competence with precision, the
law establishes a line that is to some degree arbitrary. By
fixing the minimal age requirement at 16, society attempts
to do as well as possible in ensuring that only competent
people get on the road, accepting a certain number of
false negatives and false positives as an acceptable cost
for allowing people to be able to drive.
The exponent of the slippery slope argument against
assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia will naturally
disagree with the analogizing of cases of public policy
(such as those just annulled with cases in which moral
principles are in play). Whereas the former are amenable
to cost/benefit reasoning, the latter, he or she will claim,
are not. Thus, the argument might run, when the placing
of an arbitrary line at one point rather than another, along
a continuum, risks placing the defence of a principle on
the wrong side of the line, we should avoid drawing
lines altogether, and prescind from the impugned practice.
This is a moral problem, no matter what the benefit of
drawing the line somewhere. Thus, for example, if it is
settled that stringency test ‘X’ accommodates requests
for assisted dying, and that there exists a more stringent
test ‘X + 1’, the space between ‘X’ and ‘X + 1’ can be
cashed out in terms of lives lost that ought not to have
been lost. Thus the most stringent test there is should be
chosen: namely outright, or almost outright, prohibition.
This line of argument can be resisted in a number of
ways. First, prohibition will not lead to the elimination
of lives lost through assisted dying. It will rather mean that
the practice will continue as it does in all jurisdictions
where it is prohibited in the absence of any principle or
institutional safeguard. Second, moral costs must be reckoned that flow both from permission and from prohibition
– the moral costs of the latter are needless suffering
and thwarting the wills of autonomous individuals.241
The exponent of the slippery slope argument against
euthanasia and assisted suicide cannot, in other words,
avoid assessing the costs of not drawing a line somewhere.
Finally, the vagueness of concepts can only be of
limited use to the partisan of slippery slope arguments.
241
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For, though a concept like that of competence is ambiguous, it cannot be reasonably inferred that there are not
clear, paradigm cases of competence and, correspondingly, that there are not paradigm cases of incompetence.
The fallacy of the sorites paradox upon which the conceptual slippery slope is grounded claims there will not
come a point when the succession of imperceptibles gives
rise to cases in which it is known that it is no longer
competent individuals being dealt with.
Causal slippery slopes, being based on empirical
premises, are not amenable to logical refutation. Unless
their empirical premises run counter to the laws of
physics, they invoke real possibilities. It is, rather, that
human decisions will give rise to other human decisions,
and that, whereas the first set of decisions were morally
acceptable – or only contestably morally unacceptable –
the second set of decisions (unavoidable according to the
slippery slope theorist once the first have been made) are
clearly unacceptable. The inevitability of the second set of
decisions is seen in this way to impugn the first.
The causal mechanisms invoked to make such arguments plausible are of a very different kind from those
invoked in straight consequentialist reasoning. The argument based on such mechanisms is, the Panel submits,
much more difficult to make good because these arguments imply that such mechanisms will hold sway, even
when the possibilities are laid bare and steps are taken to
counteract them. Consider two cases: the first is one in
which a person has no moral qualms about the principles
and decisions which may flow from an initial decision.
She thinks that both are morally justified. When she
adopts the second, it is not as a result of having fallen
prey to the slippery slope. Rather, she is simply expressing her support for both ‘Decision 1’ and ‘Decision 2’,
and for whatever principles underpin the two decisions.
In the second, an agent supports ‘Decision 1’, but has
serious moral qualms about ‘Decision 2’. He is aware of
the fact that there are empirical (psychological, social,
institutional, etc.) mechanisms that may make it more
likely that ‘Decision 2’ will come to seem more plausible
to some, once ‘Decision 1’ has been taken. This person is
aware of the risk of a slippery slope, but intent as he is to
resist it, he will be at pains to put safeguards in place –
both psychological and institutional – to make it less
likely than it might otherwise have been that policy or
‘Decision 2’ will come to be adopted as a result of policy
or ‘Decision 1’ having been adopted.
The supporter of slippery slope arguments offers a very
difficult argument to respond to the agent in the second
case. He will have to claim, not only that a slippery slope
might be set in motion by the adoption of ‘Decision 1’,
but that it will overpower whatever – legal, institutional,
psychological, moral – resistances and safeguards responsible citizens and politicians, aware of the risks, are intent
on putting in place in order to avoid the morally prob-
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lematic decision being made. The partisan of the slippery
slope thus has a formidable burden of argument to take
up. Indeed, slippery slopes might fail to eventuate not
only because the gradient of the slope might not be quite
as steep as some think (the causal mechanisms linking
a morally acceptable decision or policy to a morally
problematic one that are invoked by partisans of slippery
slope arguments may not be as reliable as hypothesized),
but also – and this is the important point in the context of
this argument – because there will be various kinds of
obstacles built along the path of the slope that are the
result of deliberate human intent.
In continuing to strike the theme of slippery slopes in
the face of these considerations, the slippery slope theorist must take care not to overreach. Much already existing public policy takes precisely the form just described.
Measures are taken, and watchdog institutions are put in
place to guard against abuse. Under-discussed but crucial
functions within liberal democracies such as auditors
general and ombudsmen are just two such offices. There
is no reason to think that this could not also be done in
the case of assisted death.
Causal slippery slope arguments can play an important
role in this context. Rather than being key elements in
the refutation of moral/political positions, they can serve
to alert decision-makers as to the kinds of safeguards
that will have to be put in place, given the particular
risks associated with a given decision. But this does not
amount to the kind of role that practitioners and theorists
who routinely employ slippery slope arguments consistently fill, which is to refute a position rather than contributing to designing safeguards that might maximize
the benefits of its adoption while minimizing its costs. In
designing the regulatory structure that would govern the
practices of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide,
some of the arguments of opponents of these practices
should be attended to, not because they are convincing as
refutations of the practices in question, but because they
do point to potential risks against which prudent policymakers will want to take steps to counteract.
Some slippery-slope arguments that can be found in
the literature about assisted dying are good examples
of fear-mongering rather than of a realistic assessment of
the risks that might accompany the decriminalization of
assisted dying. For instance, there is no evidentiary basis
for the fear that the decriminalization of assisted dying
would relax the inhibitions that medical professionals
presently feel for resorting to assisted dying in all but the
most extreme of contexts.
Other slippery-slope arguments suggest real risks
against which institutional safeguards must be erected.
The following risks deserve attention from prudent
policy-makers and institutional designers.
First, the argument in this Report limits the justification of assisted dying to competent persons. Safeguards

50

Udo Schüklenk et al.

must be put in place that avoid ‘false positives’ to as great
a degree as possible. That is, ways must be found to
ensure that assisted dying is only provided to competent
agents.
Second, opponents of the decriminalization of assisted
dying often formulate the fear that it would lead to a
reduction in resources for such practices as palliative
care, and for adapting various social contexts and institutions to the (often quite costly) needs of persons with
disabilities. The appetite for cost-cutting that characterizes most modern states, especially in the context of
health-care, suggests that this fear is not unfounded. But
again, the point is not to conclude from the observation
that certain risks might possibly eventuate that the State
ought to prohibit the practice of assisted death altogether. Rather, institutional safeguards must be put in
place that would be effective in offsetting the risk in
question. Thus, for example, it is conceivable that
decriminalization of assisted death would be accompanied by legislation requiring that funding of programs
such as palliative care, as well as policies aimed at
addressing the needs of persons with chronic diseases and
disabilities be maintained at certain levels. Such legislation could be accompanied by the creation of a watchdog
body tasked with ensuring that funding commitments be
respected, and more generally that the overall situation of
palliative care, as well as of programs devoted to the
needs of persons with disabilities and chronic diseases,
not be worsened by the decriminalization of assisted
dying. This body might for example take on a public
education mandate, to ensure that the decriminalization
not be accompanied in an erosion in public support for
such programs, and in a coarsening of public attitudes
with respect to the needs and interests of such persons.
The logic of slippery slope arguments, most charitably
construed, is that there are certain risks that might
accompany a policy, and that those risks are so grave,
and/or society’s capacity reliably to counteract them so
limited, that it would be better not to enact the policy.
This logic is however premised on a faulty assumption,
namely that the status quo is itself without costs or risks,
and that the only costs and risks to be factored into our
deliberations concerning the desirability of moving away
from the status quo are the ones that accompany the
move away from the status quo. But this is never the case.
Indeed, the problematic policy would not have been proposed had there not been a perception among policymakers that the status quo was fraught with costs and
harms. In the case of the issues before the Panel, that is
most certainly the case. As has been pointed out in
Chapter 2, the practice of assisted death presently occupies a shady area in which it is both prohibited, and the
prohibitions against it sometimes unenforced. The result
is that assisted dying presently goes on in various medical
contexts in Canada, but it is governed not by transparent,

reliable norms but by the private convictions of individuals. The present dispensation is fraught with all of the
anxiety, uncertainty and needless suffering that attends
any policy area governed by arbitrariness and lack of
clarity rather than transparent, democratically enacted
norms. The evidence adduced in Chapter 4 strongly suggests that jurisdictions that have liberalized laws concerning assisted death have not succumbed to the slippery
slopes pointed to by opponents of liberalization. Opponents of decriminalization have not adequately taken into
account the very real costs and harms that the present
situation regarding assisted dying in Canada involves.
The Panel concludes that two important arguments
that would, if successful, block the legal recognition of
the prima facie moral right to assisted suicide, fail. There
is no blanket moral objection to physicians assisting their
patients in dying. Nor is the slippery slope that could
lead from the decriminalization of assisted death in voluntary contexts to the acceptance of euthanasia in nonvoluntary contexts as decisive as its proponents pretend.
Rather than constituting a refutation of the argument
in favour of a legal right to choose assisted death, they
helpfully point us toward safeguards that must accompany that decriminalization, lest the safety and security of
vulnerable Canadians be imperilled.
With this conclusion, the argument in favour of a
legal right to choose assisted death is complete. We have
shown that there is a strong autonomy-based argument in
favour of the right that is not defeated by other constitutional values to do with safety and security, dignity, or
the rights of third parties.

8. CONCLUSIONS
The Panel concludes:
1)

That there is a moral right, grounded in autonomy,
for competent and informed individuals who have
decided after careful consideration of the relevant
facts, that their continuing life is not worth living, to
non-interference with requests for assistance with
suicide or voluntary euthanasia.

2)

That none of the grounds for denying individuals
the enjoyment of their moral rights applies in the case
of assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. There
are no third-party interests, self-regarding duties, or
duties toward objective goods that warrant denying
people the right to assisted suicide and voluntary
euthanasia. Prophesied undesirable social consequences are not sufficient to negate the right to
choose assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia.
Rather, they should be taken into account in
constructing the regulatory environment within
which this right can be exercised.
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3)

That health care professionals are not duty-bound to
accede to the request of competent and informed
individuals who have formulated the uncoerced wish
to die, but they may do so. If their religious or moral
conscience prevents them from doing so, they are
duty bound to refer their patients to a health care
professional who will.

CHAPTER FOUR: INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCE WITH LAWS ON
ASSISTED DYING
bioe_1939_5
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1. INTRODUCTION
This Panel has reached the conclusion that there are persuasive arguments in support of the development of a
legally permissive regime with respect to assisted dying in
Canada. Since Canada would not be the first country to
embark on a path to a permissive regime, it is useful to
examine and learn from the experiences of other nations.
While the majority of countries throughout the world
continue to regard assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia as criminal offences, a small but significant number
of jurisdictions now accommodate assisted suicide and/or
voluntary euthanasia in certain circumstances. In this
chapter, the Panel analyzes the experience of other countries in two ways.
First, the ways in which different countries have
approached the issue of assisted dying are described.
Second, the Panel turns to the practical experience in
these countries or states – in so far as there are available
data – to see what happens in practice when assisted
dying is, in some circumstances, allowed.

2. MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE TO LAW
AND/OR PRACTICE
When discussing different legal mechanisms for changing
law and practice with respect to assisted dying, it is
important to remember that not all jurisdictions (countries or states) share a similar legal background. The
starting point obviously dictates the range of potential
routes to reform. Switzerland, for example, was able to
develop a permissive regime because assisted suicide,
under certain conditions, was not criminalized in the first
place. The Netherlands, on the other hand, had to institute laws on both voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide because both were, and still are, mentioned in the
Dutch Criminal Code. Against this contextual backdrop,
four major mechanisms have been used internationally to
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effect change: judicial decisions; prosecutorial charging
guidelines; new or revised laws; and evolution of practice
without legal change.

a. Judicial Decisions
The courts have been used to effect change in two jurisdictions through imposing reduced sentences and recognizing defences to charges of voluntary euthanasia or
assisted suicide.
In a 1973 case Dutch court recognized that a physician
could lawfully be allowed to prevent serious and irremediable suffering, even if this meant shortening the
patient’s life. At that time, voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide were punishable in all circumstances. In
this particular case, the physician was found guilty of
breaking the law but the court only meted out a more
or less symbolic punishment. The decision provoked a
wide-ranging legal discussion regarding the acceptability
of active physician involvement in death. The underlying
legal reasoning for accepting this involvement remained
unclear until 1984, when the first voluntary euthanasia
case reached the Dutch Supreme Court. It reasoned as
follows:
1. As a general rule, voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide are punishable since the Penal Code defines
both activities as a crime.
2. However, when a physician is confronted with a conflict of duties he or she may invoke the so-called
defence of necessity. A conflict of duties occurs when
honouring a patient’s request to die with dignity is
the only available means to end unbearable and irremediable suffering.
3. The criteria for accepting this defence of necessity are
to be derived from professional and medical ethical
opinions formulated by the medical profession.242
This line of legal reasoning served as the foundation of
the practice of voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands
until the country’s 2002 Act came into force243 (this Act
will be discussed in detail later in this chapter under the
heading ‘New or Revised Laws’). The concept of euthanasia as a kind of medical exception was rejected by the
Supreme Court. It reasoned that voluntary euthanasia
could not be regarded as a normal medical procedure,
like surgery. Thus, from 1973 to 2002, the Dutch Criminal
Code remained unchanged, but the courts, through a
series of decisions, established the parameters for the use
of the defence of necessity in cases of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide.
242
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this Court as applicable to violent breaches of the
public peace. Physician aid in dying does not satisfy
that definition. We also find nothing in the plain language of Montana statutes indicating that physician
aid in dying is against public policy. In physician aid in
dying, the patient – not the physician – commits the
final death-causing act by self-administering a lethal
dose of medicine.
Furthermore, the Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act indicates legislative respect for a patient’s
autonomous right to decide if and how he will receive
medical treatment at the end of his life. The Terminally
Ill Act explicitly shields physicians from liability for
acting in accordance with a patient’s end-of-life wishes,
even if the physician must actively pull the plug on a
patient’s ventilator or withhold treatment that will
keep him alive. There is no statutory indication that
lesser end-of-life physician involvement, in which the
patient himself commits the final act, is against public
policy. We therefore hold that under §45-2-211, MCA,
a terminally ill patient’s consent to physician aid in
dying constitutes a statutory defence to a charge of
homicide against the aiding physician when no other
consent exceptions apply.246

The consequence of this court-based approach is that
the Criminal Code remained unchanged, including the
general prohibition of voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide, but cases could go unpunished if they met the
conditions stipulated in the court rulings. The result was
a tough law compassionately applied. The downside of
this policy was that its exact content remained undetermined, as only case rulings and no general guidelines were
published. This resulted in an unsatisfactory situation
whereby assisted dying was both accepted and prohibited, creating uncertainty and vagueness for both patients
and physicians.
Another example of a courts-based approach is found
in the US American state of Montana. On December 5,
2008, Justice Dorothy McCarter ruled that:
The Montana constitutional rights of individual
privacy and human dignity, taken together, encompass
the right of a competent terminally ill patient to die
with dignity. That is to say, the patient may use the
assistance of his physician to obtain a prescription for
a lethal dose of medication that the patient may take
on his own if and when he decides to terminate his life.
The patient’s right to die with dignity includes protection of the patient’s physician from liability under the
State’s homicide statutes [the assisted suicide prohibition falls within the homicide statutes].
The Court recognizes compelling State interests in
protecting patients and their loved ones from abuses,
in protecting life in general, and in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession. However,
those interests can be protected [relying explicitly on
the Oregon experience] while preserving a patient’s
right to die with dignity.244
As a result, the homicide statutes were declared
unconstitutional as they applied to the plaintiffs and
the application of those statutes to the plaintiffs was
enjoined.
Justice McCarter’s decision was appealed and, on
December 31, 2009, the Supreme Court of Montana
issued its ruling.245 The majority vacated the lower court’s
constitutional ruling (but not the result) on the basis that
it was not necessary to make a constitutional ruling when
the case could be decided on the basis of statutory analysis (in this case the Montana statutory consent defence).
The majority of the Court held that:
[W]e find nothing in Montana Supreme Court precedents or Montana statutes indicating that physician
aid in dying is against public policy. The ‘against
public policy’ exception to consent was interpreted by
244
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As this case involved interpretation of the Montana
Constitution and criminal law (which falls under state
jurisdiction), it cannot be appealed to any other court
and, unless and until there is legislative reform, it stands
as the law in Montana. Although opponents of the decision have asked the Montana legislature to ban assisted
suicide,247 a recent poll indicated that 63% of Montana
voters supported the Supreme Court decision and only
25% felt that the state legislature should ‘overturn the
Supreme Court decision, making doctor-assisted suicide
a crime.’248 Two competing bills were introduced in
2011 by Montana legislators (one seeking to prohibit
physician-assisted suicide and the other seeking to establish a system within which assisted suicide would be permitted) but both died in the Standing Committee and so
are ‘probably dead’.249
246
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The experience of Montana points to another disadvantage of law reform through case law; there is no
mechanism by which the state can monitor the results of
the change. It has been reported in the press that there has
been at least one physician-assisted suicide in Montana in
2010 and the President of Compassion and Choices was
quoted by the Associated Press as saying that ‘[t]here are
physicians in Montana who are implementing the law,’250
but declined to provide numbers or details, probably to
protect the physicians and the individuals they have
helped.

b. Prosecutorial Charging Guidelines
The next mechanism has some similarities to the previous
one, in that the Criminal Code remains unchanged, but a
way is found to adopt a more accepting stance in at least
some cases. The mechanism in question shifts the possibility of acceptance earlier in the process (at the stage of
charging) through guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in cases of voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide. This approach has recently been taken in
parts of the United Kingdom with respect to assisted
suicide. The law as it operates in England and Wales
will be discussed first and then the law as it operates in
Scotland will be explained. It should be noted here that
the Netherlands did make use of prosecutorial charging guidelines between 1994 and 2002. However, these
were never the mechanism of change, rather they merely
reflected the change that came about through case law.
Furthermore, they have been superseded by the 2001 legislation and therefore will not be discussed in this section.
The law with respect to assisted suicide in England and
Wales is contained in the Suicide Act 1961, section 2 (1),
which says that ‘[a] person who aids, abets, counsels or
procures the suicide of another, or an attempt by another
to commit suicide, shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen
years.’ The 1961 Act was primarily designed to decriminalize suicide itself. In so doing, the specific crime of
assisting suicide was created, although the Act also indicates that no prosecution should take place without
the agreement of the Director of Public Prosecutions
PROVIDING IMMUNITY FOR PERSONS PARTICIPATING IN
GOOD FAITH COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURES; PROVIDING RULEMAKING AUTHORITY; AND PROVIDING AN
IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVE DATE.” Senate Bill 167, 62nd Legislature. Available at http://laws.leg.mt.gov/laws11/LAW0203W$BSRV.
ActionQuery?P_BLTP_BILL_TYP_CD=&P_BILL_NO=&P_BILL_
DFT_NO=LC0177&Z_ACTION=Find&P_SBJ_DESCR=&P_SBJT_
SBJ_CD=&P_LST_NM1=&P_ENTY_ID_SEQ= [Accessed 2 August
2011].
250
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2011].
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(DPP).251 Much has changed in the legal landscape since
these somewhat elderly provisions were enacted, not
least the incorporation of the European Convention of
Human Rights into UK law by means of the Human
Rights Act of 1998. The passing of this act allows UK
citizens to take full advantage of the rights contained in
the Convention, many of which appear to have relevance
to the assisted dying debate. More particularly, it allows
citizens to challenge the compatibility of existing (and
future) legislation with the Convention. As Michael
Freeman has noted, it was ‘inevitable with the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights
into English law that the ban on assisted suicide would be
challenged.’252
The first such challenge arose in the case of Diane
Pretty.253 Diane Pretty lost her case, but Freeman nonetheless argued ‘the time has come for a rethink, certainly
of assisted suicide, and probably of all “end of life” decisions.’254 The opportunity to do so arrived some years
later in the case of Debbie Purdy, which reached the
House of Lords in 2009.255
Debbie Purdy suffers from multiple sclerosis (MS) and
is currently wheelchair bound. She sought clarification
from the DPP as to what they might decide in terms of
prosecution should her husband travel with her – it is
presumed to Switzerland – in order that she might have
an assisted death. Assisted suicide is not a crime in Switzerland providing certain conditions prevail. Two questions were raised by her case. First, was the question of
whether or not her husband would commit a crime by
travelling with her to facilitate an act that is legal in that
jurisdiction. Second, a question was raised about the
clarity of the English prosecution’s policies.
On the first question, while it might seem odd that
travelling with someone to another country could be a
constituent element of a crime, the House of Lords was
in no doubt that it could be categorized as such.256 The
second question was more complex. Although a Code of
Practice for prosecutors already existed, the issue was
whether or not it was sufficiently clear to satisfy the
requirements of the European Convention on Human
Rights and, in particular, article 8 (2).
As Lord Hope explained:
The Convention principle of legality requires the court
to address itself to three distinct questions. The first is
whether there is a legal basis in domestic law for the
251

s. 2(4).
Freeman M. Denying Death Its Dominion: Thoughts on the Dianne
Pretty Case. Medical Law Review. 2002;10:245.
253
R. (on the application of Pretty) v DPP. British Medical Law
Reports. 2001;63:1.
254
loc cit, at p. 270.
255
R.(on the application of Purdy) v DPP British Medical Law Reports.
2008;104:231. B.M.L.R. 2009;106;170 (HL)
256
Para [18].
252

54

Udo Schüklenk et al.
restriction. The second is whether the law or rule in
question is sufficiently accessible to the individual who
is affected by the restriction, and sufficiently precise to
enable him to understand its scope and foresee the
consequences of his actions so that he can regulate
his conduct without breaking the law. The third is
whether, assuming that these two requirements are satisfied, it is nevertheless open to the criticism that it is
being applied in a way that is arbitrary because, for
example, it has been resorted to in bad faith or in a way
that is not proportionate.257

For Lord Brown, ‘with the best will in the world, it is
simply impossible to find in the Code itself enough to
satisfy the article 8(2) requirements of accessibility and
foreseeability in assessing how prosecutorial discretion
is likely to be exercised in section 2(1) cases.’258 The
outcome of this case was a direction to the Director of
Public Prosecutions that he should clarify and publicize
the criteria that would be taken into consideration when
deciding on whether or not to exercise his statutory prosecutorial discretion. Interim guidelines were produced
in September 2009 and final guidance was issued in
February 2010. The guidelines follow.
The sixteen public interest factors in favour of prosecution are:
1. The victim was under 18 years of age.
2. The victim did not have the capacity (as defined by
the Mental Capacity Act 2005) to reach an informed
decision to commit suicide.
3. The victim had not reached a voluntary, clear,
settled and informed decision to commit suicide.
4. The victim had not clearly and unequivocally communicated his or her decision to commit suicide to
the suspect.
5. The victim did not seek the encouragement or assistance of the suspect personally or on his or her own
initiative.
6. The suspect was not wholly motivated by compassion; for example, the suspect was motivated by the
prospect that he or she or a person closely connected to him or her stood to gain in some way from
the death of the victim.
7. The suspect pressured the victim to commit suicide.
8. The suspect did not take reasonable steps to ensure
that any other person had not pressured the victim
to commit suicide.
9. The suspect had a history of violence or abuse
against the victim.
10. The victim was physically able to undertake the act
that constituted the assistance himself or herself.
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11. The suspect was unknown to the victim and encouraged or assisted the victim to commit or attempt to
commit suicide by providing specific information
via, for example, a website or publication.
12. The suspect gave encouragement or assistance to
more than one victim not known to each other.
13. The suspect was paid (by the victim, or those close
to the victim) for his or her encouragement and/or
assistance.
14. The suspect was acting in his or her capacity as
a medical doctor, nurse, other healthcare professional, a professional care-giver (whether for
payment or not), or as a person in authority, such
as a prison officer, and the victim was in his or her
care.
15. The suspect was aware that the victim intended to
commit suicide in a public place where it was reasonable to think that members of the public might
be present.
16. The suspect was acting in his or her capacity as
a person involved in the management or as an
employee (whether for payment or not) of an organization or group, a purpose of which is to provide
a physical environment (whether for payment or
not) in which to allow another to commit suicide.
The six public interest factors against prosecution are:
1. The victim had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and
informed decision to commit suicide.
2. The suspect was wholly motivated by compassion.
3. The actions of the suspect, although sufficient to
come within the definition of the crime, were of only
minor encouragement or assistance.
4. The suspect had sought to dissuade the victim from
the course of action that resulted in his or her suicide.
5. The actions of the suspect may be characterized as
reluctant encouragement or assistance in the face of a
determined wish on the part of the victim to commit
suicide.
6. The suspect reported the victim’s suicide to the police
and fully assisted them in their enquiries into the
circumstances of the suicide or the attempt and his or
her part in providing encouragement or assistance.259
Debbie Purdy’s case has been widely heralded as a
victory for right-to-die campaigners. At least one newspaper was happy to categorise it as such, calling for law
reform and arguing that ‘a significant blow has been dealt
to the 1961 Act that makes an offence of “complicity” in
suicide and so criminalises deeds that might otherwise
be judged merciful.’260 The true importance of this case,
259
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however, actually lies in its potential to bring additional
clarity to the law in England and Wales.
In Scotland, suicide has never been a crime; no specific
crime of assisted suicide exists. This is not to say,
however, that assisting a suicide would not fall under
criminal law. The law of murder or culpable homicide
(the Scottish equivalent of manslaughter) is the catch
all for such behaviour.261 However, a major difference
between the jurisdictions under consideration is that
there is likely to be no crime committed in Scottish
law should an individual accompany someone to
another country – for example, Switzerland – where they
then undertake an act that is lawful in that country.
However, there is a dearth of case law in Scotland; this
conclusion is derived from general principles rather than
actual jurisprudence.
It is important to emphasize here that the charging
guidelines do not apply to voluntary euthanasia (as elsewhere, in assisted suicide, the third party merely supplies
the means for the individual to kill him- or herself, in the
case of voluntary euthanasia, the third party directly acts
to kill). Euthanasia is prohibited throughout the United
Kingdom, not through statute, but rather through the
common law. The common law makes it clear that
consent is no defence against criminal charges, save in the
case of rape where consent (or rather its absence) is
central to the offence itself. An individual who kills
another can, then, be prosecuted for the crime of murder.
That said, despite the fact that there is a dearth of Scottish cases, it can be concluded that a murder charge, while
possible, is unlikely in Scotland when the individual is
motivated by compassion; the most likely charge would
be culpable homicide, the Scottish equivalent of manslaughter (in Scotland, murder is not a form of culpable
homicide, whereas in Canada murder and manslaughter
are both forms of culpable homicide).

c. New or Revised Laws
The most far-reaching mechanism for changing a regime
with respect to assisted death is to decriminalize euthanasia and/or assisted suicide. The Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxemburg and the US states of Oregon and Washington
have chosen this route. In this section, the Dutch law –
and what brought the Dutch to this law – is first
described. There then follows a consideration of the legislative regimes in Belgium and Luxemburg, comparing
them with the Dutch situation. Finally, the laws in
Oregon and Washington are discussed.
It is worth noting that the Netherlands was not the first
country to engage in the debate on euthanasia (although
261
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it was the first country to reform its law). This debate
started in England, Germany and the USA somewhere
in the middle of the 19th century when drugs became
available to physicians that allowed them to influence the
way people die. Interestingly, the first known proposal to
decriminalize voluntary euthanasia was made in 1906 in
the US state of Ohio.262 The Northern Territory of Australia was the first jurisdiction to decriminalize euthanasia but as it was overruled by the federal government it
will not be considered further here.

i. The Netherlands
In the second half of the last century, Dutch society had
rapidly become more secular and less divided along religious lines, framing the societal debate about life and
death decisions in a different context. Responsibility for
one’s life, once safely in the hands of the church or the
medical profession, has shifted back to the individual.
Many Dutch people believe that they must be free to
make their own decisions about their lives, including
when and how their life should end. A large majority of
the population is of the opinion that assistance in death
should be available.263
The Dutch position on euthanasia and assisted suicide
is the result of a long discussion both in society and in
parliament on the acceptability of voluntary euthanasia
and assisted suicide and the mechanisms for social
control of these practices. As stated above, the shape of
policy at the beginning of this discussion was more or
less determined by case law, but the exact content of the
policy remained undetermined. This resulted in an unsatisfactory situation whereby assisted dying appeared to be
both accepted and prohibited at the same time. The
Dutch government tried to end this ambiguity by implementing a uniform notification procedure in 1990, hoping
to persuade physicians to bring voluntary euthanasia
cases to the attention of the authorities.264 This notification procedure helped to raise the notification rate from
18% in 1990 to 41% in 1995. A 1995 study into end-oflife decision-making revealed that doctors who did not
report cases of voluntary euthanasia had usually acted
according to the established criteria.265 Why then did they
fail to report their actions to the public prosecutor? The
262
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main reason seems to have been that – despite the fact
that they had exercised due care – they felt they were
being treated as criminals precisely because they had to
report to the Public Prosecution Service, and then faced
long periods of uncertainty, during which time they were
formally murder suspects.
The government therefore tried to lower the number of
unreported cases further by developing a new notification
procedure, in which much of the assessment of the physician’s behaviour was undertaken outside of the legal
system.266 In 1998, five regional multidisciplinary assessment committees were created to assess all reported cases
of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. These committees consisted of a lawyer, a physician and an ethicist.
The outcome of their assessment was to be regarded
merely as advice to the prosecutor. The effect of this
change in procedure on the notification rate was a rise in
the reporting percentage to 54% in 2001. This was better
than 41% in 1995, but far from satisfactory. The continued relatively low numbers of reporting led the government to change the role of the assessment committees.
Following the passage of the Termination of Life on
Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures Act)
(the Dutch Act) in 2001 (and coming into force in 2002)267
the ruling of the committee is no longer just advice to the
prosecutor, but is the final judgement in all cases in which
the criteria are met. Only if the criteria are not met is the
report handed over to the prosecutor. After this change in
the law, physicians reported in 80% of cases a considerable improvement.268
The Dutch government also wanted to create a system
of assessment that did not inevitably involve the prosecutor. The coalition parties in the government, therefore,
developed a proposal giving immunity from prosecution
to those physicians whose cases had come before a review
committee and where the committee had decided that
the physician had acted with due care. This immunity
from prosecution was regulated in the Dutch Act. The
Dutch Act states that, although voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide remain, in principle, criminal offences,
physicians will not be prosecuted if they have reported to
the committee and the committee finds that they have
acted with due care.269 The Public Prosecution Service in
these cases is no longer notified and the physician cannot
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be prosecuted. Only if the review committee finds that
they have not acted with due care, will it then contact the
Public Prosecution Service which, in turn, will decide
whether or not to press charges.
The ‘due care criteria’ that a physician has to observe
when performing voluntary euthanasia or assisted
suicide, as they are set out in the Dutch Act, are as
follows:
The attending physician must:
1. be satisfied that the patient has made a voluntary and
carefully considered request;
2. be satisfied that the patient’s suffering was unbearable, and that there was no prospect of improvement;
3. have informed the patient about his situation and his
prospects;
4. have come to the conclusion, together with the
patient, that there is no reasonable alternative in the
light of the patient’s situation;
5. have consulted at least one other, independent physician, who must have seen the patient and given a
written opinion on the due care criteria referred to in
1–4 above; and
6. have terminated the patient’s life or provided
assistance with suicide with due medical care and
attention.
Physicians have to decide for themselves whether they
can meet the due care criteria in a specific situation. The
patient’s decision must be genuinely voluntary; doctors
therefore have to be sure that the patient’s request is not
the result, for example, of family pressure. Whether the
suffering is unbearable or not is, of course, a subjective
judgement. Every individual has their own limits in terms
of how much pain and suffering and loss of self they
can bear. The prospect of improvement, however, can
be assessed more objectively in medical terms. Recent
advances in palliative care have made it even more relevant to discuss alternative options with the patient. The
obligation to consult a second independent physician is
an essential part of the review system. The second physician has to see the patient in person and submit his or
her opinion to the review committee in writing. Subsequently, the committee examines whether the attending
physician exercised due care in reaching their decision
and in their actions.
It should be added that, under the Dutch Act, no physician is obligated to fulfill the request of a patient, even
when the criteria are met, because neither voluntary
euthanasia nor assisted suicide is regarded as a normal
medical procedure. If a physician is a conscientious
objector to assistance in dying, their refusal to comply
with the request will be respected. What is expected,
however, is that the physician assists the patient in finding
another physician who has a different view of voluntary
euthanasia or assisted suicide. It goes without saying that
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such a referral should not be left until the very last phase
of the patient’s life. It is also expected that the objecting
physician will discuss his or her views on voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide with the patient at an appropriate time, preferably early in the palliative phase.
Importantly, terminal illness has explicitly been
rejected as a condition necessary for granting a request
for voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide. The reason
for this has always been that unbearable suffering
without the prospect of improvement is not restricted to
the terminal phase of a disease.
While Dutch law has made some physician-assisted
dying permissible, it has also created new boundaries.
It is clear from the criteria that the physician plays a
crucial role. The patient has to make a voluntary and
well-considered decision, and the physician must consult
the patient at every step. Ultimately, it is the physician’s
actions that are under scrutiny and they bear final responsibility. This sets limits on a patient’s right to choose.
Patients have no right to voluntary euthanasia in the
Netherlands and physicians are not obligated to grant a
request for voluntary euthanasia. The result of this is the
medicalization of end-of-life decisions, since whether
or not physician-assisted death is justifiable, in whatever
form, becomes largely a matter of medical judgement.
For example, requests from elderly people who are tired
of life and for whom life has lost all meaning, but who do
not suffer from any serious illnesses, cannot be complied
with under the present framework. This was confirmed in
the 2002 ruling of the Supreme Court in the Brongersma
case.270 In addition, physicians remain reluctant to follow
advance directives containing a written request for euthanasia in the case of incompetent (for example, demented)
patients.271 By emphasizing the role of the physician in
the regulatory framework for voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide, requests that are exclusively grounded
in the patient’s evaluation of his or her life (vs. the physician’s assessment as well) may not be accommodated.
Alternative systems that put greater emphasis on patient
autonomy might be better equipped to satisfy such
requests.

practices, the Belgian Act primarily aimed to modify
the behavior of physicians.273 It was hoped that Belgian
physicians would abandon their practice of actively
ending the lives of patients without request (LAWER), as
was shown to be happening by the first empirical data
reported out of Flanders.274
Both the Dutch and the Belgian Acts regulate the practice of voluntary euthanasia, defined as the intentional
termination of one person’s life, at their request, by
another person. Whereas the Dutch Act treats voluntary
euthanasia and assisted suicide in the same way and
regulates both practices, the Belgian Act does not consider assisted suicide at all. While the Dutch Criminal
Code criminalizes assisted suicide (in section 294), the
Belgian Criminal Code does not. Therefore, at first there
was some lack of clarity with respect to the status of
assisted suicide in Belgium.275 This has since been clarified by the Federal Control and Evaluation Commission
which ‘has accepted cases of assisted suicide as falling
under the law’.276 One striking similarity between the
Dutch and Belgian Acts is that both are concerned with
assisted deaths brought about solely by physicians. In
both countries voluntary euthanasia is accepted if, and
only if, performed by a physician and, as shown below,
in both countries certain medical criteria must be met for
voluntary euthanasia to be lawful. In effect, both countries countenance only medicalized voluntary euthanasia.
This is also reflected in the fact that in The Netherlands
the physician performing voluntary euthanasia should
have an established treatment relationship with the
patient,277 although this is less clear in the case of
Belgium.
Two characteristics are central to the lawful practice
of voluntary euthanasia in Belgium: it must follow a
competent patient’s request; and eligibility is determined
by the patient’s medical condition. With respect to the
first requirement, the Belgian Act is more detailed than
the Dutch one, at least at first glance. The Belgian Act
requires the request to be voluntary, considered, repeated
and made in writing, free from external pressure and of a
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ii. Belgium
In Belgium, the legal conditions for the lawful practice of
voluntary euthanasia can be found in the Belgian Act on
Euthanasia of May 28, 2002 that came into effect on
September 23, 2002 (Belgian Act).272 It is important to
note that, while the Dutch Act aimed to codify existing
270
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durable nature,278 but the Dutch Act only requires the
request to be voluntary and well considered.279 However,
if one takes into account the way in which the Dutch
review committees judge the request of the patient, it
is clear that many of the criteria that are specified in
the Belgian Act also apply de facto if not de jure in the
Netherlands.
The second important requirement concerns the suffering of the patient who requests euthanasia. The Belgian
Act requires the patient to be ‘in a medically hopeless
condition of continuous and unbearable physical and
mental suffering that cannot be alleviated and that is
resulting from a serious and incurable disorder caused by
illness or accident.’280 The Dutch Act states that the physician who has performed voluntary euthanasia or
assisted suicide should be convinced that the patient is
suffering unbearably and hopelessly.281 It is generally
accepted that the first element is a subjective one, whereas
the second is more objective. In both countries, a
patient’s suffering does not have to be physical, but it
should originate from a medical condition. As in the
Netherlands, terminal illness is not a necessary condition
for voluntary euthanasia to be lawful in Belgium.

iii. Luxemburg
In March 2009, Luxemburg decriminalized both voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide.282 Unlike the legislation in the Netherlands and Belgium, the legislation was
not introduced by the Luxemburg government; rather, it
was proposed by two members of Parliament. Again, as
in Belgium and the Netherlands, physician-assisted dying
is medicalized. Article 1 states that voluntary euthanasia
is an act performed by a physician, which intentionally
ends the life of a person at the express and voluntary
request of that person. The definition of assisted suicide
in the same article runs along the same lines, except that
the termination of life is undertaken by the patient.
The same conditions apply to voluntary euthanasia
and assisted suicide in Luxemburg. The conditions specified resemble the Dutch criteria in many respects. The
Luxemburg law stipulates that the request should be
made voluntarily and carefully, it should be repeated and
should not result from external pressure.283 The patient’s
medical situation must be hopeless and the patient must
278
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report constant and unbearable mental or physical suffering with no prospect of improvement.284 Again, the
patient does not have to be in the terminal phase of an
illness.
It is not only within Europe that legislative changes
have occurred in this area. Increasing public engagement
with the issue – as well as an increasing recognition of the
primacy of personal autonomy that continues to dominate both ethics and law– have also led to initiatives to
change the law in the United States.

iv. Oregon
In November 1994, the Death With Dignity Act was
passed by Oregon voters through a ballot initiative.285
The Act faced, and ultimately survived, a host of challenges including: court challenges aimed at having the
Act declared unconstitutional;286 a ballot initiative aimed
at repealing the Act;287 federal legislative efforts to effectively block the law;288 and a federal policy directive
aimed at preventing physicians from providing assistance
under the Act.289 The Act was finally enacted by the
Oregon legislature in 1997.
The Death With Dignity Act permits physicianassisted suicide provided a number of substantive and
procedural requirements have been met, including:
•

•
•

The person must be a capable adult (18 years of age or
older), a resident of Oregon, and terminally ill (given a
prognosis of less than six months to live).
The decision must be voluntary and informed.
The diagnosis, as well as the competence and voluntariness of the request, must be confirmed by two
physicians.
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•

The request must be signed and witnessed by two
people (one of whom cannot be a relative or in other
ways in a position of potential conflict of interest).290

v. Washington State
In November 2008, the Death with Dignity Act was
passed by Washington State voters through a ballot initiative;291 the Act came into effect in March 2009.292 The
Act in Washington State is similar to the Act in Oregon:
An adult who is competent, is a resident of Washington State, has been determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a
terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his
or her wish to die, may make a written request for
medication that the patient may self-administer to end
his or her life in a humane and dignified manner in
accordance with this chapter.293

d. Evolution of Practice Without
Legal Change
For the purposes of this Report it is useful to look at
countries where the need for decriminalization was
absent as the Criminal Code of that country never contained a prohibition of assisted suicide in the first place.
In Switzerland, there has been an evolution of practice
without legal change.
Unlike other European countries that have decriminalized voluntary euthanasia and/or assisted suicide, Switzerland does not have a specific statute in this area.
Rather, the legal position is based on the Swiss Criminal
Code. While article 114 of the Code makes it a criminal
offence to kill someone even ‘upon the latter’s earnest and
urgent request’, article 115 criminalizes those who assist a
suicide unless they act from honourable motives. An individual who assists another to commit suicide must show
that they did not act for ‘self serving ends’. In evidence to
the UK House of Lords Select Committee on the Assisted
Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill,294 the Swiss Ministry of
Justice explained that ‘self serving ends’ would cover
assisting a death ‘to satisfy his own material or emotional needs. . . . the possibility of eliminating some major
problem for the family, or other motives such as gaining
an inheritance, relieving himself of the burden of supporting the individual . . . or eliminating a person he hated’.295
290
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Another feature that distinguishes the situation in
Switzerland from other jurisdictions which have moved
to somewhat permissive regimes with respect to assisted
suicide – European and non-European – is that, beyond
prescribing the lethal substance, there is no requirement
that doctors are involved in the suicide. Indeed, as the
UK House of Lords Select Committee noted, ‘the vast
majority of assisted suicides which take place in Switzerland are not directly supervised by doctors.’296 The arguments offered by clinicians, therefore, and especially
those in palliative care297 that focus on the allegedly detrimental effect that decriminalization of assisted suicide
would have on the doctor/patient relationship, clearly
do not apply in Switzerland (nor need they apply in any
other jurisdiction that decides to decriminalize assisted
suicide). Equally, ‘[b]ecause the Swiss Penal Code does
not link assisted suicide specifically with terminal illness
or suffering as the result of ill-health, it does not specify
any medical conditions under which assistance with
suicide may be given.’298
Although there is no requirement that doctors be
directly involved in assisting a suicide, which is often
undertaken by one of the four voluntary organisations
that exist in Switzerland, doctors are on occasion asked
by their patients to assist in their death. The Swiss
Academy of Medical Sciences has, therefore, issued
guidelines which declare that physician-assisted suicide is
‘not part of a doctor’s task’ yet ‘consideration of the
patient’s wishes is fundamental for the doctor-patient
relationship.’ It concludes that ‘this dilemma requires a
personal decision of conscience on the part of the doctor.
The decision to provide assistance in suicide must be
respected as such.’299
The Swiss position is summed up by Guillod and
Schmidt who confirm that ‘assisted suicide is a crime only
when four elements can be shown: a suicide was committed or attempted; a third party encouraged or helped in
the suicide; the third party acted on selfish grounds; the
third party acted deliberately (intent)’.300 The first two of
these criteria are referred to as ‘objective’ and the latter
two as ‘subjective’. All suicides, including those that are
assisted, must be reported and will be ‘investigated on the
spot by the authorities in conjunction with a forensic
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Table 1

Which type of assisted dying is regulated?
Who is allowed to aid?
Provision for euthanasia through advance
directives?
Limits on health condition
Consultation required?

NL

B

L

CH

Oregon

VE, AS
Physician
yes

VE, [AS]
Physician
yes

VE, AS
Physician
yes

AS
Lay person
no

AS
Physician
no

AS
Physician
no

yes
yes

yes
yes

yes
yes

no
no

yes
yes

yes
yes

medical officer.’301 Research into one of the voluntary
organizations that exist in Switzerland (EXIT Deutsche
Schweiz), while concluding that the numbers of assisted
suicides was increasing year on year, also found that the
indications for assisted suicide had not been relaxed over
the years and that reporting rates appeared to be 100%.302
Nonetheless, although it is lawful to assist in a suicide
within the framework described, it is also important to
note that there is no right to assisted suicide in Switzerland. As Guillod and Schmidt comment:
Article 115 of the Penal code is a criminal provision
and, therefore, cannot create a right to assisted suicide.
It merely recognizes the liberty to request assisted
suicide and leaves it to each third party (whether a
health-care professional or not) to accept such a
request.303
This apparently benign picture of Swiss law, however,
disguises the debate that has continued in that country
for some years. Two particular aspects of the debate are
worthy of brief consideration here. First, is the question
of eligibility for an assisted death. As the above has
shown, Swiss law does not require that the individual be
terminally ill to be eligible for assisted suicide, although a
recent agreement between EXIT and the Zurich chief
prosecutor – the first such agreement – will ‘regulate the
particulars of assisted suicide, including the use of deadly
sodium pentobarbital,’304 and it is reported that Swiss
authorities want to limit the availability of assisted
suicide to those who are terminally ill.305 Moreover, there
is apparently concern about the number of foreigners
301
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Washington

travelling to Switzerland to take advantage of the law.306
While it is anticipated that there may be legislative reform
in Switzerland, limitations on citizenship or residency do
not as yet apply. It is arguably paradoxical that, while
Swiss law seems to work well, there is so much current
activity concerning possible legal reform. It appears that
at least part of the current debate is driven by the accessibility of assisted suicide to those who live outside Switzerland in countries that prohibit the activity. However,
should the anticipated legal reform become a reality, it
is plausible that it will not simply focus on so-called
‘assisted suicide tourism’, but may also involve a reconsideration of the eligibility criteria.

3. ELEMENTS OF REGULATED
PERMISSIVE REGIMES
Clearly, the mechanisms discussed above differ not only
in legal position and latitude but also in the requirements
put on physicians and patients. These differences with
respect to the elements of regulated permissive regimes,
are summarized in Table 1.
What becomes immediately apparent when looking at
this table is that, in almost all jurisdictions (with the
exception of Switzerland), assisted dying is accepted only
if performed by a physician. This convergence may originate from the fact that in all these jurisdictions limits are
put on the health condition of the patient who wants to
be assisted in dying. These limits vary from terminal
illness to suffering without prospect of being relieved, but
since physicians are capable of evaluating such conditions, at least to a certain extent, it would seem obvious
that they are the ones best situated to provide assistance.
An additional reason for the convergence may be that in
all these jurisdictions there are mechanisms in place that
only allow the prescription of drugs by physicians. It may
also be the case that the societies involved perceive
putting aid in dying in the hands of physicians as an
additional safeguard against abuse. Whatever is true of
these hypotheses, the example of Switzerland highlights
306
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that there is no inevitable logic that has led to the current
mechanisms. Assistance in dying could also be regulated
with the limited involvement of physicians and without
putting limits on the health condition of the person
requesting the aid.
An additional and very important common feature of
regimes in countries that have decriminalized assisted
dying is an oversight structure. These structures have
different formats and obligations, but a common goal is
that, through their implementation, the state and the
public should be able to have insight into, and control
over, the practice of assisted dying.
A striking similarity between the Dutch, Belgian, and
Luxemburg Acts is that reporting of the case to a review
committee is an explicit legal condition. The physician
who does not respect this obligation commits a criminal
offence. In all three countries, review committees are
created as separate, independent bodies. Their tasks are
not only to keep an inventory of cases but also to evaluate
the cases reported to them and to judge whether the
requirements for due care were met. The composition of
these bodies is therefore multidisciplinary in all countries
and, in Belgium they include representatives of, for
instance, different religious perspectives.
The role of the bodies tasked with oversight in Oregon
and Washington State are slightly different, as they are
not charged with judging individual cases. Their task is to
collect data and report on the practice. It is not surprising
that the position and the composition of these bodies in
these states differ from their equivalents in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. In Oregon and Washington State the oversight bodies are part of state
administration. As required by Oregon law, data on
activity under the Act has been kept since 1998 and is
reported publicly on an annual basis.307 As in Oregon,
data must be collected in Washington State and publicly
reported on an annual basis.308

4. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
a. Data on Voluntary Euthanasia and
Assisted Suicide
For the purposes of this Report, it is interesting to see
what legal mechanisms have been used with respect to
assisted dying in different jurisdictions. It is also helpful
to know what has happened in countries when such
mechanisms have been introduced. Given the lack of
publicly accessible information for some of the countries
or states discussed in this document, only data from the
Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Oregon, and Wash307
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ington can be presented, starting with the Netherlands as
it is the country most extensively studied to date and most
referred to in debates about voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide.

i. Netherlands
In the Netherlands, systematic empirical research did not
start as an oversight mechanism after the introduction of
a permissive regime. Rather, this research helped to pave
the way for the changes in the reporting procedure which
eventually led to the Dutch Act. As such, they are a
unique feature of the process of decriminalizing voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands. Large scale, nationwide studies were undertaken in 1990, 1995, 2001, 2005.309
A new round began in the fall of 2010.
This process started in 1990 when the government
decided that legislation on voluntary euthanasia should
be deferred until the findings of a commission appointed
to conduct research on the frequency and characteristics
of voluntary euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, and
other medical end-of-life decisions in the Netherlands
was available.310 The method of these studies will be
described here in somewhat more detail as it has been
used elsewhere.
The frequency and characteristics of end-of-life decisions were studied using death certificate studies in 1990,
1995, 2001, and 2005.311 Stratified samples of cases
were drawn from the central death registry of Statistics
Netherlands, to which all deaths in the Netherlands are
reported. Deaths were assigned to strata, according to the
likelihood that the death was preceded by an end-of-life
decision. Higher sampling proportions were drawn from
strata where the likelihood of an end-of-life decision was
higher. All physicians attending deaths for which the
cause of death did not preclude an end-of-life decision
(such as a car accident resulting in instant death) received
a written questionnaire. The anonymity of physicians and
patients was guaranteed. This approach resulted in high
response rates: 76% in 1990, 77% in 1995, 74% in 2001,
and 78% in 2005.312
In 1990, 1.7% of all deaths were preceded by voluntary
euthanasia, as compared to 2.4% in 1995, 2.6% in 2001
(see Table 2). This trend reversed in 2005, when again
1.7% of all deaths were the result of voluntary euthanasia
309
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Table 2

Annual number of deaths
Voluntary euthanasia
Assisted suicide
LAWER*
Total

1990

1995

2001

2005

128,824
%
1.7
0.2
0.8
2.7

135,675
%
2.4
0.2
0.7
3.3

140,377
%
2.6
0.2
0.7
3.5

136,402
%
1.7
0.1
0.4
2.2

* Life-terminating Acts Without Explicit Request of the Patient (LAWER).

(approximately 2325 cases). Physician-assisted suicide
occurred with much lower frequency than voluntary
euthanasia in each year; for example, in 2005 it accounted
for only 0.1% of all deaths (approximately 100 cases
annually). An important factor in explaining the decline
in the frequency of voluntary euthanasia and physicianassisted suicide in the period 2000–2005 may be an
increased use of other options to relieve the patient’s
suffering, such as terminal sedation, which increased
from 5.6% of all deaths in 2001 to 8.2% in 2005. The table
below further shows that the frequency of the ending
of life without an explicit patient request (LAWER)
decreased from 0.8% of all deaths in 1990 to 0.4% in 2005
(approximately 550 cases). Further analysis of these cases
shows that they typically involve patients who are very
close to death and are presently incompetent but where
there has been an earlier discussion about the hastening
of death with them and/or their relatives, and where
opioids were used to end life.313 The most recent study
also showed that about one third of these cases can also
be described as terminal sedation: cases in which high
dosages of sedatives were given without hydrating the
patient.314
The studies show in great detail the kind of doctors and
patients involved in the decisions described. In interviews, 57% of doctors said that they had performed
voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide. A further 32%
reportedly could conceive of situations in which they
would be prepared to do so.315 General practitioners are
involved in 87% of voluntary euthanasia cases and nearly
all cases of assisted suicide. About 9% of voluntary euthanasia cases are performed in hospital.316 With respect to
the patients involved, the studies showed that in two
313
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thirds of cases of voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide,
the patients were in the terminal stages of different illnesses, most often cancer (84%).317 The estimated shortening of life was less than one week in 46% of cases; only
8% of patients had a life-expectancy of more than one
month.318 The number of voluntary euthanasia requests
decreased from 9700 in 2001 to 8400 in 2005.319 Most
requests for euthanasia are not complied with. Given the
evidence contained in table 2, requests were met in 2325
cases by performing voluntary euthanasia and in 100
cases by assisting in suicide. Therefore, only approximately three out of ten requests for assistance in dying
were granted. In about half of the cases where the
patient’s request was not followed by voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide, the patient died before a final
decision whether or not to perform voluntary euthanasia
or provide assistance with suicide had been made. In the
other half, the physician refused to grant the request. The
most frequently mentioned reasons for not granting
the request were: the patient died before the request could
be fulfilled (39%), the request was not well-considered
(18%), suffering was not unbearable (16%), and the
patient withdrew the request (10%).320

ii. Belgium
There has now also been a series of studies in Belgium in
which, by and large, the same method was applied. The
third survey, with data from 2007, showed that the enactment of the Belgian euthanasia law was followed by an
increase in all types of end-of-life decisions, with the
exception of the use of lethal drugs without the patient’s
explicit request.321 Taking the longer view, between 1998
and 2007, the incidence of voluntary euthanasia went
from 1.1% to 1.9% of annual deaths, and of assisted
suicide from 0.12% to 0.07%. The incidence of the
LAWER cases in 2007 was almost identical to voluntary
euthanasia at 1.8%. This constitutes a sharp reduction of
LAWER cases, when compared with the situation in
1998 when ending of life without the patient’s explicit
request occurred reportedly in 3.2% of cases.
317
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iii. Switzerland
In Switzerland, between 1990 and 2000, the organization
EXIT assisted in 748 suicides among Swiss residents
(0.1% of total deaths, 4.8% of total suicides).322 Compared to EXIT (E), Dignitas (D) provided more assistance to non-residents (D: 91%; E: 3%), younger persons
(mean age in years D: 64.5; E: 76.6), and people suffering
from fatal diseases such as multiple sclerosis (MS) and
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), (D: 79%; E: 67%).
The number of women and the proportion of older
people suffering from non-fatal diseases among suicides
assisted by EXIT Deutsche Schweiz has increased since
the 1990s.323

•

Since the law passed in 1997, 525 patients have died
from ingesting mediations prescribed under the Death
with Dignity Act.324

v. Washington State
As in Oregon, data must be collected in Washington State
and publicly reported on an annual basis.325 The official
summary of the data on the 2010 calendar year is as
follows:
In 2010, medication was dispensed to 87 individuals
(defined as 2010 participants):
Prescriptions were written by 68 different physicians
Prescriptions were dispensed by 40 different pharmacists
Of the 87 participants in 2010:

iv. Oregon

72 individuals have died
51 of these people died after ingesting the medication
15 of these people died without having ingested the
medication
For the remaining 6 people who died, ingestion status
is unknown
Status is unknown for the remaining 15 people

As required by law, data on activity under the Oregon
Act have been kept since 1998 and are reported publicly
on an annual basis. The following is taken from the most
recent official summary of the data:
•

•

•

•

As of January 7, 2011, 96 prescriptions for lethal
medications had been written under the provisions of
the DWDA [Death with Dignity Act] during 2010,
compared to 95 during 2009. Of the 96 patients for
whom prescriptions were written during 2010, 59 died
from ingesting the medications. In addition, six
patients with prescriptions written during previous
years ingested the medications and died during 2010
for a total of 65 known 2010 DWDA deaths at the
time of this report. This corresponds to 20.9 DWDA
deaths per 10,000 total deaths.
Of the 65 patients who died under DWDA in 2010,
most (70.8%) were over age 65 years; the median age
was 72 years. As in previous years, most were white
(100%), well-educated (42.2% had at least a baccalaureate degree), and had cancer (78.5%).
Most (96.6%) patients died at home; and most (92.6%)
were enrolled in hospice care at time of death. Most
(96.7%) had some form of health care insurance,
although the number of patients who had private
insurance (60.0%) was lower in 2010 than in previous
years (69.1%), and the number of patients who had
only Medicare or Medicaid insurance was higher than
in previous years (36.7% compared to 29.6%).
As in previous years, the most frequently mentioned
end-of-life concerns were: loss of autonomy (93.8%),
decreasing ability to participate in activities that made
life enjoyable (93.8%), and loss of dignity (78.5%).

Of the 72 participants in 2010 who have died, their
characteristics and underlying illnesses include:
Age range between 52 and 99 years
94% lived west of the Cascades
78% had cancer
10% had neuro-degenerative disease, including
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS)
12% had heart disease or other illnesses
88% had private, Medicare or Medicaid or a combination of health insurance
Of the 72 participants in 2010 who have died, Death
Certificates were received for 61 of these individuals.
Their characteristics include:
95% were white, non-Hispanic
51% were married
62% had at least some college education
Of the 72 participants in 2010 who have died, After Death
Reporting Forms were received for 67 of these individuals. Their end-of-life concerns include:
90% were concerned about loss of autonomy, 64%
about loss of dignity, and 87% about losing the ability
to participate in activities that made life enjoyable
Of the 51 participants in 2010 who ingested the medication and died:
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90% were at home and 84% were enrolled in hospice
care when they ingested the medication.
No complications of ingesting the medication were
reported
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) were not called for
intervention after ingestion of the medication by
any participant.326

b. Slippery Slopes?
Two aspects of the Dutch experience need some further
discussion here, as they are frequently referred to as evidence of a descent down a slippery slope, specifically with
respect to vulnerable groups such as the elderly, the disabled, and incompetent patients.
With respect to euthanasia and incompetent patients
there are two issues to be discussed: LAWER and the
so-called ‘Groningen protocol’. The publication of the
LAWER cases in the Netherlands described above
created a new dimension in the Dutch euthanasia debate.
Since the middle of the 1980s, the debate had focused on
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide with the
explicit request of the patient as the central feature. This
in part had been a deliberate attempt to narrow the discussion because it was felt that consensus was most likely
to be achieved in cases of this sort. The Dutch even
changed their definition of euthanasia to include only
those cases in which there was an explicit request from
the patient. The societal impact of the LAWER cases,
however, was to broaden the discussion. In particular, the
results may have created the impression that the Dutch
started hastening the end of life on request and ended up
accepting non-voluntary ending of life; the so-called slippery slope often referred to by opponents of permissive
legal regimes.327 This, however, is not necessarily true, as
it is simply not possible to know whether LAWER cases
occurred more or less often in the past. What is known is
that the occurrence of such cases decreased in the Netherlands between 1991 and 2005. It is also known that their
prevalence was higher in Belgium which did not tolerate
voluntary euthanasia for many years.328 In 2003, the
results of a European study conducted in Belgium,
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland were published.329 The study design was the same as
that used in previous studies in the Netherlands and
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in Belgium. In countries with a restrictive regime for
assisted suicide and euthanasia, the incidence of nonvoluntary cases was higher than of voluntary ones, as
opposed to countries with permissive regimes. Apparently, therefore, the incidence of non-voluntary cases of
assisted death is independent of the permissibility of
euthanasia and assisted suicide. It may even be the case
that an open and liberal policy leads to a reduction in
non-voluntary assisted dying.
As was stated above, after the narrowing of the definition of euthanasia in1985 to active voluntary euthanasia,
societal debate in the Netherlands concentrated on competent patients. In 2005, however, the publication of the
so-called ‘Groningen protocol’ changed this as this protocol provided for the active ending of life of some newborns.330 After a thorough discussion with the Dutch
Paediatric Association, the government responded to this
local protocol by issuing a ruling that led to a prosecutorial guideline and to the creation of a committee of
experts to advise the Prosecutor in individual cases.331
This has been cited as evidence of a slide down a slippery
slope. However, a number of responses can be made to
those who assert a slide. First, the ruling did not change
the criminal law; active ending of life without request
remains a criminal offense. Second, since the establishment of the committee in March 2007, only one case has
been reported.332 According to the committee, this is due
to a number of developments of which the introduction
of prenatal screening in 2006 is the most important one.
By means of this screening, foetuses with severe malformations are detected early in pregnancy and often not
brought to term. The protocol may simply not be used
anymore. Third, the discussion of euthanasia of severely
disabled newborns is not new in the Netherlands and did
not arise with the Groningen protocol. Indeed, it predated the legislation. Therefore, the legislation cannot be
said to have caused any slide down a slope. Finally, it
must be remembered that, contrary to the approach
advocated by the Panel, the Netherlands has traditionally
relied upon two bases for justifying its permissive regime
for assisted suicide and euthanasia – autonomy and
beneficence. It is beneficence that is used as the foundation for the Groningen Protocol. As this is not a basis
relied upon by the Panel, it could not be used to justify
any move to non-voluntary euthanasia in the regime proposed by the Panel.
In sum, there is no evidence from the Netherlands supporting the concern that society’s vulnerable would be at
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increased risk of abuse if a more permissive regime were
implemented in Canada.

5. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter of the Report, the Panel has sought to
describe the law in a number of jurisdictions where the
approach to assisted dying (in one form or another) is
somewhat permissive. It is evident from this survey that
the societies which have acted on this issue are by no
means homogeneous, yet they appear to share similar
approaches to assisted dying. Whether or not it is voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide that is involved (or
indeed both), each jurisdiction (arguably with the exception of Montana, where the legal status quo came about in
a very different way, and Switzerland where the provisions are primarily based only on intent) has premised
permissibility (or lower likelihood of prosecution) on a
number of conditions:
1. the request must be voluntary;
2. the request must be repeated (i.e. consistent over
time);
3. the request must be certified by a physician
4. the request must be wholly or at least in part carried
out by a physician;
5. the person making the request must be legally
competent.
Different, although similar, provisions exist regarding the
reporting of assisted deaths and safeguards are built in to
try to ensure that the above requirements are verified.
The Panel notes that a policy of permitting at least
some assisted dying often leads to ongoing discussions
about reasonable limits on its practice. Assistance in
dying is not only sought in cases of severe refractory
physical suffering; requests may also partly or even predominantly originate from psychosocial or existential
problems and in a number of cases the exact rationale for
the request may not be identifiable. Legalization of
assisted dying therefore inevitably involves further discussion of the boundaries of what is permissible. Should
it, for example, be allowed for types of suffering that do
not originate from physical diseases per se, such as being
tired of life at a very old age? Furthermore, it can be
questioned whether lawful assistance in dying should be
the exclusive domain of physicians, especially when existential suffering is the problem at hand. When society
asks physicians to evaluate existential judgements that
they are not trained to evaluate, the result is not only an
extraordinary emotional burden for physicians, but also
arguably a threat to the credibility of the moral and legal
frameworks that govern physician-assisted dying.
Despite the fears of opponents, it is also clear that the
much-feared slippery slope has not emerged following
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decriminalization, at least not in those jurisdictions for
which evidence is available. Nor is there evidence to
support the claim that permitting doctors to participate
in bringing about the death of a patient has harmed the
doctor/patient relationship. What has emerged is evidence that the law is capable of managing the decriminalization of assisted dying and that state policies on this
issue can reassure citizens of their safety and well-being.

CHAPTER FIVE: PROPOSALS
FOR REFORM
bioe_1939
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1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters have set the stage for this final
chapter. There is a need and there are persuasive ethical
arguments for reforms across the spectrum of end-of-life
law and policy discussed to this point in this Report. As
with the overview of the current legal status, the discussion of the proposed reforms will be organized in terms
of the following categories: withholding and withdrawal
of potentially life-sustaining treatment; potentially
life-shortening symptom relief; terminal sedation;
assisted suicide; and voluntary euthanasia. The Panel
also offers recommendations with respect to palliative
care as this is a critical component in any system designed
to provide end-of-life care.

2. WITHHOLDING AND WITHDRAWAL
OF POTENTIALLY LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT
a. Valid Refusals by Competent Adults
(or Legally Authorized Substitute
Decision-makers)
As noted in Chapter Two, there is some confusion in the
minds of healthcare providers and members of the public
as to the legal rights and responsibilities that arise in the
case of the withholding and withdrawal of potentially
life-sustaining treatment. This confusion may result
in some legally valid refusals of treatment not being
respected and some scarce medical resources being
wasted on unwanted care. In order to avoid these undesirable consequences and as there is no controversy over
what the law should be in this area (nor any reason
for controversy from an ethical perspective), the Panel
recommends that:
•

The federal government should revise the Criminal
Code to make it clear that the withholding and withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining treatment for
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which there has been a legally valid refusal does
not constitute criminal negligence and will not attract
criminal liability. This could be achieved, for example,
by the federal government: adding the following to
s.215 of the Criminal Code ‘215(4)(e) Necessaries
of life do not include medical treatment for which
consent has been withheld or rescinded according to
the relevant provincial or territorial law’; and adding
the following to s.217 of the Criminal Code ‘except
where consent for the act has been withdrawn after
the undertaking was made.’

•

Unless or until the Criminal Code is revised as
described above, prosecution guidelines should be
drafted to make it clear that the withholding or withdrawal of potential life-sustaining treatment consistent with the law as described in Chapter Two, will not
be subject to criminal prosecution.

•

Healthcare professional educational institutions
and regulators should ensure that their trainees and
members understand their legal obligation to respect
refusals of potentially life-sustaining treatment so that
unwanted health services are not provided (i.e. legally
valid refusals of treatment are not respected) out of
misplaced fear of liability.

•

The federal government in collaboration with
provincial/territorial governments should educate the
public regarding the legal status of the withholding
and withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining treatment so that they can better advocate for themselves
and their loved ones.

b. Mature Minors
The issue of the possible limits on respect for the decisions of mature minors outlined in Chapter Two plays
out across all of health care (for all treatment decisions
including, for example, contraception, abortion, drug
and alcohol addiction treatment, and mental health). A
position on the issue can therefore only be adopted following a thorough review of the implications across the
spectrum of potential applications. Since such a review
would fall outside the time limits, mandate, and expertise
of the Panel, the Panel determined that it would be inappropriate for it to make specific recommendations with
respect to how the controversy identified in Chapter Two
should be resolved. Rather, the Panel notes the importance of clarity with respect to the mature minor rule for
end-of-life decision-making and recommends that this
issue be taken up by provincial/territorial Departments of
Health and Community Services (or equivalent governmental departments) as it can best be dealt with in a
proactive way, through their consent and child protection
legislation and through the relevant departments clarify-

ing the consent law for mature minors in their jurisdiction
(in whatever direction is deemed appropriate following a
public consultation and legal and ethical analysis). The
law on mature minors, as drafted in the various jurisdictions, should then apply to all aspects of end-of-life
decision-making.

c. Unilateral Withholding and Withdrawal
As noted in Chapter Two, there is a great deal of confusion and controversy over what the law should be
with respect to unilateral withholding and withdrawal
of potentially life-sustaining treatment. The current
approach of leaving the resolution of the confusion and
controversy to the courts does not serve anyone well.
Family members of dying patients and healthcare providers find themselves locked in conflict; one side often
feeling that they are fighting for their loved one’s wishes
and interests and the other side often feeling that they are
fighting for the patient’s interests and their own professional integrity. Litigation often seems the only route for
conflict resolution and yet it is deeply corrosive of important relationships and distracts the participants from
spending time with and caring for the patient. Furthermore, given the physical condition of most patients
involved in such cases and given the time required for a
case to work its way through the court system (especially
for a matter of unsettled law), the results of litigation are
often deeply unsatisfying for all involved.
As with the issue of mature minors, however, the issue
of unilateral withholding and withdrawal plays out
across many areas of health care and is not restricted
to potentially life-sustaining treatment. There are many
kinds of treatment that a patient or her substitute
decision-maker might seek that a healthcare provider
might wish, or feel compelled, to deny (because he
believes that there are insufficient healthcare resources to
meet the demand, it is not in the patient’s best interests,
or it does not meet the standard of care for medical
practice).
A position on the unilateral issue can therefore only be
adopted following a thorough review of the implications
across the spectrum of potential applications. Again,
since such a review would fall outside the time limits,
mandate, and expertise of the Panel, the Panel determined that it would be inappropriate for it to make
specific recommendations with respect to how the controversy identified in Chapter Two should be resolved.
However, the Panel concluded that action is necessary
to prevent a continuation of the cycle of damaging and
inconclusive litigation.
In order to eliminate confusion and reduce the conflict
and controversy surrounding unilateral withholding and
withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining treatment, the
Panel recommends the following:
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1)

Provincial/territorial governments should ensure
that their consent legislation and healthcare professional regulators should ensure that their policies
make it clear when, if ever, healthcare professionals
have the legal authority to unilaterally withhold or
withdraw potentially life-sustaining treatment.333

2)

Health care professional educational institutions
and regulators should ensure that their trainees and
members understand their legal obligations with
respect to unilateral withholding or withdrawal of
potentially life-sustaining treatment.

3)

The provincial/territorial governments should
educate the public regarding the legal status of unilateral withholding and withdrawal of potentially
life-sustaining treatment so that they can better
advocate for themselves and their loved ones and
better communicate with health care providers.

of-life issues remain topics avoided in routine clinical care
despite an abundance of literature indicating that it is a
topic many patients and families want to discuss. This is
a matter of concern partly because it reflects a failure to
engage in autonomy-enhancing care but also because it
may result in some individuals receiving care that they do
not want and some scarce medical resources being wasted
on unwanted care. The Panel therefore recommends the
following:
1)

More research should be funded and conducted into
how best to facilitate the completion of valid and
useful advance directives and to engage in advance
care planning.

2)

Better education of healthcare providers and the
public should be provided. If the public understands
how to complete advance directives and the benefits
of doing so, the completion rates and the validity
and utility of the completed advance directives may
increase with corresponding benefits for both the
individuals and the health care system. If health
care providers develop knowledge and skills with
respect to communicating about end-of-life care and
advance care planning, individuals’ wishes may be
more accessible to guide care.

3)

More resources should be directed to encouraging
and facilitating discussions of advance directives
and advance care planning. For example, such discussions could be billable to provincial health care
plans and individuals particularly skilled in such conversations should be available to patients in healthcare institutions.

4)

More effective administrative mechanisms should be
developed to ensure that the results of discussions of
advance directives and advance care planning are
made evident in a variety of contexts of care. For
example, it should be (but often is not) possible for
an advance directive and advance care plan to follow
an individual seamlessly from an acute care setting to
a long-term care facility and back again.

3. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
The main problems with respect to advance directives
and end-of-life care have less to do with the content of the
law than with its implementation. As noted in Chapter
Two, very few Canadians have completed advance directives and very little advance care planning is done. There
is clear evidence of communication failures between
patients, family members and healthcare providers. End333

For example, provincial consent legislation could include the following statement and definitions (a modified version of the provisions in the
Ontario Health Care Consent Act, 1996 S.O. 1996, c.2, Sch.A., ss.2 and
10):
“A health practitioner who proposes a treatment for a person shall
not proceed with the treatment, and shall take reasonable steps to
ensure that it is not administered, unless,
(a) he or she is of the opinion that the person is capable with respect
to the treatment, and the person has given consent; or
(b) he or she is of the opinion that the person is incapable with respect
to the treatment, and the person’s substitute decision-maker has given
consent on the person’s behalf in accordance with this Act.
“Treatment” means anything that is done for a therapeutic, preventive, palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic, or other health-related purpose.
“Treatment plan” means a plan that: (a) is developed by one or more
health practitioners; (b) deals with one or more of the health problems that a person has and may, in addition, deal with one or more of
the health problems that the person is likely to have in the future
given the person’s current health condition; and (c) provides for the
administration to the person of various treatments or courses of
treatment and may, in addition, provide for the withholding or withdrawal of treatment in light of the person’s current health condition.
A sample policy statement for a health care regulator is The Manitoba
College of Physicians and Surgeons Position Statement on Withholding
and Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment. An alternate policy
statement for a health care regulator is found in Downie J and McEwen
K. The Manitoba College of Physicians and Surgeons Position Statement on Withholding and Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment
(2008): Three Problems and a Solution. Health Law Journal.
2010;17:115–138.
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4. PALLIATIVE CARE
As described in Chapter One, the evidence is clear that
most Canadians still die in institutions and also that the
majority of Canadians lack access to quality end-of-life
care. Many remediable gaps in care exist and much can be
done to improve this situation. Indeed, a comprehensive
set of recommendations with regard to the provision of
palliative care services was recently articulated in a report
authored by Senator Sharon Carstairs. The Panel found
these recommendations to be consistent with the findings
of its review of the literature on end-of-life care in
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Canada, as presented in Chapter Two, as well as the
philosophical foundations for reform presented in
Chapter Three. The Panel therefore endorses the recommendations contained within Raising the Bar: A
Roadmap for the Future of Palliative Care in Canada.334
To these recommendations, the Panel adds the following:
1)

Governments, health care institutions, and health
care providers should work together to ensure that
resources that could be better used for wanted palliative care are not diverted to unwanted acute care.

2)

Palliative care specialists should continue to expand
their scope beyond cancer and specialists in areas
other than cancer care should continue to expand
their understanding and use of palliative care.

Although the Panel strongly endorses all efforts to
improve the quality of and access to palliative care in
Canada it is of the opinion that this does not constitute a
reason for not taking a more permissive approach to
assisted suicide and euthanasia. There are two reasons
for this. Data from the Netherlands, Belgium, and Oregon
show that the need for assisted death is only partly dependent on the quality and availability of palliative care.
Patients ask for assisted suicide or euthanasia not only
because they are in pain but also because they evaluate
their own situation as undignified.335 Patients ask for
assisted suicide for reasons relating to autonomy and their
own perceived quality of life.336 Palliative care would be
able to respond to such concerns in some but certainly not
in all cases. And even if it is the case that better palliative
care would take away some of the need for assisted dying,
it does not follow that a society should wait to have a
policy on assisted dying until palliative care is optimized.
It would constitute a reason for working on these
improvements, but not a valid reason for telling people
who are suffering right here and now to wait until these
improvements have been realized.337

5. POTENTIALLY LIFE-SHORTENING
SYMPTOM RELIEF

concerned that some patients are not receiving adequate
symptom relief due to a misguided fear of liability. The
Panel therefore recommends:
1)

Healthcare providers, regulators, and prosecutors
should collaborate on the development of guidelines
with respect to what they consider to constitute the
Criminal Code standards of ‘reasonable knowledge,
skill and care’ and ‘wanton or reckless disregard’ in
the context of the provision of potentially lifeshortening symptom relief (each would promulgate
their own – i.e. clinical practice guidelines for physicians and nurses and prosecutorial charging guidelines for prosecutors, but they would each benefit
from collaboration with the other in the development
phase).

2)

Healthcare providers, institutions, and regulators
and prosecution services should collaborate on the
development and delivery of programs to educate the
public and health care providers, regarding the fact
that healthcare providers must provide symptom
relief that accords with the guidelines and that they
are protected from liability if they do.

6. TERMINAL SEDATION
In order to ensure that patients receive needed and
wanted terminal sedation and that patients who seek
terminal sedation in the absence of a need for it to relieve
physical suffering receive all of the protections afforded
in cases of voluntary euthanasia under the new proposed
regime (see below), the Panel recommends the following:
1)

The federal government should revise the Criminal
Code to make it clear that terminal sedation in
circumstances where it is not required to alleviate
physical suffering should be considered euthanasia
and be subject to the same procedural conditions
and requirements as other forms of euthanasia (see
below).

2)

Healthcare providers, regulators, and prosecutors
should collaborate on the development of guidelines
with respect to what they consider to constitute the
Criminal Code standards of ‘reasonable knowledge,
skill and care’ and ‘wanton or reckless disregard’ in
the context of the provision of terminal sedation (each
would promulgate their own clinical practice guidelines for physicians and nurses and prosecutorial
charging guidelines for prosecutors, but they would
each benefit from collaboration with the other).

3)

The federal government in collaboration with the
provincial/territorial governments should develop
and deliver programs to educate the public and

Given the uncertainty that exists about the legal status of
potentially life-shortening symptom relief, the Panel is
Available
at
<http://sen.parl.gc.ca/scarstairs/PalliativeCare/
PalliativeCare_e.asp>. [Accessed 26 July 2011].
335
Onwuteaka-Philipsen BD et al. Evaluatie wet toetsing levensbeëindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding. Den Haag: ZONMW; 2007.
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Ganzini L, Goy ER, Dobscha SK. Oregonians’ reasons for requesting physician aid in dying. Archives of Internal Medicine. 2009 Mar
9;169(5):489–92. Erratum in: Arch Intern Med. 2009 March
23;169(6):571.
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See also Delden JJM van, Battin MP. Euthanasia: not just for rich
countries. In: Green R, Donovan A (eds). Global bioethics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press: 243–261.
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healthcare providers, regarding the fact that healthcare providers must provide terminal sedation that
accords with the guidelines and that they are protected from liability if they do.

7. ASSISTED SUICIDE AND
VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA
For the reasons articulated in Chapter Three, the Panel
was persuaded that the law in Canada as described in
Chapter Two should be changed to allow some form of
assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. Putting the
philosophical analysis together with the lessons learned
from Chapter Four’s review of the paths taken in
other jurisdictions that have moved to more permissive
regimes, the Panel considered the options for the design
of a permissive regime and suggests the following legal
mechanisms for achieving the reform and the core elements of the proposed reform. The Panel begins by discussing the different options in rank order of preference
(in other words, the Panel recommends reform of the
Criminal Code and, only if that is not taken up, development of prosecutorial charging guidelines and, only if
that is not taken up, development of diversion programs).

a. Legal Mechanisms
i. Criminal Code Reform
The Criminal Code falls within the jurisdiction of the
federal government and so only the Parliament of
Canada can proactively reform the Criminal Code.338 To
date, all bills aimed at decriminalizing assisted suicide
and/or voluntary euthanasia have been private members’
bills.339 None have been passed by the House. However,
with a bill drawn up to avoid the weaknesses of the previous attempts in this area340 and if the public presses
Parliament for change, legislative reform might be
possible.
The Panel concludes that revision of the Criminal Code
is the best available mechanism for legal reform for a
number of reasons. First, as it flows from the federal
Parliament, it provides for the greatest consistency of
338

The Supreme Court of Canada can, in effect, change the Criminal
Code as it can strike down or read in content to ensure that the Criminal
Code is consistent with the Charter. This is, however, reactive as a case
must come before the Court before it can take such steps.
339
The legislative history is reviewed in Marlisa Tiedemann and Dominique Valiquet in a Library of Parliament Report “Euthanasia and
Assisted Suicide in Canada” 91–9E (revised 17 July 2008). Available
online at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/
919-e.htm#parliamentary. [Accessed 26 July 2011].
340
An example of such a bill can be found in Downie J and Bern S.
“Rodriguez Redux”. Health Law Journal. 2008;16:27–54.

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

69

approach across all of the provinces and territories. There
is merit in treating an issue of such extraordinary social
significance grounded in constitutional values as consistently across the country as possible. Second, again, as it
flows from the federal Parliament, it allows for the creation of a national oversight body that could ensure an
accurate and comprehensive picture of what is happening
in the area of assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia
across the country. This would be efficient, protective,
and reassuring as well as in line with best international
practice. Third, it avoids leaving the burden of changing
the law on the backs of individuals who wish to access
assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia. Without leadership from Parliament, it is left to individuals to challenge
the constitutionality of the law through the emotionally,
physically, and financially draining court system. Finally,
it provides the greatest level of certainty to Canadians
with respect to their rights and responsibilities. The other
options also recommended by the Panel (see below) have
their strengths, but they involve a measure of discretion
that leaves the consequences of a particular act of assisted
suicide or voluntary euthanasia less certain. This means
that some cases of what the Panel would deem morally
acceptable voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide might
not happen for fear of liability or, if they do happen, it
may be under the unsettling shadow of that fear.
Therefore, for these and for the reasons articulated
in Chapter Three, the Panel recommends that the prohibitions on assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia in
the Criminal Code be modified such that, in carefully
circumscribed and monitored circumstances, they are
legally permissible (see a later section of this chapter
for an explication of the proposed circumscription and
monitoring).

ii. Prosecutorial Charging Guidelines
A second-best path to reform lies in the revision of
prosecution services policy manuals. Guidelines for the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion could spell out the
circumstances in which cases of assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia will not result in charges of assisted
suicide or murder being laid.
The Crown, through prosecutors, has discretion with
respect to the pursuit and withdrawal of charges under
the Criminal Code.341 This is known as ‘the prerogative
of prosecutorial discretion’ or simply ‘prosecutorial discretion.’ Assistance, guidance, and sometimes direction
on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is provided
341

Prosecutorial discretion is discussed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in, for example, R. v Lyons. Supreme Court Reports. 1987;2:309.
R. v Beare. Supreme Court Reports. 1988;2:387. R. v Power. Supreme
Court Reports. 1994;1:601. and Fraser v Public Service Staff Relations
Board. Supreme Court of Canada. 1985;2:455.
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to individual prosecutors through guidelines found in
Crown Policy Manuals under the authority of the federal
or provincial Attorney General.342 Generally, charges
should only be laid where there is a substantial (or what
could be alternately worded as, for example, a realistic
or reasonable) likelihood of conviction and where prosecution is in the public interest.
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion can be manifest
through charging with a lesser offence (for example, manslaughter instead of murder) or withdrawing the charges.
This has obvious significant implications as, for example,
murder carries with it a mandatory minimum life sentence while manslaughter has no mandatory minimum
sentence. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion can
mean the difference between no criminal record, a conviction but no jail time, or a conviction and mandatory
life sentence in jail.
It is within the mandate of provincial/territorial
Attorneys General and prosecution services to establish
policies and processes that, while not decriminalizing
assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia (only the
federal government can do that), shape how the Criminal
Code provisions are administered within their jurisdiction. The Panel recommends that, unless or until the
Criminal Code is reformed as recommended above, those
with authority over prosecutorial policies in all provinces
and territories introduce such policies to provide guidance with respect to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and to make clear the circumstances within which a
prosecution for assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia
would not be in order (these circumstances are spelled out
in a later section of this chapter).343

iii. Diversion Programs
Where programs have been established by the province or
territory, before or even during a prosecution, prosecutors have the discretion to divert a case away from the
traditional court system to alternative pathways (e.g.
community service, restitution, reconciliation, education).344 This discretionary authority has been shaped by
342

While some jurisdictions have created independent public prosecution services (e.g., Nova Scotia under the Public Prosecutions Act, S.N.
1990, c.21, all have retained a policy power for the Attorney General.
343
Examples of guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in
relation to some aspects of end of life law, policy, and practice include:
Criminal Justice Branch, Ministry of Attorney General. Crown Counsel
Policy Manual – Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide. March 15, 2004.
Available at http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/prosecution-service/policy-man/
pdf/EUT1-EuthanasiaAndAssistedSuicide-15Mar2004.pdf; [Accessed
26 July 2011]; The Crown Prosecution Service. Policy for Prosecutors
in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide. February
2010. Available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/
assisted_suicide_policy.html. [Accessed 26 July 2011].
344
For example, see “Alternative Measures – Adult Diversion”
“approved by the Attorney General of Nova Scotia, pursuant to s.717

various statutes, regulations, and policies resulting in a
variety of diversion programs.
Judges also have significant discretion with respect to
diverting individuals charged under the Criminal Code at
the sentencing stage of the process. While the independence of the bench is very strong, it is limited insofar as
judges are bound by the rule of law (e.g. mandatory
minimum sentences, Criminal Code definitions of the elements of a criminal offence). Judicial discretion can be
exercised in relation to determinations of how the law
applies to the specific facts of a case, the interpretation of
laws, and the authority to seek input and recommendations from third parties and to issue all different manner
of sentences which accord with the sentencing principles
in the Criminal Code (e.g. prison terms, community
service, and unconditional discharge). As an alternative
to the traditional adversarial trial process, a judge can
suggest that a defendant take part in an alternative
process and then use information from that process to
inform the sentencing decision (e.g. an unconditional or
conditional discharge instead of jail time).
The Panel was struck by the idea of introducing
a restorative justice option345 as a diversion program
available to judges and prosecutors in cases of assisted
suicide and voluntary euthanasia. As restorative justice
will be an unfamiliar concept and restorative justice programs an unfamiliar phenomenon to most readers, a brief
description is in order here, particularly in relating it to
assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia.346
Restorative justice processes are fundamentally oriented to recognizing, understanding, characterizing,
and responding to harms. Restorative justice focuses on
harms not only to individuals but also to the relationships
between and among the parties involved and, even more
broadly, to social values (as these are, at least in part,
what bind us together). It also focuses on harms caused
not only by individual conduct but also by institutional
practices and social structures.
Restorative justice processes involve a variety of individuals in their attempts to understand and respond
to harms. In contrast to the traditional criminal justice
of the Criminal Code of Canada”. Available at http://www.gov.ns.
ca/pps/publications/ca_manual/ProsecutionPolicies/Restorativejustice.
pdf. [Accessed 26 July 2011].
345
For an example of a restorative justice program (for youth aged
12–17 charged with a particular set of criminal offences), see the description of the restorative justice program in Nova Scotia. Available at
http://gov.ns.ca/just/rj. For more information and resources on restorative justice, see the Nova Scotia Restorative Justice Community University Research Alliance. Available at <http://www.nsrj-cura.ca>
[Accessed 26 July 2011].
346
For a detailed discussion of the use of restorative justice in the
context of assisted suicide and euthanasia, see Llewellyn J and Downie
J. “Restorative Justice, Euthanasia, and Assisted Suicide A New Arena
for Restorative Justice and A New Path for End of Life Law and Policy
in Canada” Alberta Law Review, Special Issue on Restorative Justice,
2011: 48:4.
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processes, restorative processes provide a forum in which
all of those with a stake in the outcome of the situation
(narrowly and broadly understood) can come together to
discuss the issues and consider appropriate responses.
Such processes provide a public space in which to reflect
upon all of the issues and interests raised by the cases.
This makes them particularly adept at determining the
public interest. By bringing into the process those more
broadly engaged and affected by a situation, they facilitate the recognition of the community and public stake in
the issues and their resolution and the significance of
public participation and accountability in and through
these processes. From this, such processes are able to
affirm, challenge and even begin to reform public values
and policies.
When they come together, the stakeholders explore the
individual and social impact on the relationships between
themselves and others. They also work to hold individuals and institutions accountable for the harm they caused
and to facilitate planning amongst the parties aimed at
addressing the resulting and related harm and creating
the conditions to prevent future harms. Restorative
processes are not only attentive to the facts of what happened, but are committed to exploring their contexts and
causes in order to consider a future focused response.
They can consider and respond to the full range of legal,
social and ethical issues raised and the roles and responsibilities of everyone involved.
As a result of their broader orientation and engagements, restorative justice processes are able to arrive at a
richer understanding of what led to the harms (individual
conduct, institutional practices, and a wide variety of
background conditions), the interests and values that are
at stake, and a broader range of responses that are seen as
needed and appropriate. Despite a common misconception to the contrary, restorative justice processes do more
than simply ‘restore’ the pre-harm status quo.
Restorative justice processes thus understood seem
particularly well-suited for service as diversion programs
for cases involving assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia (assuming that the public policy decision, that this
Panel has rejected, is made to continue to treat assisted
suicide and voluntary euthanasia as crimes). There is
good evidence that these processes work particularly well
for conduct characterized as serious crimes and in cases
involving relational harms.347
Relational harms are very much at issue in cases of
assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia not only at the
micro level in terms of the relationships between particular parties (healthcare professional, patient, family
members, etc.), but also at a macro level in terms of the

347
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potential harm to broader social values (respect for
autonomy, life, etc.).
Bringing together a variety of stakeholders could be
particularly fruitful in the context of assisted suicide and
voluntary euthanasia cases. For example, those charged
under the Criminal Code could be brought together with
others directly affected by their actions (other family
members, for example) together with health professionals, ethicists, justice officials, community members, etc. In
this space, unlike in the criminal justice system, the parties
would not be restricted in their focus to only the facts of
the case and the acts of the particular offender charged.
In the case of assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia, it can be particularly useful to be able to take into
account avoidable institutional, systemic, or societal
factors that may have played into or structured the decision to seek assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia (e.g.
where a lack of resources with respect to adequate pain
management contributed to the decision; in such a case
the decision might be understandable and justifiable but
nevertheless warrant attention and reflection from the
system actors to determine whether changes need to or
ought to be made in order to provide different options
about which autonomous decisions can be made).
Restorative processes are able to lift up and respond to
such background contexts and causes.
In light of this understanding of restorative justice processes, the Panel recommends that, unless or until the
Criminal Code is reformed or prosecutorial charging
guidelines are implemented as recommended above, provinces and territories consider implementing a restorative
justice process for assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia cases. Such processes can be turned to by prosecutors in
the exercise of their discretion over which charges to
pursue, if any, and judges, in the exercise of their discretion
in respect to sentencing in cases of assisted death. With
respect to judicial discretion, for all but voluntary euthanasia charged as murder, participation in a restorative
justice program could lead to a full range of sentences
(including discharge). For voluntary euthanasia charged
as murder, participation could affect how high above the
mandatory minimum sentence the judge would go as well
as the length of parole decisions (again above the mandatory minima). The Panel notes that Nova Scotia is particularly well-situated to pilot such a process as it has a
uniquely well-developed restorative justice program for
youth, which is currently, on a pilot basis, being expanded
to include some adults and so has the expertise and infrastructure necessary for such an initiative.

b. Core Elements
Once the legal mechanism(s) for achieving law reform
have been settled upon, designers of any permissive
regime must take and defend positions on a set of core
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elements. The following represents the Panel’s considered
positions on the core elements of a permissive regime.
They flow from the ethical analysis set out in Chapter
Three. Where the reasons for the position taken may not
be immediately obvious from the content of Chapter
Three, the Panel here provides additional commentary.

i. Assisted Suicide and/or Voluntary Euthanasia
Both assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia must be
available. The Panel found no morally significant difference between these two activities and, furthermore, found
that the arguments canvassed in Chapter Three and the
evidence presented in Chapters Two and Four undercut
prohibiting either and support permitting both.

vague and would leave the statute or policy open to a
Charter challenge. There is no precise science to providing a prognosis of a terminal illness in terms of a specific
length of time. Healthcare providers cannot be accurate
enough, and if the statute or policy does not include
a time restriction then the condition ‘terminal illness’
becomes too broad. For example, a person with GuillainBarré syndrome will die from her disease, but lives in the
average three years after diagnosis. Further, if the term
‘terminal illness’ is made a necessary condition in the
statute, then it would be under-inclusive; there are many
individuals whose lives, to them, are no longer worth
living, who have not been diagnosed with a terminal
illness. They may be suffering greatly and permanently,
but are not imminently dying. There is no principled basis
for excluding them from assisted suicide or voluntary
euthanasia.

ii. Features of the Person
The person making the request for assisted suicide or
euthanasia must be competent or, while competent, must
have expressed the wish for voluntary euthanasia through
a valid advance directive. Great care must be taken to
ensure that, at the time of the decision, the person is able
to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of the decision. However, this level of care is not
unique to assisted suicide and euthanasia. Many healthcare decisions (e.g. risky surgery and cessation of treatment) bring with them the possibility or even certainty of
death and many require the ability to understand more
complex information than is required to decide whether
to commit suicide. For the same reason, there is also no
justification for requiring unique skills in competency
assessment of the health care providers in the context of
assisted suicide or euthanasia. Of course, as with any
assessment of competence for the purposes of health care
decision-making, if an individual physician is uncertain
about the competence of the person making a request, she
must take all necessary steps to resolve this uncertainty
(e.g. consulting with a colleague with greater experience
or expertise).
Any age restrictions for access to assisted suicide or
voluntary euthanasia should flow from the mature minor
law in the particular jurisdiction.

iii. Features of the Decision
The decision must be voluntary and informed. Again,
great care must be taken to ensure that these conditions
are met.

iv. Features of the Person’s Condition
The Panel recommends against using ‘terminal illness’ as
a prerequisite for requesting assistance. The term is too

v. Features of the Request for Assistance
Written or otherwise recorded requests are preferable (as
they can be more reliable as evidence that a request was
made and what the request was for), but verbal requests
are sufficient, if properly documented.
The time required to elapse between the initial request
and the granting of the assistance will depend on the time
required to ensure that the person’s request is voluntary
and informed and that the individual is competent
(or was competent at the time of making an advance
directive). Depending on the circumstances, this may take
a short or quite a long time. Once all of the other conditions have been met, there must be a short (for example,
twenty-four hours) pause before the assistance is provided to allow confidence that all of the conditions and
procedural requirements have been met. Beyond that, the
Panel does not recommend any delay requirements.

vi. Features of the Provider
The Panel recommends that healthcare professionals be
permitted to provide assistance with suicide or voluntary
euthanasia. For the reasons expressed in Chapter Three,
the Panel concludes that health care professionals are not
obligated to provide assistance. However, should they
decide not to provide assistance they are obligated to pass
the person requesting assistance on to a professional who
will provide such assistance. An open question is whether
only health care professionals should be permitted to
provide assistance. These two issues are interrelated and
dependent upon the mechanisms available to protect the
patients while minimizing the limits on the autonomy of
healthcare professionals and maximizing respect for the
autonomy of those seeking assistance. The availability
of various potential mechanisms and the balancing that
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must follow rests upon empirical evidence that was not
available to the Panel. The Panel recommends that permission to provide assistance be granted only to those:
who have the knowledge and skills necessary to ensure
that the conditions for access laid out earlier in this
section (e.g. competence, voluntariness, conveyance of
information) have been met; and with whom the oversight system can meaningfully function. Furthermore,
the more restrictive the list of those who are permitted
to provide assistance, the less that group should be
permitted to refuse to provide assistance.
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services will continue to have the authority and responsibility to investigate and prosecute potential violations
of the law.
The Panel recommends that requirements for assessments, declarations of request, statements of reasons for
requests, and document filing be set out in statute and be
designed to minimize the intrusion on the person seeking
assistance, but also be sufficient to make possible effective
oversight so as to ensure that only requests for assistance
that fit within the autonomy-based analysis are respected
and the public trust is maintained.

vii. Oversight and Control
As was shown in Chapter 4, different approaches are
taken with respect to oversight in different jurisdictions.
There is variability in the legal position of these oversight
entities, their constitution, authority, and objectives. The
Dutch, Belgian and Luxemburg systems provide for a
case-by-case evaluation both to keep an inventory and
also to judge whether the requirements established by law
were met in individual cases. The Oregon and Washington State bodies do not judge individual cases but rather
are tasked with collecting information and reporting
at an aggregate level. Interestingly, none of the existing
permissive regimes use prospective rather than retrospective oversight.
The Panel recommends that a national oversight commission be established to monitor and report annually
and publicly on assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia
in Canada.348 The Panel sees two roles for this oversight
body. The first role is maintenance of public trust in the
system. The second is the prevention of mistaken or
intentional violations of the new law. The means of realizing the first objective is the collection of data and the
reporting of the data in aggregated form. The means of
realizing the second is expert assessment of specific cases
with appropriate follow-up, which could be engagement
with specific individual providers or more general education programs for health care providers or the general
public. Obviously, the coroners, police and prosecution
348

An example of draft legislation to describe and establish these oversight functions and a national oversight commission is included in
Downie J. and Bern S. “Rodriguez Redux”. Health Law Journal.
2008;16:27–54.
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